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
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**E S S A Y S**  
**A N D**  
**T R E A T I S E S**  
**O N**  
**SEVERAL SUBJECTS.**

**By DAVID HUME, Esq;**

**V O L. II.**

**Containing ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, and  
LITERARY. PART II.**

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**A NEW EDITION.**

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

MINING

General Land Office

Washington, D. C.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

FROM THE

COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF



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OF THE  
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MORAL, POLITICAL,  
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PART II.\*

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# ESSAY I.

## OF COMMERCE.

**T**HE greatest part of mankind may be divided into two classes; that of *shallow* thinkers, who fall short of the truth; and that of *abstruse* thinkers, who go beyond it. The latter class are by far the most uncommon; and I may add, by far the most useful and valuable. They suggest hints, at least, and start difficulties, which they want, perhaps, skill to pursue; but which may produce very fine discoveries, when handled by men who have a more just way of thinking. At worst, what they say is uncommon; and if it should cost some pains to comprehend it, one has, however, the pleasure of hearing something that is new. An author is little to be valued, who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee-house conversation.

ALL people of *shallow* thought are apt to decry even those of *solid* understanding, as *abstruse* thinkers, and metaphysicians, and refiners; and never will allow

any thing to be just which is beyond their own weak conceptions. There are some cases, I own, where an extraordinary refinement affords a strong presumption of falsehood, and where no reasoning is to be trusted but what is natural and easy. When a man deliberates concerning his conduct in any *particular* affair, and forms schemes in politics, trade, oeconomy, or any business in life, he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of consequences together. Something is sure to happen, that will disconcert his reasoning, and produce an event different from what he expected. But when we reason upon *general* subjects, one may justly affirm, that our speculations can scarce ever be too fine, provided they be just; and that the difference between a common man and a man of genius is chiefly seen in the shallowness or depth of the principles upon which they proceed. General reasonings seem intricate, merely because they are general; nor is it easy for the bulk of mankind to distinguish, in a great number of particulars, that common circumstance in which they all agree, or to extract it, pure and unmixed, from the other superfluous circumstances. Every judgment or conclusion, with them, is particular. They cannot enlarge their view to those universal propositions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole science in a single theorem. Their eye is confounded with such an extensive prospect; and the conclusions  
derived

derived from it, even tho' clearly expressed, seem intricate and obscure. But however intricate they may seem, 'tis certain, that general principles, if just and sound, must always prevail in the general course of things, tho' they may fail in particular cases; and 'tis the chief business of philosophers to regard the general course of things. I may add, that 'tis also the chief business of politicians; especially in the domestic government of the state, where the public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of cases; not, as in foreign politics, on accidents, and chances, and the caprices of a few persons. This therefore makes the difference betwixt *particular* deliberations and *general* reasonings, and renders subtilty and refinement much more suitable to the latter than to the former.

I THOUGHT this introduction necessary before the following discourses on *commerce, money, interest, balance of trade, &c.* where, perhaps, there will occur some principles which are uncommon, and which may seem too refined and subtle for such vulgar subjects. If false, let them be rejected: But no one ought to entertain a prejudice against them, merely because they are out of the common road.

THE greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects, however independent they may be supposed

in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to commerce ; and as private men receive greater security, in the possession of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to the riches and extensive commerce of private men. This maxim is true in general ; tho' I cannot forbear thinking, that it may possibly admit of some exceptions, and that we often establish it with too little reserve and limitation. There may be some circumstances, where the commerce, and riches, and luxury of individuals, instead of adding strength to the public, will serve only to thin its armies, and diminish its authority among the neighbouring nations. Man is a very variable being, and susceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. What may be true while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found false when he has embraced an opposite set of manners and opinions.

THE bulk of every state may be divided into *husbandmen* and *manufacturers*. The former are employed in the culture of the land : The latter work up the materials furnished by the former, into all the commodities which are necessary or ornamental to human life. As soon as men quit their savage state, where they live chiefly by hunting and fishing, they must fall into these two classes ; tho' the arts of agriculture employ *at first* the most numerous part of the society.

ciety \*. Time and experience improve so much these arts, that the land may easily maintain a much greater number of men, than those who are immediately employed in its cultivation, or who furnish the more necessary manufactures to such as are so employed.

If these superfluous hands apply themselves to the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of *luxury*, they add to the happiness of the state; since they afford to many the opportunity of receiving enjoyments, with which they would otherwise have been unacquainted. But may not another scheme be proposed for the employment of these superfluous hands? May not the sovereign lay claim to them, and employ them in fleets and armies, to increase the dominions of the state abroad, and spread its fame over distant nations? 'Tis certain, that the fewer desires and wants are found in the proprietors and labourers of land, the fewer hands do they employ;

\* Mons. MELON in his political essay on commerce asserts, that even at present, if you divide FRANCE into 20 parts, 16 are labourers or peasants; 2 only artificers; one belonging to the law, church, and military; and one merchants, financiers, and bourgeois. This calculation is certainly very erroneous. In FRANCE, ENGLAND, and indeed most parts of EUROPE, half of the inhabitants live in cities; and even of those who live in the country, a very great number are artisans, perhaps above a third.

and consequently the superfluities of the land, instead of maintaining tradesmen and manufacturers, may support fleets and armies to a much greater extent, than where a great many arts are required to minister to the luxury of particular persons. Here therefore seems to be a kind of opposition between the greatness of the state and the happiness of the subjects. A state is never greater than when all its superfluous hands are employed in the service of the public. The ease and convenience of private persons, require, that these hands should be employed in their service. The one can never be satisfied, but at the expence of the other. As the ambition of the sovereign must entrench on the luxury of individuals; so the luxury of individuals must diminish the force, and check the ambition of the sovereign.

NOR is this reasoning merely chimerical; but is founded on history and experience. The republic of SPARTA was certainly more powerful than any state now in the world, consisting of an equal number of people: and this was owing entirely to the want of commerce and luxury. The HELOTES were the labourers: The SPARTANS were the soldiers or gentlemen. 'Tis evident, that the labour of the HELOTES could not have maintained so great a number of SPARTANS, had these latter lived in ease and delicacy, and given employment to a great variety of trades and manufactures.

tures. The like policy may be remarked in ROME. And indeed, thro' all antient history, 'tis observable, that the smallest republics raised and maintained greater armies, than states consisting of triple the number of inhabitants, are able to support at present. 'Tis computed, that, in all EUROPEAN nations, the proportion between soldiers and people does not exceed one to a hundred. But we read, that the city of ROME alone, with its small territory, raised and maintained, in early times, ten legions against the LATINS. ATHENS, whose whole dominions were not larger than YORKSHIRE, sent to the expedition against SICILY near forty thousand men\*. DIONYSIUS the elder, 'tis said, maintained a standing army of a hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse, beside a large fleet of four hundred sail†; tho' his territories extended no farther than the city of SYRACUSE, about a third part of the island of SICILY, and some sea-port towns or garrisons on the coast of ITALY and ILLYRICUM. 'Tis true, the antient armies, in time of war, subsisted much upon plunder: But did not the enemy plunder in their turn? which 'was a more ruinous way of levying a tax, than any other that could be devised. In short, no probable reason

\* THUCYDIDES, lib. 7.

† DION. SIC. lib. 2. This account, I own, is somewhat suspicious, not to say worse; chiefly because this army was not composed of citizens, but of mercenary forces.



can be assigned for the great power of the more antient states above the modern, but their want of commerce and luxury. Few artificers were maintained by the labour of the farmers, and therefore more soldiers might live upon it. TITUS LIVIUS says, that ROME, in his time, would find it difficult to raise as large an army as that which, in her early days, she sent out against the GAULS and LATINS \*. Instead of those soldiers who fought for liberty and empire in CAMILLUS's time, there were in AUGUSTUS's days, musicians, painters, cooks, players, and tailors; and if the land was equally cultivated at both periods, 'tis evident it could maintain equal numbers in the one profession as in the other. They added nothing to the mere necessities of life, in the latter period more than in the former.

'Tis natural on this occasion to ask, whether foreigners may not return to the maxims of antient policy, and consult their own interest, in this respect, more than the happiness of their subjects? I answer, that it appears to me almost impossible; and that because antient policy was violent, and contrary to the more natural and usual course of things. 'Tis well known with what peculiar laws SPARTA was govern-

\* TITI LIVII, lib. 7. cap. 24. "Adeo in quæ laboramus," says he, "sola crevimus, divitiarum luxuriamque."

ed, and what a prodigy that republic is justly esteemed by every one, who has considered human nature, as it has displayed itself on other nations, and other ages. Were the testimony of history less positive and circumstantial, such a government would appear a mere philosophical whim or fiction, and impossible ever to be reduced to practice. And tho' the ROMAN and other antient republics were supported on principles somewhat more natural, yet was there a very extraordinary concurrence of circumstances to make them submit to such grievous burthens. They were free states; they were small ones; and the age being martial, all the neighbouring states were continually in arms. Freedom naturally begets public spirit, especially in small states; and this public spirit, this *amor patriæ*, must increase, when the public is almost in continual alarm, and men are obliged, every moment, to expose themselves to the greatest dangers for its defence. A continual succession of wars makes every citizen a soldier: He takes the field in his turn; and during his service is chiefly maintained by himself. And, notwithstanding that his service is equivalent to a very severe tax, 'tis less felt by a people addicted to arms, who fight for honour and revenge more than pay, and are unacquainted with gain and industry as well as pleasure †. Not to mention the great equality

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† The more antient ROMANS lived in perpetual war with all their neighbours: and in old LATIN, the term, *hostis*, expressed both

lity of fortunes amongst the inhabitants of the antient republics, where every field belonging to a different proprietor, was able to maintain a family, and rendered the numbers of citizens very considerable, even without trade and manufactures.

BUT tho' the want of trade and manufactures, amongst a free and very martial people, may *sometimes* have no other effect than to render the public more powerful, 'tis certain, that in the common course of human affairs, it will have a quite contrary tendency. Sovereigns must take mankind as they find them, and

both a stranger and an enemy. This is remarked by CICERO, but by him is ascribed to the humanity of his ancestors, who softened, as much as possible, the denomination of an enemy, by calling him by the same appellation which signified a stranger. *De Off.* lib. 2. 'Tis however much more probable, from the manners of the times, that the ferocity of those people was so great as to make them regard all strangers as enemies, and call them by the same name. It is not, besides, consistent with the most common maxims of policy or of nature, that any state should regard its public enemies with a friendly eye, or preserve any such sentiments for them as the ROMAN orator would ascribe to his ancestors. Not to mention, that the early ROMANS really exercised piracy, as we learn from their first treaties with CARTHAGE, preserved by POLYBIUS, lib. 3. and consequently like the SALLER and ALGERINE rovers, were actually at war with most nations, and a stranger and an enemy were with them almost synonymous.

cannot

cannot pretend to introduce any violent change in their principles and ways of thinking. A long course of time, with a variety of accidents and circumstances, are requisite to produce those great revolutions, which so much diversify the face of human affairs. And the less natural any set of principles are, which support a particular society, the more difficult will a legislator meet with in raising and cultivating them. 'Tis his best policy to comply with the common bent of mankind, and give it all the improvements of which it is susceptible. Now, according to the most natural course of things, industry, and arts, and trade increase the power of the sovereign as well as the happiness of the subjects; and that policy is violent, which aggrandizes the public by the poverty of individuals. This will easily appear from a few considerations, which will present to us the consequences of sloth and barbarity.

WHERE manufactures and mechanic arts are not cultivated, the bulk of the people must apply themselves to agriculture; and if their skill and industry increase, there must arise a great superfluity from their labour beyond what suffices to maintain them. They have no temptation, therefore, to increase their skill and industry; since they cannot exchange that superfluity for any commodities, which may serve either to their pleasure or vanity. A habit of indolence naturally prevails. The greater part of the land lies uncultivated.

uncultivated. What is cultivated, yields not its utmost, for want of skill or assiduity in the farmers. If at any time the public exigencies require, that great numbers should be employed in the public service, the labour of the people furnishes now no superfluities, by which these numbers can be maintained. The labourers cannot increase their skill and industry on a sudden. Lands uncultivated cannot be brought into tillage for some years. The armies, mean while, must either make sudden and violent conquests, or disband for want of subsistence. A regular attack or defence, therefore, is not to be expected from such a people, and their soldiers must be as ignorant and unskilful as their farmers and manufacturers.

EVERY thing in the world is purchased by labour; and our passions are the only causes of labour. When a nation abounds in manufactures and mechanic arts, the proprietors of land, as well as the farmers, study agriculture as a science, and redouble their industry and attention. The superfluity which arises from their labour, is not lost; but is exchanged with the manufacturers for those commodities which mens luxury now makes them covet. By this means, land furnishes a great deal more of the necessaries of life, than what suffices for those who cultivate it. In times of peace and tranquility, this superfluity goes to the maintenance of manufacturers, and the improvers of liberal arts. But 'tis easy for the public to convert  
many

many of these manufacturers into soldiers, and maintain them by that superfluity, which arises from the labour of the farmers. Accordingly we find, that this is the case in all civilized governments. When the sovereign raises an army, what is the consequence? He imposes a tax. This tax obliges all the people to retrench what is least necessary to their subsistence. Those who labour in such commodities, must either enlist in the troops, or turn themselves to agriculture, and thereby oblige some labourers to enlist for want of business. And to consider the matter abstractly, manufactures increase the power of the state only as they store up so much labour, and that of a kind to which the public may lay claim, without depriving any one of the necessities of life. The more labour, therefore, is employed beyond mere necessities, the more powerful is any state; since the persons engaged in that labour may easily be converted to the public service. In a state without manufactures, there may be the same number of hands; but there is not the same quantity of labour, nor of the same kind. All the labour is there bestowed upon necessities, which can admit of little or no abatement.

Thus the greatness of the sovereign and the happiness of the state are, in a great measure, united with regard to trade and manufactures. 'Tis a violent method, and in most cases impracticable, to oblige the labourer to toil, in order to raise from the land more than what subsists himself and family. Furnish  
him

him with manufactures and commodities, and he will do it of himself. Afterwards you will find it easy to seize some part of his superfluous labour, and employ it in the public service, without giving him his wonted return. Being accustomed to industry, he will think this less grievous, than if, at once, you obliged him to an augmentation of labour without any reward. The case is the same with regard to the other members of the state. The greater is the stock of labour of all kinds, the greater quantity may be taken from the heap, without making any sensible alteration upon it.

A PUBLIC granary of corn, a storehouse of cloth, a magazine of arms; all these must be allowed real riches and strength in any state. Trade and industry are really nothing but a stock of labour, which, in time of peace and tranquility, is employed for the ease and satisfaction of individuals; but in the exigencies of state, may, in part, be turned to public advantage. Could we convert a city into a kind of fortified camp, and infuse into each breast so martial a genius, and such a passion for public good, as to make every one willing to undergo the greatest hardships for the sake of the public; these affections might now, as in antient times, prove alone a sufficient spur to industry, and support the community. It would then be advantageous, as in camps, to banish all arts and luxury; and, by restrictions on equipage and tables, make the provisions and forage last longer than if the army were loaded with a number of superfluous

ous

ous retainers. But as these principles are too disinterested and too difficult to support, 'tis requisite to govern men by other passions, and animate them with a spirit of avarice and industry, art and luxury. The camp is, in this case, loaded with a superfluous retinue; but the provisions flow in proportionably larger. The harmony of the whole is still supported; and the natural bent of the mind being more complied with, individuals, as well as the public, find their account in the observance of those maxims.

THE same method of reasoning will let us see the advantage of *foreign* commerce, in augmenting the power of the state, as well as the riches and happiness of the subjects. It increases the stock of labour in the nation; and the sovereign may convert what share of it he finds necessary to the service of the public. Foreign trade, by its imports, furnishes materials for new manufactures; and by its exports, it produces labour in particular commodities, which could not be consumed at home. In short, a kingdom, that has a large import and export, must abound more with industry, and that employed upon delicacies and luxuries, than a kingdom which rests contented with its native commodities. It is, therefore, more powerful, as well as richer and happier. The individuals reap the benefit of these commodities, so far as they gratify the senses and appetites. And the public is also a gainer, while a greater stock of labour is, by



by this means, stored up against any public exigency ; that is, a greater number of laborious men are maintained, who may be diverted to the public service, without robbing any one of the necessities, or even the chief conveniencies of life.

If we consult history, we shall find, that in most nations foreign trade has preceded any refinement in home manufactures, and given birth to domestic luxury. The temptation is stronger to make use of foreign commodities, which are ready for use, and which are entirely new to us, than to make improvements on any domestic commodity, which always advance by flow degrees, and never affect us by their novelty. The profit is also very great, in exporting what is superfluous at home, and what bears no price, to foreign nations, whose soil or climate is not favourable to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted with the *pleasures* of luxury and the *profits* of commerce ; and their *delicacy* and *industry*, being once awakened, carry them to farther improvements, in every branch of domestic as well as foreign trade. And this perhaps is the chief advantage which arises from a commerce with strangers. It rouses men from their indolence ; and presenting the gayer and more opulent part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they never before dreamed of, raises in them a desire of a more splendid way of life than what their ancestors enjoyed. And at the same time, the few  
merchants,

merchants, who possess the secret of this importation and exportation, make exorbitant profits; and becoming rivals in wealth to the antient nobility, tempt other adventurers to become their rivals in commerce. Imitation soon diffuses all those arts; while domestic manufacturers emulate the foreign in their improvements, and work up every home commodity to the utmost perfection of which it is susceptible. Their own steel and iron, in such laborious hands, become equal to the gold and rubies of the *INDIES*.

WHEN the affairs of the society are once brought to this situation, a nation may lose most of its foreign trade, and yet continue a great and powerful people. If strangers will not take any particular commodity of ours, we must cease to labour in it. The same hands will turn themselves towards some refinement in other commodities, which may be wanted at home. And there must always be materials for them to work upon; till every person in the state, who possesses riches, enjoys as great plenty of home commodities, and those in as great perfection, as he desires; which can never possibly happen. *CHINA* is represented as one of the most flourishing empires in the world; tho' it has very little commerce beyond its own territories.

It will not, I hope, be considered as a superfluous digression, if I here observe, that as the multitude of mechanical arts is advantageous, so is the great number

ber of persons to whose share the productions of these arts fall. A too great disproportion among the citizens weakens any state. Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his labour, in a full possession of all the necessaries, and many of the convenience of life. No one can doubt, but such an equality is most suitable to human nature, and diminishes much less from the *happiness* of the rich than it adds to that of the poor. It also augments the *power of the state*, and makes any extraordinary taxes or impositions be paid with much more chearfulness. Where the riches are engrossed by a few, these must contribute very largely to the supplying the public necessities. But when the riches are dispersed among multitudes, the burthen feels light on every shoulder, and the taxes make not a very sensible difference on any one's way of living.

ADD to this, that where the riches are in few hands, these must enjoy all the power, and will readily conspire to lay the whole burthen on the poor, and oppress them still farther, to the discouragement of all industry.

IN this circumstance consists the great advantage of ENGLAND above any nation at present in the world, or that appears in the records of any story. 'Tis true, the ENGLISH feel some disadvantages in foreign trade by the high price of labour, which is in part the effect

fect of the riches of their artificers, as well as of the plenty of money : But as foreign trade is not the most material circumstance, 'tis not to be put in competition with the happiness of so many millions. And if there were no more to endear to them that free government under which they live, this alone were sufficient. The poverty of the common people is a natural, if not an infallible effect of absolute monarchy; tho' I doubt, whether it be always true, on the other hand, that their riches are an infallible result of liberty. Liberty must be attended with particular accidents, and a certain turn of thinking, in order to produce that effect. Lord BACON, accounting for the great advantages obtained by the ENGLISH in their wars with FRANCE, ascribes them chiefly to the superior ease and plenty of the common people amongst the former; yet the governments of the two kingdoms were, at that time, pretty much alike. Where the labourers and artificers are accustomed to work for low wages, and to retain but a small part of the fruits of their labour, 'tis difficult for them, even in a free government, to better their condition, or conspire among themselves to heighten their wages. But even where they are accustomed to a more plentiful way of life, 'tis easy for the rich, in a despotic government, to conspire against *them*, and throw the whole burthen of the taxes on their shoulders.

IT may seem an odd position, that the poverty of the common people in FRANCE, ITALY, and SPAIN, is, in some measure, owing to the superior riches of the soil and happiness of the climate; and yet there want not many reasons to justify this paradox. In such a fine mold or soil as that of those more southern regions, agriculture is an easy art; and one man, with a couple of sorry horses, will be able, in a season, to cultivate as much land as will pay a pretty considerable rent to the proprietor. All the art, which the farmer knows, is to leave his ground fallow for a year, so soon as it is exhausted; and the warmth of the sun alone and temperature of the climate enrich it, and restore its fertility. Such poor peasants, therefore, require only a simple maintenance for their labour. They have no stock nor riches, which claim more; and at the same time, they are for ever dependant on their landlord, who gives no leases, nor fears that his land will be spoiled by the ill methods of cultivation. In ENGLAND, the land is rich, but coarse; must be cultivated at a great expence; and produces slender crops, when not carefully managed, and by a method which gives not the full profit but in a course of several years. A farmer, therefore, in ENGLAND must have a considerable stock and a long lease; which beget proportional profits. The fine vineyards of CHAMPAGNE and BURGUNDY, that oft yield to the landlord above five pounds *per acre*, are cultivated by  
peasants,

peasants; who have scarce bread: And the reason is, that such peasants need no stock but their own limbs, with instruments of husbandry, which they can buy for twenty shillings. The farmers are commonly in some better circumstances in those countries. But the graziers are most at their ease of all those who cultivate the land. The reason is still the same. Men must have profits proportionable to their expence and hazard. Where so considerable a number of the labouring poor as the peasants and farmers are in very low circumstances, all the rest must partake of their poverty, whether the government of that nation be monarchical or republican.

WE may form a similar remark with regard to the general history of mankind. What is the reason, why no people living between the tropics could ever yet attain to any art or civility, or reach even any police in their government, and any military discipline; while few nations in the temperate climates have been altogether deprived of these advantages? 'Tis probable, that one cause of this phænomenon is the warmth and equality of weather in the torrid zone, which render cloaths and houses less requisite for the inhabitants, and thereby remove, in part, that necessity, which is the great spur to industry and invention. *Curis acens mortalia corda:* Not to mention,

tion, that the fewer goods or possessions of this kind any people enjoy, the fewer quarrels are likely to arise amongst them, and the less necessity will there be for a settled police or regular authority to protect and defend them from foreign enemies, or from each other.

E S S A Y

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# ESSAY II.

## Of REFINEMENT in the ARTS.

**L**UXURY is a word of a very uncertain signification, and may be taken in a good as well as a bad sense. In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the senses; and any degree of it may be innocent or blameable, according to the age, or country, or condition of the person. The bounds between the virtue and the vice cannot here be fixed exactly, more than in other moral subjects. To imagine, that the gratifying any of the senses, or the indulging any delicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel, is of itself a vice, can never enter into a head, that is not disordered by the frenzies of enthusiasm. I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, because the windows of his cell opened upon a very noble prospect, made a *covenant with his eyes* never to turn that way, or receive so sensual a gratification. And such is the crime of drinking CHAMPAGNE or BURGUNDY, preferably to small beer or porter. These indulgences are only vices, when they are pursued at



the expence of some virtue, as liberality or charity ; in like manner as they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himself to want and beggary. Where they entrench upon no virtue, but leave ample subject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generosity or compassion, they are intirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged such by almost all moralists. To be intirely occupied with the luxury of the table, for instance, without any relish for the pleasures of ambition, study, or conversation, is a mark of gross stupidity, and is incompatible with any vigour of temper or genius. To confine one's expence intirely to such a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart intirely devoid of humanity or benevolence. But if a man reserve time sufficient for all laudable pursuits, and money sufficient for all generous purposes, he is free from every shadow of blame or reproach.

SINCE luxury may be considered either as innocent or blameable, one may be surprized at those preposterous opinions which have been entertained concerning it ; while men of libertine principles bestow praises even on vicious luxury, and represent it as highly advantageous to society ; and on the other hand, men of severe morals blame even the most innocent luxury, and represent it as the source of all the corruptions, disorders, and factions, incident to civil

civil government. We shall here endeavour to correct both these extremes, by proving, *first*, that the ages of refinement are both the happiest and most virtuous; *secondly*, that where-ever luxury ceases to be innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial; and when carried a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, tho' perhaps not the most pernicious, to political society.

To prove the first point, we need but consider the effects of refinement both on *private* and on *public* life. Human happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in three ingredients; action, pleasure, and indolence: And tho' these ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the particular dispositions of the person; yet no one ingredient can be intirely wanting, without destroying, in some measure, the relish of the whole composition. Indolence or repose, indeed, seems not of itself to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like sleep, is requisite as an indulgence to the weakness of human nature, which cannot support an uninterrupted course of business or pleasure. That quick march of the spirits, which takes a man from himself, and chiefly gives satisfaction, does in the end exhaust the mind, and requires some intervals of repose, which, tho' agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy, that destroy all enjoyment. Education, custom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to

any of these pursuits; and it must be owned, that where they promote a relish for action and pleasure, they are so far favourable to human happiness. In times when industry and arts flourish, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, the occupation itself, as well as those pleasures which are the fruits of their labour. The mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly spring up, when nourished with ease and idleness. Banish those arts from society, you deprive men both of action and of pleasure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even destroy the relish of indolence, which never is agreeable, but when it succeeds to labour, and recruits the spirits, exhausted by too much application and fatigue.

ANOTHER advantage of industry and of refinements in the mechanical arts, is, that they commonly produce some refinements in the liberal arts; nor can the one be carried to perfection, without being accompanied, in some degree, with the other. The same age which produces great philosophers and politicians, renowned generals and poets, usually abounds with skilful weavers and ship-carpenters. We cannot reasonably expect, that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation which is ig-

norant of astronomy, or where ethics are neglected. The spirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once roused from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themselves on all sides, and carry improvements into every art and science. Profound ignorance is totally banished, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleasures of the mind as well as those of the body.

THE more these refined arts advance, the more sociable do men become; nor is it possible, that, when enriched with science, and possessed of a fund of conversation, they should be contented to remain in solitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that distant manner, which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to show their wit or their breeding; their taste in conversation or living, in cloaths or furniture. Curiosity allures the wise; vanity the foolish; and pleasure both. Particular clubs and societies are every where formed: Both sexes meet in an easy and sociable manner; and the tempers of men, as well as their behaviour, refine apace. So that, beside the improvements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, 'tis impossible but they must feel an increase of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each other's pleasure and entertainment. Thus

*industry, knowledge, and buranily*, are linked together by an indissoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well as reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and, what are commonly denominated, the more luxurious ages.

NOR are these advantages attended with disadvantages which bear any proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleasure, the less will they indulge in excesses of any kind; because nothing is more destructive to true pleasure than such excesses. One may safely affirm, that the TARTARS are oftener guilty of beastly gluttony, when they feast on their dead horses, than EUROPEAN courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed, be more frequent in polite ages, when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry; drunkenness, on the other hand, is much less common: A vice more odious, and more pernicious both to mind and body. And in this matter I would appeal, not only to an OVID or a PETRONIUS, but to a SENECA or a CATO. We know, that CÆSAR, during CATALINE'S conspiracy, being necessitated to put into CATO'S hands a *billet-doux*, which discovered an intrigue with SERVILIA CATO'S own sister, that stern philosopher threw it back to him with indignation; and, in the bitterness of his wrath, gave him the appellation of drunkard,

as a term more opprobrious than that with which he *could* more justly have reproached him.

BUT industry, knowledge, and humanity, are not advantageous in private life alone : They diffuse their beneficial influence on the *public*, and render the government as great and flourishing as they make individuals happy and prosperous. The increase and consumption of all the commodities which serve to the ornament and pleasure of life, are advantageous to society ; because at the same time that they multiply those innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of *storehouse* of labour, which, in the exigencies of state, may be turned to the public service. In a nation, where there is no demand for such superfluities, men sink into indolence, lose all the enjoyment of life, and are useless to the public, which cannot maintain nor support its fleets and armies, from the industry of such slothful members.

THE bounds of all the EUROPEAN kingdoms are, at present, pretty near the same they were two hundred years ago : But what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of those kingdoms ? Which can be ascribed to nothing but the increase of art and industry. When CHARLES VIII. of FRANCE invaded ITALY, he carried with him about 20,000 men : And yet this armament so exhausted the nation, as we learn from GUICCIARDIN, that for some years it was not

able to make so great an effort. The late king of FRANCE, in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000 men \*; tho', from MAZARINE's death to his own, he was engaged in a course of wars that lasted near thirty years.

THIS industry is much promoted by the knowledge inseparable from the ages of art and refinement; as, on the other hand, this knowledge enables the public to make the best advantage of the industry of its subjects. Laws, order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise,\* and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least, of commerce and manufactures. Can we expect, that a government will be well modelled by a people, who know not how to make a spinning-wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage? Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infested with superstition, which throws the government off its bias, and disturbs men in the pursuit of their interest and happiness.

KNOWLEDGE in the arts of government naturally begets mildness and moderation, by instructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above rigour and severity, which drive subjects into rebellion, and render the return to submission impracticable, by cut-

\* The inscription on the PLACE-DE-VENDOME says 410,000.  
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ting off all hopes of pardon. When the tempers of men are softened as well as their knowledge improved, this humanity appears still more conspicuous, and is the chief characteristic which distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then less inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and interest steel men against compassion as well as fear, the combatants divest themselves of the brute, and resume the man.

NOR need we fear, that men, by losing their ferocity, will lose their martial spirit, or become less undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty. The arts have no such effect in enervating either the mind or body. On the contrary, industry, their inseparable attendant, adds new force to both. And if anger, which is said to be the whetstone of courage, loses somewhat of its asperity, by politeness and refinement; a sense of honour, which is a stronger, more constant, and more governable principle, acquires fresh vigour by that elevation of genius, which arises from knowledge and a good education. Add to this, that courage can neither have any duration, nor be of any use, when not accompanied with discipline and martial skill, which are seldom found among a barbarous people. The antients remarked, that DATAMES was the only barbarian



that ever knew the art of war. And PYRRHUS seeing the ROMANS marshal their army with some art and skill, said with surprize, *These barbarians have nothing barbarous in their discipline!* 'Tis observable, that as the old ROMANS, by applying themselves solely to war, were the only civilized people that ever possessed military discipline; so the modern ITALIANS are the only civilized people, among EUROPEANS, that ever wanted courage and a martial spirit. Those who would ascribe this effeminacy of the ITALIANS to their luxury or politeness, or application to the arts, need but consider the FRENCH and ENGLISH, whose bravery is as uncontestable, as their love for luxury, and their assiduity in commerce. The ITALIAN historians give us a more satisfactory reason for this degeneracy of their countrymen. They shew us how the sword was dropt at once by all the ITALIAN sovereigns; while the VENETIAN aristocracy was jealous of its subjects, the FLORENTINE democracy applied itself intirely to commerce; ROME was governed by priests, and NAPLES by women. War then became the business of soldiers of fortune, who spared one another, and, to the astonishment of the world, could engage a whole day in what they called a battle, and return at night to their camp, without the least bloodshed.

WHAT has chiefly induced severe moralists to declaim against refinement in the arts, is the example of  
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antient ROME, which, joining to its poverty and rusticity, virtue and public spirit, rose to such a surprising height of grandeur and liberty; but having learned from its conquered provinces the ASIATIC luxury, fell into every kind of corruption; whence, arose sedition and civil wars, attended at last with the total loss of liberty. All the LATIN classics, whom we peruse in our infancy, are full of these sentiments, and universally ascribe the ruin of their state to the arts and riches imported from the East: Insomuch that SALLUST represents a taste for painting as a vice no less than lewdness and drinking. And so popular were these sentiments, during the latter ages of the republic, that this author abounds in praises of the old rigid ROMAN virtue, tho' himself the most egregious instance of modern luxury and corruption; speaks contemptuously of GRECIAN eloquence, tho' the most elegant writer in the world; nay, employs preposterous digressions and declamations to this purpose, tho' a model of taste and correctness.

BUT it would be easy to prove, that these writers mistook the cause of the disorders in the ROMAN state, and ascribed to luxury and the arts, what really proceeded from an ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent of conquests. Refinement on the pleasures and conveniencies of life has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption. The value which all men put upon any particular pleasure, de-

pende on comparifon and experience ; nor is a porter lefs greedy of money, which he fpende on bacon and brandy, than a courtier, who purchafes champagne and ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times, and to all men, becaufe they always purchafe pleasures, fuch as men are accuftomed to, and defire : Nor can any thing reftrain or regulate the love of money, but a fenfe of honour and virtue ; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound moft in ages of knowledge and refinement.

OF all EUROPEAN kingdoms, POLAND feems the moft defective in the arts of war, as well as peace, mechanical as well as liberal ; and yet 'tis there that venality and corruption do moft prevail. The nobles feem to have preferved their crown elective for no other purpofe, but regularly to fell it to the higheft bidder. This is almoft the only fpecies of commerce with which that people are acquainted.

THE liberties of ENGLAND, fo far from decaying fince the improvements in the arts, have never flourifhed fo much as during that period. And tho' corruption may feem to increafe of late years ; this is chiefly to be afcribed to our eftablifhed liberty, when our princes have found the impoffibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying parliaments by the phantom of prerogative. Not to mention, that this corruption or venality prevails infinitely more  
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among the electors than the elected; and therefore cannot justly be ascribed to any refinements in luxury.

If we consider the matter in a proper light, we shall find, that improvements in the arts are rather favourable to liberty, and have a natural tendency to preserve, if not produce a free government. In rude unpolished nations, where the arts are neglected, all the labour is bestowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole society divides into two classes, proprietors of land, and their vassals or tenants. The latter are necessarily dependent, and fitted for slavery and subjection; especially where they possess no riches, and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture; as must always be the case where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect themselves into petty tyrants; and must either submit to an absolute master for the sake of peace and order; or if they will preserve their independency, like the GOTHIC barons, they must fall into feuds and contests among themselves, and throw the whole society into such confusion, as is perhaps worse than the most despotic government. But where luxury nourishes commerce and industry, the peasants, by a proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradesmen and merchants acquire a share of the property, and drag authority and consideration to that middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty. These submit not to slavery,

slavery, like the poor peasants, from poverty and meanness of spirit; and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the sake of that gratification, to submit to the tyranny of their sovereign. They covet equal laws, which may secure their property, and preserve them from monarchical, as well as aristocratical tyranny.

THE house of Commons is the support of our popular government; and all the world acknowledge, that it owed its chief influence and consideration to the increase of commerce, which threw such a balance of property into the hands of the Commons. How inconsistent then is it to blame so violently a refinement in the arts, and to represent it as the bane of liberty and public spirit!

To declaim against present times, and magnify the virtue of remote ancestors, is a propensity almost inherent in human nature: And as the sentiments and opinions of civilized ages alone are transmitted to posterity, hence it is that we meet with so many severe judgments pronounced against luxury, and even science; and hence it is that at present we give so ready an assent to them. But the fallacy is easily perceived from comparing different nations that are contemporaries; where we both judge more impartially, and can better set in opposition those manners with which

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we are sufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cruelty, the most pernicious and most odious of all vices, seem peculiar to uncivilized ages; and by the refined GREEKS and ROMANS were ascribed to all the barbarous nations, which surrounded them. They might justly, therefore, have presumed, that their own ancestors, so highly celebrated, possessed no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to their posterity in honour and humanity, as in taste and science. An antient FRANK or SAXON may be highly extolled: But I believe every man would think his life or fortune much less secure in the hands of a MOOR or TARTAR, than in those of a FRENCH or ENGLISH gentleman, the rank of men the most civilized in the most civilized nations.

WE come now to the *second* position which we proposed to illustrate, *viz.* that as innocent luxury, or a refinement in the arts and conveniencies of life, is advantageous to the public; so where-ever luxury ceases to be innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial; and when carried a degree farther, begins to be a quality pernicious, tho', perhaps, not the most pernicious, to political society.

LET us consider what we call vicious luxury. No gratification, however sensual, can of itself be esteemed vicious. A gratification is only vicious, when it engrosses all a man's expence, and leaves no ability for such

such acts of duty and generosity as are required by his situation and fortune. Suppose, that he correct the vice, and employ part of his expence in the education of his children, in the support of his friends, and in relieving the poor; would any prejudice result to society? On the contrary, the same consumption would arise; and that labour, which, at present, is employed only in producing a slender gratification to one man, would relieve the necessitous, and bestow satisfaction on hundreds. The same care and toil which raise a dish of peas at CHRISTMAS, would give bread to a whole family during six months. To say, that, without a vicious luxury, the labour would not have been employed at all, is only to say, that there is some other defect in human nature, such as indolence, selfishness, inattention to others, for which luxury in some measure provides a remedy; as one poison may be an antidote to another. But virtue, like wholesome food, is better than poisons, however corrected.

SUPPOSE the same number of men that are at present in BRITAIN, with the same soil and climate; I ask, is it not possible for them to be happier, by the most perfect way of life which can be imagined, and by the greatest reformation which Omnipotence itself could work in their temper and disposition? To assert, that they cannot, appears evidently ridiculous. As the land is able to maintain more than all its inhabitants,

habitants, they could never, in such an UTOPIAN state, feel any other ills than those which arise from bodily sickness ; and these are not the half of human miseries. All other ills spring from some vice, either in ourselves or others ; and even many of our diseases proceed from the same origin. Remove the vices, and the ills follow. You must only take care to remove all the vices. If you remove part, you may render the matter worse. By banishing *vicious* luxury, without curing sloth and an indifference to others, you only diminish industry in the state, and add nothing to mens charity or their generosity. Let us, therefore, rest contented with asserting, that two opposite vices in a state may be more advantageous than either of them alone ; but let us never pronounce vice in itself advantageous. Is it not very inconsistent for an author to assert in one page, that moral distinctions are inventions of politicians for public interest ; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public \* ? And indeed it seems, upon any system of morality, little less than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice which is in general beneficial to society.

I THOUGHT this reasoning necessary, in order to give some light to a philosophical question, which has been much disputed in BRITAIN. I call it a *philosophical* question, not a *political* one. For what-

\* Fable of the bees.



ever may be the consequence of such a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice; this concerns not the magistrate, who aims only at possibilities. He cannot cure every vice, by substituting a virtue in its place. Very often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that case, he ought to prefer what is least pernicious to society. Luxury, when excessive, is the source of many ills; but is in general preferable to sloth and idleness, which would commonly succeed in its place, and are more pernicious both to private persons and to the public. When sloth reigns, a mean uncultivated way of life prevails amongst individuals, without society, without enjoyment. And if the sovereign, in such a situation, demands the service of his subjects, the labour of the state suffices only to furnish the necessaries of life to the labourers, and can afford nothing to those who are employed in the public service.

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## ESSAY III.

### OF MONEY.

**M**ONEY is not, properly speaking, one of the subjects of commerce; but only the instrument which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. 'Tis none of the wheels of trade: 'Tis the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and easy. If we consider any one kingdom by itself, 'tis evident, that the greater or less plenty of money is of no consequence; since the prices of commodities are always proportioned to the plenty of money, and a crown in HARRY VII.'s time served the same purpose as a pound does at present. 'Tis only the *public* which draws any advantage from the greater plenty of money; and that only in its wars and negotiations with foreign states. And this is the reason, why all rich and trading countries, from CARTHAGE to BRITAIN and HOLLAND, have employed mercenary troops, which they hired from their poorer neighbours. Were they to make use of their native subjects, they would  
find

find less advantage from their superior riches, and from their great plenty of gold and silver; since the pay of all their servants must rise in proportion to the public opulence. Our small army in BRITAIN of 20,000 men are maintained at as great expence as a FRENCH army thrice as numerous. The ENGLISH fleet, during the late war, required as much money to support it as all the ROMAN legions, which kept the whole world in subjection, during the time of the emperors\*.

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\* A private foldier in the ROMAN infantry had a denarius a-day, somewhat less than eight pence. The ROMAN emperors had commonly 25 legions in pay, which, allowing 5000 men to a legion, makes 125,000. TACIT. *Ann. lib. 4.* 'Tis true, there were also auxiliaries to the legions; but their numbers are uncertain, as well as their pay. To consider only the legionaries, the pay of the private men could not exceed 1,600,000 pound. Now, the parliament in the last war commonly allowed for the fleet 2,500,000. We have therefore 900,000 over for the officers and other expences of the ROMAN legions. There seem to have been but few officers in the ROMAN armies, in comparison of what are employed in all our modern troops, except some SWISS corps. And these officers had very small pay: A centurion, for instance, only double a common foldier. And as the foldiers from their pay (TACIT. *Ann. lib. 1.*) bought their own cloaths, arms, tents, and baggage; this must also diminish considerably the other charges of the army. So little expensive was that mighty government, and so easy was its yoke over the world. And, indeed, this is the more natural conclusion from the foregoing calculations. For money,

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THE greater number of people and their greater industry are serviceable in all cases; at home and abroad, in private, and in public. But the greater plenty of money is very limited in its use, and may even sometimes be a loss to a nation in its commerce with foreigners.

THERE seems to be a happy concurrence of causes in human affairs, which check the growth of trade and riches, and hinder them from being confined entirely to one people; as might naturally at first be dreaded from the advantages of an established commerce. Where one nation has got the start of another in trade, 'tis very difficult for the latter to regain the ground it has lost; because of the superior industry and skill of the former, and the greater stocks, of which its merchants are possessed, and which enable them to trade for so much smaller profits. But these advantages are compensated, in some measure, by the low price of labour in every nation which has not an extensive commerce, and does not very much abound in gold and silver. Manufactures, therefore, gradually shift their places, leaving those countries and provinces which they have already enriched, and flying to others, whither they are allured by the cheapness

after the conquest of EGYPT, seems to have been nearly in as great plenty at ROME, as it is at present in the richest of the EUROPEAN kingdoms.

of

of provisions and labour ; till they have enriched these also, and are again banished by the same causes. And, in general, we may observe, that the dearness of every thing, from plenty of money, is a disadvantage, which attends an established commerce, and sets bounds to it in every country, by enabling the poorer states to undersel the richer in all foreign markets.

THIS has made me entertain a great doubt concerning the benefit of *banks* and *paper-credit*, which are so generally esteemed advantageous to every nation. That provisions and labour should become dear by the increase of trade and money, is, in many respects, an inconvenience ; but an inconvenience that is unavoidable, and the effect of that public wealth and prosperity which are the end of all our wishes. 'Tis compensated by the advantages which we reap, from the possession of these precious metals, and the weight which they give the nation in all foreign wars and negotiations. But there appears no reason for increasing that inconvenience by a counterfeit money, which foreigners will not accept in any payment, and which any great disorder in the state will reduce to nothing. There are, 'tis true, many people in every rich state, who, having large sums of money, would prefer paper with good security ; as being of more easy transport and more safe custody. If the public provide not a bank, private bankers will take advantage of this circumstance ; as the goldsmiths formerly did  
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in LONDON, or as the bankers do at present in DUBLIN: And therefore 'tis better, it may be thought, that a public company should enjoy the benefit of that paper-credit, which always will have place in every opulent kingdom. But to endeavour artificially to increase such a credit, can never be the interest of any trading nation; but must lay them under disadvantages, by increasing money beyond its natural proportion to labour and commodities, and thereby heightening their price to the merchant and manufacturer. And in this view, it must be allowed, that no bank could be more advantageous than such a one as locked up all the money it received\*, and never augmented the circulating coin, as is usual, by returning part of its treasure into commerce. A public bank, by this expedient, might cut off much of the dealings of private bankers and money-jobbers; and tho' the state bore the charge of salaries to the directors and tellers of this bank, (for, according to the preceding supposition, it would have no profit from its dealings), the national advantage, resulting from the low price of labour and the destruction of paper-credit, would be a sufficient compensation. Not to mention, that so large a sum, lying ready at command, would be a great convenience in times of public danger and distress; and what part of it was

\* This is the case with the bank of AMSTERDAM.

used might be replaced at leisure, when peace and tranquillity were restored to the nation:

BUT of this subject of paper-credit we shall treat more largely hereafter. And I shall finish this essay on money, by proposing and explaining two observations, which may, perhaps, serve to employ the thoughts of our speculative politicians. For to these only I all along address myself. 'Tis enough, that I submit to the ridicule sometimes, in this age, attached to the character of a philosopher, without adding to it that which belongs to a projector.

IT was a shrewd observation of ANACHARSIS † the SCYTHIAN, who had never seen money in his own country, that gold and silver seemed to him of no use to the GREEKS, but to assist them in numeration and arithmetic. 'Tis indeed evident, that money is nothing but the representation of labour and commodities, and serves only as a method of rating or estimating them. Where coin is in greater plenty; as a greater quantity of it is required to represent the same quantity of goods; it can have no effect, either good or bad, taking a nation within itself; no more than it would make any alteration on a merchant's books, if, instead of the ARABIAN method of notation, which requires few characters, he should make use of

† PLUT. *Quomodo quis suos profectus in virtute sentire possit.*

the ROMAN, which requires a great many. Nay, the greater quantity of money, like the ROMAN characters, is rather inconvenient, and requires greater trouble both to keep and transport it. But notwithstanding this conclusion, which must be allowed just, 'tis certain, that, since the discovery of the mines in AMERICA, industry has increased in all the nations of EUROPE, except in the possessors of those mines; and this may justly be ascribed, amongst other reasons, to the increase of gold and silver. Accordingly we find, that in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face; labour and industry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer more diligent and skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater alacrity and attention. This is not easily to be accounted for, if we consider only the influence which a greater abundance of coin has in the kingdom itself, by heightening the price of commodities, and obliging every one to pay a greater number of these little yellow or white pieces for every thing he purchases. And as to foreign trade, it appears, that great plenty of money is rather disadvantageous, by raising the price of every kind of labour.

To account, then, for this phenomenon, we must consider, that tho' the high price of commodities be a necessary consequence of the increase of gold and



silver, yet it follows not immediately upon that increase; but some time is required before the money circulate thro' the whole state, and make its effects be felt on all ranks of people. At first, no alteration is perceived; by degrees, the price rises, first of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at last reaches a just proportion with the new quantity of specie which is in the kingdom. In my opinion, 'tis only in this interval or intermediate situation, between the acquisition of money and rise of prices, that the increasing quantity of gold and silver is favourable to industry. When any quantity of money is imported into a nation, it is not at first dispersed into many hands; but is confined to the coffers of a few persons, who immediately seek to employ it to the best advantage. Here are a set of manufacturers or merchants, we shall suppose, who have received returns of gold and silver for goods which they sent to CADIZ. They are thereby enabled to employ more workmen than formerly, who never dream of demanding higher wages, but are glad of employment from such good paymasters. If workmen become scarce, the manufacturer gives higher wages, but at first requires an increase of labour; and this is willingly submitted to by the artisan, who can now eat and drink better, to compensate his additional toil and fatigue. He carries his money to market, where he finds every thing at the same price as formerly, but returns with greater quantity and of better kinds, for the use of his family.

family. The farmer and gardener, finding, that all their commodities are taken off, apply themselves with alacrity to the raising more; and at the same time can afford to take better and more cloths from their tradesmen, whose price is the same as formerly, and their industry only whetted by so much new gain. 'Tis easy to trace the money in its progress thro' the whole commonwealth; where we shall find, that it must first quicken the diligence of every individual, before it increase the price of labour.

And that the specie may increase to a considerable pitch, before it have this latter effect, appears, amongst other instances, from the frequent operations of the FRENCH king on the money; where it was always found, that the augmenting the numerary value did not produce a proportional rise of the prices, at least for some time. In the last year of LOUIS XIV. money was raised three sevenths, but prices augmented only one. Corn in FRANCE is now sold at the same price, or for the same number of livres it was in 1683; tho' silver was then at 30 livres the mark, and is now at 50 \*. Not to mention the great addition

\* These facts I give upon the authority of Mons. du TOR in his *Reflexions politiques*, an author of reputation. Tho' I must confess, that the facts which he advances on other occasions, are often so suspicious, as to make his authority less in this matter. However, the general observation, that the augmenting the

tion of gold and silver, which may have come into that kingdom since the former period.

FROM the whole of this reasoning we may conclude, that 'tis of no manner of consequence, with regard to the domestic happiness of a state, whether money be in a greater or less quantity. The good policy of the magistrate consists only in keeping it, if possible, still increasing; because, by that means, he keeps alive a spirit of industry in the nation, and increases the money in FRANCE does not at first proportionably augment the prices, is certainly just.

By the by, this seems to be one of the best reasons which can be given, for a gradual and universal augmentation of the money, tho' it has been intirely overlooked in all those volumes which have been wrote on that question by MELON, du TOT, and PARSIS de VERNEY. Were all our money, for instance, recoined, and a penny's worth of silver taken from every shilling, the new shilling would probably purchase every thing that could have been bought by the old; the prices of every thing would thereby be insensibly diminished; foreign trade enlivened; and domestic industry, by the circulation of a greater number of pounds and shillings, would receive some increase and encouragement. In executing such a project, 'twould be better to make the new shilling pass for 24 half-pence, in order to preserve the illusion, and make it be taken for the same. And as a recoinage of our silver begins to be requisite, by the continual wearing of our shillings and sixpences, it may be doubtful, whether we ought to imitate the example in King WILLIAM's reign, when the clipt money was raised to the old standard.

stock

stock of labour, in which consists all real power and riches. A nation whose money decreases, is actually, at that time, much weaker and more miserable than another nation, who possesses no more money, but is on the increasing hand. This will be easily accounted for, if we consider, that the alterations in the quantity of money, either on the one side or the other, are not immediately attended with proportionable alterations in the prices of commodities. There is always an interval before matters be adjusted to their new situation; and this interval is as pernicious to industry when gold and silver are diminishing, as it is advantageous when these metals are increasing. The workman has not the same employment from the manufacturer and merchant; tho' he pays the same price for every thing in the market. The farmer cannot dispose of his corn and cattle; tho' he must pay the same rent to his landlord. The poverty, and beggary, and sloth, which must ensue, are easily foreseen.

II. THE second observation which I proposed to make with regard to money, may be explained after the following manner. There are some kingdoms, and many provinces in EUROPE, (and all of them were once in the same condition) where money is so scarce, that the landlord can get none at all from his tenants; but is obliged to take his rent in kind, and either to consume it himself, or transport it to places

where he may find a market. In those countries, the prince can levy few or no taxes, but in the same manner: And as he will receive very small benefit from impositions so paid, 'tis evident that such a kingdom has very little force even at home; and cannot maintain fleets and armies to the same extent, as if every part of it abounded in gold and silver. There is surely a greater disproportion betwixt the force of GERMANY at present and what it was three centuries ago †, than there is in its industry, people, and manufactures. The AUSTRIAN dominions in the empire are in general well peopled and well cultivated, and are of great extent; but have not a proportionable weight in the balance of EUROPE; proceeding, as is commonly supposed, from the scarcity of money. How do all these facts agree with that principle of reason, that the quantity of gold and silver is in itself altogether indifferent? According to that principle, where ever a sovereign has numbers of subjects, and these have plenty of commodities, he should of course be great and powerful, and they rich and happy, independent of the greater or lesser abundance of the precious metals. These admit of divisions and subdivisions to a great extent; and where they would be-

† The ITALIANS gave to the emperor MAXIMILIAN, the nick-name of POCCHI-DANARE. None of the enterprises of that prince ever succeeded, for want of money.

come so small as to be in danger of being lost, 'tis easy to mix them with a baser metal, as is practised in some countries of EUROPE ; and by that means raise them to a bulk more sensible and convenient. They still serve the same purposes of exchange, whatever their number may be, or whatever colour they may be supposed to have.

To these difficulties I answer, that the effect here supposed to flow from scarcity of money, really arises from the manners and customs of the inhabitants ; and that we mistake, as is too usual, a collateral effect for a cause. The contradiction is only apparent ; but it requires some thought and reflection to discover the principles by which we can reconcile *reason* to *experience*.

It seems a maxim almost self-evident, that the prices of every thing depend on the proportion between commodities and money, and that any considerable alteration on either of these has the same effect, either of heightening or lowering the prices. Increase the commodities, they become cheaper ; increase the money, they rise in their value. As, on the other hand, a diminution of the former, and that of the latter, have contrary tendencies.

'Tis also evident, that the prices do not so much depend on the absolute quantity of commodities and

that of money, which are in a nation, as on that of the commodities, which come or may come to market, and of the money which circulates. If the coin be locked up in chests, 'tis the same thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated : If the commodities be hoarded in granaries, a like effect follows. As the money and commodities, in these cases, never meet, they cannot affect each other. Were we, at any time, to form conjectures concerning the price of provisions, the corn which the farmer must reserve for the maintenance of himself and family, ought never to enter into the estimation. 'Tis only the overplus, compared to the demand, that determines the value.

To apply these principles, we must consider, that in the first and more uncultivated ages of any state, ere fancy has confounded her wants with those of nature, men, contented with the productions of their own fields, or with those rude preparations which they themselves can work upon them, have little occasion for exchange, or at least for money, which, by agreement, is the common measure of exchange. The wool of the farmer's own flock, spun in his own family, and wrought by a neighbouring weaver, who receives his payment in corn or wool, suffices for furniture and cloathing. The carpenter, the smith, the mason, the tailor, are retained by wages of a like nature; and the landlord himself, dwelling in the neighbour-

neighbourhood, is contented to receive his rent in the commodities raised by the farmer. The greatest part of these he consumes at home, in rustic hospitality: The rest, perhaps, he disposes of for money to the neighbouring town, whence he draws the few materials of his expence and luxury.

BUT after men begin to refine on all these enjoyments, and live not always at home, nor are contented with what can be raised in their neighbourhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and more money enters into that exchange. The tradesmen will not be paid in corn; because they want something more than barely to eat. The farmer goes beyond his own parish for the commodities he purchases, and cannot always carry his commodities to the merchant who supplies him. The landlord lives in the capital, or in a foreign country; and demands his rent in gold and silver, which can easily be transported to him. Great undertakers, and manufacturers, and merchants, arise in every commodity; and these can conveniently deal in nothing but in specie. And consequently, in this situation of society, the coin enters into many more contracts, and by that means is much more employed than in the former.

THE necessary effect is, that, provided the money does not increase in the nation, every thing must be-



come much cheaper in times of industry and refinement, than in rude, uncultivated ages. 'Tis the proportion between the circulating money, and the commodities in the market, which determines the prices. Goods that are consumed at home, or exchanged with other goods in the neighbourhood, never come to market; they affect not in the least the current specie; with regard to it they are as if totally annihilated; and consequently this method of using them sinks the proportion on the side of the commodities, and increases the prices. But after money enters into all contracts and sales, and is every where the measure of exchange, the same national cash has a much greater task to perform; all commodities are then in the market; the sphere of circulation is enlarged; 'tis the same case as if that individual sum were to serve a larger kingdom; and therefore, the proportion being here lessened on the side of the money, every thing must become cheaper, and the prices gradually fall.

By the most exact computations that have been formed all over EUROPE, after making allowance for the alteration in the numerary value or the denomination, 'tis found, that the prices of all things have only risen three, or at most, four times, since the discovery of the WEST INDIES. But will any one assert, that there is not four times the coin in EUROPE, that was in the fifteenth century, and the centuries preceding it? The SPANIARDS and PORTUGUESE  
from

from their mines, the ENGLISH, FRENCH, and DUTCH; by their AFRICAN trade, and by their interlopers in the WEST INDIES, bring home about six millions a-year, of which not above a third part goes to the EAST INDIES. This sum alone in ten years would probably double the antient stock of money in EUROPE. And no other satisfactory reason can be given, why all prices have not risen to a much more exorbitant height, except that derived from a change of customs and manners. Besides that more commodities are produced by additional industry, the same commodities come more to market, after men depart from their antient simplicity of manners. And tho' this increase has not been equal to that of money, it has, however, been considerable, and has preserved the proportion between coin and commodities nearer the antient standard.

WERE the question proposed, Which of these methods of living in the people, the simple or the refined, is the most advantageous to the state or public? I should, without much scruple, prefer the latter, in a view to politics at least; and should produce this as an additional reason for the encouragement of trade and manufactures.

When men live in the antient simple manner, and supply all their necessities from domestic industry or from the neighbourhood, the sovereign can levy no

taxes in money from a considerable part of his subjects; and if he will impose on them any burdens, he must take his payment in commodities, with which alone they abound; a method attended with such great and obvious inconveniencies, that they need not here be insisted on. All the money he can pretend to raise, must be from his principal cities, where alone it circulates; and these, 'tis evident, cannot afford him so much as the whole state could, did gold and silver circulate thro' the whole. But besides this obvious diminution of the revenue, there is also another cause of the poverty of the public in such a situation. Not only the sovereign receives less money, but the same money goes not so far as in times of industry and general commerce. Every thing is dearer, where the gold and silver are supposed equal; and that because fewer commodities come to market, and the whole coin bears a higher proportion to what is to be purchased by it; whence alone the prices of every thing are fixed and determined.

HERE then we may learn the fallacy of the remark, often to be met with in historians, and even in common conversation, that any particular state is weak, tho' fertile, populous, and well cultivated, merely because it wants money. It appears, that the want of money can never injure any state within itself. For men and commodities are the real strength of any community. 'Tis the simple manner of living which  
here

here hurts the public, by confining the gold and silver to few hands, and preventing its universal diffusion and circulation. On the contrary, industry and refinements of all kinds incorporate it with the whole state, however small its quantity may be: They digest it into every vein, so to speak; and make it enter into every transaction and contract. No hand is intirely empty of it. And as the prices of every thing fall by that means, the sovereign has a double advantage: He may draw money by his taxes from every part of the state; and what he receives, goes farther in every purchase and payment.

WE may infer, from a comparison of prices, that money is not more plentiful in *CASSIA*, than it was in *EUROPE* three centuries ago: But what immense power is that empire possessed of, if we may judge by the civil and military list maintained by it? *POLYBIUS* \* tells us, that provisions were so cheap in *ITALY* during his time, that in some places the stated club in the inns was a *semis* a-head, little more than a farthing? Yet the *ROMAN* power had even then subdued the whole known world. About a century before that period, the *CARTHAGINIAN* ambassador said, by way of raillery, that no people lived more sociably amongst themselves than the *ROMANS*; for that in every entertainment, which, as foreign ministers, they received, they still observed the same plate

\* Lib. 2, cap. 15.

at every table †. The absolute quantity of the precious metals is a matter of great indifference. There are only two circumstances of any importance, *viz.* their gradual increase, and their thorough concoction and circulation thro' the state; and the influence of both these circumstances has been here explained.

In the following Essay we shall see an instance of a like fallacy as that above-mentioned; where a collateral effect is taken for a cause, and where a consequence is ascribed to the plenty of money; tho' it be really owing to a change in the manners and customs of the people.

• PAIN. lib. 33. cap. 12.

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# ESSAY IV.

## OF INTEREST.

**N**OTHING is esteemed a more certain sign of the flourishing condition of any nation than the lowness of interest: And with reason; tho' I believe the cause is somewhat different from what is commonly apprehended. The lowness of interest is generally ascribed to the plenty of money. But money, however plentiful, has no other effect, *if fixed*, than to raise the price of labour. Silver is more common than gold; and therefore you receive a greater quantity of it for the same commodities. But do you pay less interest for it? Interest in BATAVIA and JAMAICA is at 10 *per cent.* in PORTUGAL at 6; tho' these places, as we may learn from the prices of every thing, abound much more in gold and silver than either LONDON or AMSTERDAM.

WERE all the gold in ENGLAND annihilated at once, and one and twenty shillings substituted in the place of every guinea, would money be more plentiful or  
interest

interest lower? No surely: We should only use silver instead of gold. Were gold rendered as common as silver, and silver as common as copper; would money be more plentiful or interest lower? We may assuredly give the same answer. Our shillings would then be yellow, and our halfpence white; and we should have no guineas. No other difference would ever be observed; no alteration on commerce, manufactures, navigation, or interest; unless we imagine, that the colour of the metal is of any consequence.

Now, what is so visible in these greater variations of scarcity or abundance of the precious metals, must hold in all inferior changes. If the multiplying gold and silver fifteen times makes no difference, much less can the doubling or tripling them. All augmentation has no other effect than to heighten the price of labour and commodities; and even this variation is little more than that of a name. In the progress towards these changes, the augmentation may have some influence, by exciting industry; but after the prices are settled, suitable to the new abundance of gold and silver, it has no manner of influence.

An effect always holds proportion with its cause. Prices have risen about four times since the discovery of the *INDIES*; and 'tis probable gold and silver have multiplied much more: But interest has not fallen much above half. The rate of interest, therefore,

is

is not derived from the quantity of the precious metals.

MONEY having merely a fictitious value, arising from the agreement and convention of men, the greater or less plenty of it is of no consequence, if we consider a nation within itself; and the quantity of specie, when once fixed, tho' never so large, has no other effect, than to oblige every one to tell out a greater number of those shining bits of metal, for cloaths, furniture, or equipage, without increasing any one convenience of life. If a man borrows money to build a house, he then carries home a greater load; because the stone, timber, lead, glass, &c. with the labour of the masons and carpenters, are represented by a greater quantity of gold and silver. But as these metals are considered merely as representations, there can no alteration arise, from their bulk or quantity, their weight or colour, either upon their real value or their interest. The same interest, in all cases, bears the same proportion to the sum. And if you lent me so much labour and so many commodities; by receiving five *per cent.* you receive always proportional labour and commodities, however represented, whether by yellow or white coin, whether by a pound or an ounce. 'Tis in vain, therefore, to look for the cause of the fall or rise of interest in the greater or less quantity of gold and silver, which is fixed in any nation.

HIGH



**HIGH** interest arises from *three* circumstances : **A** great demand for borrowing ; little riches to supply that demand ; and great profits arising from commerce . And these circumstances are a clear proof of the small advance of commerce and industry, not of the scarcity of gold and silver . Low interest, on the other hand, proceeds from the three opposite circumstances : A small demand for borrowing ; great riches to supply that demand ; and small profits arising from commerce . And these circumstances are all connected together, and proceed from the increase of industry and commerce, not of gold and silver . We shall endeavour to prove these points as fully and distinctly as possible ; and shall begin with the causes and the effects of a great or small demand for borrowing .

WHEN a people have emerged ever so little from a savage state, and their numbers have increased beyond the original multitude, there must immediately arise an inequality of property ; and while some possess large tracts of land, others are confined within narrow limits, and some are entirely without any landed property . Those who possess more land than they can labour, employ those who possess none, and agree to receive a determinate part of the product . Thus the *landed* interest is immediately established ; nor is there any settled government, however rude, in which affairs are not on this footing . Of these proprietors of land, some must presently discover  
cover

cover themselves to be of different tempers from others; and while one would willingly store up the product of his land for futurity, another desires to consume at present what should suffice for many years. But as the spending a settled revenue is a way of life entirely without occupation; men have so much need of somewhat to fix and engage them, that pleasures such as they are, will be the pursuit of the greatest part of the landholders, and the prodigals amongst them will always be more numerous than the misers. In a state, therefore, where there is nothing but a landed interest, as there is little frugality, the borrowers may be very numerous, and the rate of interest must hold proportion to it. The difference depends not on the quantity of money, but on the habits and manners which prevail. By this alone, the demand for borrowing is increased or diminished. Were money so plentiful as to make an egg be sold for sixpence; so long as there are only landed gentry and peasants in the state, the borrowers must be numerous, and interest high. The rent for the same farm would be heavier and more bulky. But the same idleness of the landlord, with the higher prices of commodities, would dissipate it in the same time, and produce the same necessity and demand for borrowing\*.

NOR

\* I have been informed by a very eminent lawyer, and a man of great knowledge and observation, that it appears from antient papers and records, that, about four centuries ago, money, in  
SCOTLAND,

NOR is the case different with regard to the *second* circumstance which we proposed to consider, *viz.* the great or little riches to supply this demand. This effect also depends on the habits and ways of living of the people, not on the quantity of gold and silver. In order to have, in any state, a great number of lenders, 'tis not sufficient nor requisite that there be great abundance of precious metals. 'Tis only requisite that the property or command of that quantity, which is in the state, whether great or small, should be collected in particular hands, so as to form considerable sums, or compose a great monied interest. This begets a number of lenders, and sinks the rate of usury; and this, I shall venture to affirm, depends not on the quantity of specie, but on particular manners and customs, which make the specie gather into separate sums or masses of considerable value.

SCOTLAND, and probably in other parts of EUROPE, was only at five *per cent.* and afterwards rose to ten before the discovery of the WEST-INDIES. This fact is curious; but might easily be reconciled to the foregoing reasoning. Men, in that age, lived so much at home, and in so very simple and frugal a manner, that they had no occasion for money; and tho' the lenders were then few, the borrowers were still fewer. The high rate of interest among the early ROMANS is accounted for by historians from the frequent losses sustained by the inroads of the enemy.

FOR

FOR suppose, that, by miracle, every man in BRITAIN should have five pounds slipt into his pocket in one night ; this would much more than double the whole money that is at present in the kingdom ; and yet there would not next day, nor for some time, be any more lenders, nor any variation on the interest. And were there nothing but landlords and peasants in the state, this money, however abundant, could never gather into sums ; and would only serve to increase the prices of every thing, without any farther consequence. The prodigal landlord dissipates it, as fast as he receives it ; and the beggarly peasant has no means, nor view, nor ambition of obtaining above a bare livelihood. The overplus of borrowers above that of lenders continuing still the same, there will follow no reduction of interest. That depends upon another principle ; and must proceed from an increase of industry and frugality, of arts and commerce.

EVERY thing useful to the life of man arises from the ground ; but few things arise in that condition which is requisite to render them useful. There must, therefore, beside the peasants, and the proprietors of land, be another rank of men, who, receiving from the former, the rude materials, work them into their proper form, and retain part for their own use and subsistence. In the infancy of society, these contracts betwixt the artisans and the peasants, and betwixt one species of artisans and another, are commonly entered  
into

into immediately by the persons themselves, who, being neighbours, are easily acquainted with each other's necessities, and can lend their mutual assistance to supply them. But when men's industry increases, and their views enlarge, 'tis found, that the most remote parts of the state can assist each other as well as the more contiguous, and that this intercourse of good offices may be carried on to the greatest extent and intricacy. Hence the origin of *merchants*, the most useful race of men in the whole society, who serve as agents between those parts of the state, that are wholly unacquainted, and are ignorant of each other's necessities. Here are in a city fifty workmen in silk and linen, and a thousand customers; and these two ranks of men, so necessary to each other, can never rightly meet, till one man erects a shop, to which all the workmen and all the customers repair. In this province, grass rises in abundance: The inhabitants abound in cheese, and butter, and cattle; but want bread and corn, which, in a neighbouring province, are in too great abundance for the use of the inhabitants. One man discovers this. He brings corn from the one province; and returns with cattle; and supplying the wants of both, he is, so far, a common benefactor. As the people increase in numbers and industry, the difficulty of their intercourse increases; The business of the agency or merchandize becomes more intricate; and divides, subdivides, compounds, and mixes to a greater variety. In all these transac-

tions,

tions, 'tis necessary, and reasonable, that a considerable part of the commodities and labour should belong to the merchant, to whom, in a great measure, they are owing. And these commodities he will sometimes preserve in kind, or more commonly convert into money, which is their common representation. If gold and silver have increased in the state together with the industry, it will require a great quantity of these metals to represent a great quantity of commodities and labour. If industry alone has increased, the prices of every thing must sink, and a very small quantity of specie will serve as a representation.

THERE is no craving or demand of the human mind more constant and insatiable than that for exercise and employment; and this desire seems the foundation of most of our passions and pursuits. Deprive a man of all business and serious occupation, he runs restless from one amusement to another; and the weight and oppression which he feels from idleness, is so great, that he forgets the ruin which must follow from his immoderate expences. Give him a more harmless way of employing his mind or body, he is satisfied, and feels no longer that insatiable thirst after pleasure. But if the employment you give him be profitable, especially if the profit be attached to every particular exertion of industry, he has gain so often in his eye, that he acquires, by degrees, a passion for it, and knows no such pleasure as that of  
seeing

seeing the daily increase of his fortune. And this is the reason why trade increases frugality, and why, among merchants, there is the same overplus of misers above prodigals, as, among the possessors of land, there is the contrary.

COMMERCE increases industry, by conveying it readily from one member of the state to another, and allowing none of it to perish or become useless. It increases frugality, by giving occupation to men, and employing them in the arts of gain, which soon engage their affection, and remove all relish for pleasure and expence: 'Tis an infallible consequence of all industrious professions, to beget frugality, and make the love of gain prevail over the love of pleasure. Among lawyers and physicians who have any practice, there are many more who live within their income, than who exceed it, or even live up to it. But lawyers and physicians beget no industry; and 'tis even at the expence of others they acquire their riches; so that they are sure to diminish the possessions of some of their fellow-citizens as fast as they increase their own. Merchants, on the contrary, beget industry, by serving as canals to convey it thro' every corner of the state; and at the same time, by their frugality, they acquire great power over that industry, and collect a large property in the labour and commodities, which they are the chief instruments in producing. There is no other profession, therefore, except merchandize,

chandize, which can make the monied interest considerable, or, in other words, can increase industry, and, by also increasing frugality, give a great command of that industry to particular members of the society. Without commerce, the state must consist chiefly of landed gentry, whose prodigality and expence make a continual demand for borrowing; and of peasants, who have no sums to supply that demand. The money never gathers into large stocks or sums, which can be lent at interest. It is dispersed into numberless hands, who either squander it in idle show and magnificence, or employ it in the purchase of the common necessaries of life. Commerce alone assembles it into considerable sums; and this effect it has merely from the industry which it begets, and the frugality which it inspires, independent of that particular quantity of precious metal which may circulate in the state.

Thus an increase of commerce, by a necessary consequence, raises a great number of lenders, and by that means produces a lowness of interest. We must now consider how far this increase of commerce diminishes the profits arising from that profession, and gives rise to the *third* circumstance requisite to produce a lowness of interest.

It may be proper to observe on this head, that low interest and low profits of merchandize are two



events, that mutually forward each other, and are both originally derived from that extensive commerce, which produces opulent merchants, and renders the monied interest considerable. Where merchants possess great stocks, whether represented by few or many pieces of metal, it must frequently happen, that when they either become tired of business, or have heirs unwilling or unfit to engage in commerce, a great deal of these riches naturally seeks an annual and secure revenue. The plenty diminishes the price, and makes the lenders accept of a low interest. This consideration obliges many to keep their stocks in trade, and rather be content with low profit than dispose of their money at an under value. On the other hand, when commerce has become very extensive, and employs very large stocks, there must arise rivalships among the merchants, which diminish the profits of trade, at the same time that they increase the trade itself. The low profits of merchandize induce the merchants to accept more willingly of a low interest, when they leave off business, and begin to indulge themselves in ease and indolence. It is needless, therefore, to enquire which of these circumstances, *viz. low interests or low profits*, is the cause, and which the effect? They both arise from an extensive commerce, and mutually forward each other. No man will accept of low profits, where he can have high interest; and no man will accept of low interest, where he can have high profits. An extensive commerce, by producing large stocks, diminishes both interest and profit; and is always

ways assisted, in its diminution of the one, by the proportional sinking of the other. I may add, that as low profits arise from the increase of commerce and industry, they serve in their turn to the farther increase of commerce, by rendering the commodities cheaper, encouraging the consumption, and heightening the industry. And thus, if we consider the whole connection of causes and effects, interest is the true barometer of the state, and its lowness is a sign almost infallible of the flourishing of a people. It proves the increase of industry, and its prompt circulation thro' the whole state, little inferior to a demonstration. And tho', perhaps, it may not be impossible but a sudden and a great check to commerce may have a momentary effect of the same kind, by throwing so many stocks out of trade; it must be attended with such misery and want of employment in the poor, that, besides its short duration, it will not be possible to mistake the one case for the other.

Those who have asserted, that the plenty of money was the cause of low interest, seem to have taken a collateral effect for a cause; since the same industry which sinks the interest, does commonly acquire great abundance of the precious metals, A variety of fine manufactures, with vigilant enterprising merchants, will soon draw money to a state, if it be any where to be found in the world. The same cause, by multiplying the conveniencies of life, and increasing in-

dustry, collects great riches into the hands of persons, who are not proprietors of land, and produces by that means a lowness of interest. But tho' both these effects, plenty of money and low interest, naturally arise from commerce and industry, they are altogether independent of each other. For suppose a nation removed into the *Pacific* ocean, without any foreign commerce, or any knowledge of navigation: Suppose, that this nation possesses always the same stock of coin, but is continually increasing in its numbers and industry: 'Tis evident, that the price of every commodity must gradually diminish in that kingdom; since 'tis the proportion between money and any species of goods, which fixes their mutual value; and, upon the present supposition, the conveniencies of life become every day more abundant, without any alteration on the current specie. A less quantity of money, therefore, amongst this people, will make a rich man, during the times of industry, than would serve to that purpose, in ignorant and slothful ages. Less money will build a house, portion a daughter, buy an estate, support a manufactory, or maintain a family and equipage. These are the uses for which men borrow money; and therefore, the greater or less quantity of it in a state has no influence on the interest. But 'tis evident, that the greater or less stock of labour and commodities must have a great influence; since we really and in effect borrow these, when we take money upon interest. 'Tis true, when commerce is extended

tended all over the globe, the most industrious nations always abound most with the precious metals: So that low interest and plenty of money are in fact almost inseparable. But still 'tis of consequence to know the principle whence any phenomenon arises, and to distinguish betwixt a cause and a concomitant effect. Besides that the speculation is curious, it may frequently be of use in the conduct of public affairs. At least, it must be owned, that nothing can be of more use than to improve, by practice, the method of reasoning on these subjects, which of all others are the most important; tho' they are commonly treated in the loosest and most careless manner.

ANOTHER reason of this popular mistake with regard to the cause of low interest, seems to be the instance of some nations; where, after a sudden acquisition of money, or of the precious metals, by means of foreign conquest, the interest has fallen, not only among them, but in all the neighbouring states, as soon as that money was dispersed, and had insinuated itself into every corner. Thus, interest in SPAIN fell near a half immediately after the discovery of the WEST INDIES, as we are informed by GARCILASSO DE LA VEGA: And it has been ever since gradually sinking in every kingdom of EUROPE. Interest in ROME, after the conquest of EGYPT, fell from 6 to 4 *per cent.* as we learn from DION\*.

\* Lib. 51.

THE causes of the sinking of interest upon such an event, seem different in the conquering country and in the neighbouring states; but in neither of them can we justly ascribe that effect merely to the increase of gold and silver.

IN the conquering country, 'tis natural to imagine, that this new acquisition of money will fall into a few hands, and be gathered into large sums, which seek a secure revenue, either by the purchase of land or by interest; and consequently the same effect follows, for a little time, as if there had been a great accession of industry and commerce. The increase of lenders above the borrowers sinks the interest; and so much the faster, if those who have acquired those large sums, find no industry or commerce in the state, and no method of employing their money but by lending it at interest. But after this new mass of gold and silver has been digested, and has circulated thro' the whole state, affairs will soon return to their former situation: while the landlords and new money-holders, living idly, squander above their income; and the former daily contract debt, and the latter incroach on their stock till its final extinction. The whole money may still be in the state, and make itself felt by the increase of prices: But not being now collected into any large masses or stocks, the disproportion between the borrowers and lenders is the same as formerly, and consequently the high interest returns.

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ACCORDINGLY we find, in **ROME**, that so early as **TIBERIUS**'s time, interest had again mounted to 6 *per cent.* \* tho' no accident had happened to drain the empire of money. In **TRAJAN**'s time, money lent on mortgages in **ITALY**, bore 6 *per cent* †; on common securities in **BITHYNIA**, 12 ‡. And if interest in **SPAIN** has not risen to its old pitch; this can be ascribed to nothing but the continuance of the same cause that sunk it, *viz.* the large fortunes continually made in the **INDIES**, which come over to **SPAIN** from time to time, and supply the demand of the borrowers. By this accidental and extraneous cause, more money is to be lent in **SPAIN**, that is, more money is collected into large sums, than would otherwise be found in a state, where there are so little commerce and industry.

As to the reduction of interest, which has followed in **ENGLAND**, **FRANCE**, and other kingdoms of **EUROPE**, that have no mines, it has been gradual; and has not proceeded from the increase of money, considered merely in itself; but from the increase of industry, which is the natural effect of the former increase, in that interval, before it raises the price of labour and provisions. For to return to the foregoing supposition; if the industry of **ENGLAND** had risen

\* **COLUMELLA**, lib. 3. cap. 3.

† **PLINII** epist. lib. 7. ep. 18.

‡ *Id.* lib. 10. ep. 62.

as much from other causes, (and that rise might easily have happened, tho' the stock of money had remained the same) must not all the same consequences have followed, which we observe at present? The same people would, in that case, be found in the kingdom, the same commodities, the same industry, manufactures, and commerce; and consequently the same merchants, with the same stocks, that is, with the same command over labour and commodities, only represented by a smaller number of white or yellow pieces; which being a circumstance of no moment, would only affect the waggoner, porter, and trunk-maker. Luxury, therefore, manufactures, arts, industry, frugality, flourishing equally as at present, 'tis evident that interest must also have been as low; since that is the necessary result of all these circumstances; so far as they determine the profits of commerce, and the proportion between the borrowers and lenders in any state.

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# ESSAY V.

## Of the BALANCE of TRADE.

**T**IS very usual, in nations ignorant of the nature of commerce, to prohibit the exportation of commodities, and to preserve among themselves whatever they think valuable and useful. They consider not, that, in this prohibition, they act directly contrary to their intention; and that the more is exported of any commodity, the more will be raised at home, of which they themselves will always have the first offer.

'TIS well known to the learned, that the antient laws of ATHENS rendered the exportation of figs criminal; that being supposed a species of fruit so excellent in ATTICA, that the ATHENIANS esteemed it too delicious for the palate of any foreigner. And in this ridiculous prohibition they were so much in earnest, that reformers were thence called *figophants* among them, from two GREEK words, which signify



*figs and discoverer* \*. There are proofs in many old acts of the SCOTCH parliament of the same ignorance in the nature of commerce. And to this day, in FRANCE, the exportation of corn is almost always prohibited; in order, as they say, to prevent famines; tho' 'tis evident, that nothing contributes more to the frequent famines which so much distress that fertile country.

THE same jealous fear, with regard to money, has also prevailed among several nations; and it required both reason and experience to convince any people, that these prohibitions serve to no other purpose than to raise the exchange against them, and produce a still greater exportation.

THESE errors, one may say, are gross and palpable: But there still prevails, even in nations well acquainted with commerce, a strong jealousy with regard to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and silver may be leaving them. This seems to me, almost in every case, a very groundless apprehension; and I should as soon dread, that all our springs and rivers should be exhausted, as that money should abandon a kingdom where there are people and industry. Let us carefully preserve these latter advantages; and we need never be apprehensive of losing the former.

\* PLUT. *De curiasitate.*

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'Tis easy to observe, that all calculations concerning the balance of trade are founded on very uncertain facts and suppositions. The customhouse-books are owned to be an insufficient ground of reasoning; nor is the rate of exchange much better; unless we consider it with all nations, and know also the proportions of the several sums remitted; which one may safely pronounce impossible. Every man who has ever reasoned on this subject, has always proved his theory, whatever it was, by facts and calculations, and by an enumeration of all the commodities sent to all foreign kingdoms.

THE writings of Mr. GEE struck the nation with an universal panic, when they saw it plainly demonstrated; by a detail of particulars, that the balance was against them for so considerable a sum as must leave them without a single shilling in five or six years. But, luckily, twenty years have since elapsed, with an expensive foreign war; and yet it is commonly supposed, that money is still more plentiful among us than in any former period.

NOTHING can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. SWIFT; an author so quick in discerning the mistakes or absurdities of others. He says, in his *short view of the state of IRELAND*, that the whole cash of that kingdom amounted but to 500,000*l.*; that out of this they remitted every year a neat mil-

lion to ENGLAND, and had scarce any other source from which they could compensate themselves, and hence other foreign trade but the importation of FRENCH wines, for which they paid ready money. The consequence of this situation, which must be owned disadvantageous, was, that in a course of three years, the current money of IRELAND, from 500,000*l.* was reduced to less than two. And at present, I suppose, in a course of near 30 years, it is absolutely nothing. Yet I know not how, that opinion of the advance of riches in IRELAND, which gave the Doctor so much indignation, seems still to continue, and gain ground with every body.

In short, this apprehension of the wrong balance of trade, appears of such a nature, that it discovers itself, where-ever one is out of humour with the ministry, or is in low spirits; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the exports, which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a general argument, which may prove the impossibility of that event, as long as we preserve our people and our industry.

SUPPOSE four fifths of all the money in BRITAIN to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the same condition, with regard to specie, as in the reigns of the HARRYS and EDWARDS, what would be the consequence? Must not the price of all labour  
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and commodities sink in proportion, and every thing be sold as cheap as they were in these ages? What nation could then dispute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to sell manufactures at the same price, which to us would afford sufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, must this bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to the level of all the neighbouring nations? Where, after we have arrived, we immediately lose the advantage of the cheapness of labour and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is stopped by our fulness and repletion.

AGAIN, suppose, that all the money in BRITAIN were multiplied fivefold in a night, must not the contrary effect follow? Must not all labour and commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became so cheap in comparison, that, in spite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which had laid us under such disadvantages?

Now, 'tis evident, that the same causes which would correct these exorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculously, must prevent their happening in the common course of nature, and must for  
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ever in all the neighbouring nations, preserve money nearly proportionable to the art and industry of each nation. All water, where-ever it communicates, remains always at a level. Ask naturalists the reason; they tell you, that were it to be raised in any one place, the superior gravity of that part not being balanced, must depress it, till it meets a counterpoise; and that the same cause which redresses the inequality when it happens, must for ever prevent it, without some violent external operation\*.

CAN one imagine, that it had ever been possible, by any laws, or even by any art or industry, to have kept all the money in SPAIN, which the galleons have brought from the INDIES? or that all commodities could be sold in FRANCE for a tenth of the price which they would yield on the other side of the PYRENEES, without finding their way thither, and draining from that immense treasure? What other reason, indeed, is there, why all nations, at present, gain in

\* There is another cause, tho' more limited in its operation, which checks the wrong balance of trade, to every particular nation to which the kingdom trades. When we import more goods than we export, the exchange turns against us, and this becomes a new encouragement to export; as much as the charge of carriage and inference of the money which becomes due would amount to. For the exchange can never rise higher than that sum.

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their trade with SPAIN and PORTUGAL ; but because it is impossible to heap up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level ? The sovereigns of these countries have shown, that they wanted not inclination to keep their gold and silver to themselves, had it been in any degree practicable.

BUT as any body of water may be raised above the level of the surrounding element, if the former has no communication with the latter ; so in money, if the communication be cut off, by any material or physical impediment, (for all laws alone are ineffectual) there may, in such a case, be a very great inequality of money. Thus the immense distance of CHINA, together with the monopolies of our INDIA companies, obstructing the communication, preserve in EUROPE the gold and silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom. But, notwithstanding this great obstruction, the force of the causes above-mentioned is still evident. The skill and ingenuity of EUROPE in general surpasses perhaps that of CHINA, with regard to manual arts and manufactures ; yet are we never able to trade thither without great disadvantage. And were it not for the continual recruits which we receive from AMERICA, money would very soon sink in EUROPE, and rise in CHINA, till it came nearly to a level in both places. Nor can any reasonable man doubt,  
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but that industrious nation, were they as near us as POLAND or BARBARY, would drain us of the overplus of our specie, and draw to themselves a larger share of the WEST-INDIAN treasures. We need have no recourse to a physical attraction, to explain the necessity of this operation. There is a moral attraction, arising from the interests and passions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.

How is the balance kept in the provinces of every kingdom among themselves, but by the force of this principle, which makes it impossible for money to lose its level, and either to rise or sink beyond the proportion of the labour and commodities which is in each province? Did not long experience make people easy on this head, what a fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford a melancholy YORKSHIREMAN, while he computed and magnified the sums drawn to LONDON by taxes, absentees, commodities, and found on comparison the opposite articles so much inferior? And no doubt, had the *Heptarchy* subsisted in ENGLAND, the legislature of each state had been continually alarmed by the fear of a wrong balance; and as 'tis probable that the mutual hatred of these states would have been extremely violent on account of their close neighbourhood, they would have loaded and oppressed all commerce, by a jealous and superfluous caution. Since the union has removed the barriers between SCOTLAND and ENGLAND, which  
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of these nations gains from the other by this free commerce? Or if the former kingdom has received any increase of riches, can it be reasonably accounted for by any thing but the increase of its art and industry? It was a common apprehension in ENGLAND, before the union, as we learn from L'ABBE DU BOS \*, that SCOTLAND would soon drain them of their treasure, were an open trade allowed; and on the other side the TWEED a contrary apprehension prevailed: With what justice in both, time has shown.

WHAT happens in small portions of mankind, must take place in greater. The provinces of the ROMAN empire, no doubt, kept their balance with each other, and with ITALY, independant of the legislature; as much as the several counties of BRITAIN, or the several parishes of each county. And any man who travels over EUROPE at this day, may see by the prices of commodities, that money, in spite of the absurd jealousy of princes and states, has brought itself nearly to a level; and that the difference between one kingdom and another is not greater in this respect, than it is often between different provinces of the same kingdom. Men naturally flock to capital cities, sea-ports, and navigable rivers. There we find more men, more industry, more commodities, and consequently more

\* *Les interets d'ANGLETERRE mal-entendus.*



money ; but still the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and the level is preserved \*.

Our jealousy and our hatred of FRANCE, are without bounds ; and the former sentiment, at least, must be acknowledged very reasonable and well-grounded. These passions have occasioned innumerable barriers and obstructions upon commerce, where we are accused of being commonly the aggressors. But what have we gained by the bargain ? We lost the FRENCH market for our woollen manufactures, and transferred the commerce of wine to SPAIN and PORTUGAL, where we buy much worse liquor at a higher price. There are few ENGLISHMEN who would not think

\* It must carefully be remarked, that, thro'out this discourse, where-ever I speak of the level of money, I mean always its proportional level to the commodities, labour, industry, and skill, which is in the several states. And I assert, that where these advantages are double, triple, quadruple, to what they are in the neighbouring states, the money infallibly will also be double, triple, quadruple. The only circumstance that can obstruct the exactness of these proportions, is the expence of transporting the commodities from one place to another ; and this expence is sometimes unequal. Thus the corn, cattle, cheese, butter, of DERBYSHIRE, cannot draw the money of LONDON, so much as the manufactures of LONDON draw the money of DERBYSHIRE. But this objection is only a seeming one : For so far as the transport of commodities is expensive, so far is the communication between the place obstructed and imperfect.

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their country absolutely ruined, were FRENCH wines sold in ENGLAND so cheap and in such abundance as to supplant, in some measure, all ale, and home-brewed liquors : But would we lay aside prejudice, it would not be difficult to prove, that nothing could be more innocent, perhaps advantageous. Each new acre of vineyard planted in FRANCE, in order to supply ENGLAND with wine, would make it requisite for the FRENCH to take the product of an ENGLISH acre, sown in wheat or barley, in order to subsist themselves ; and 'tis evident, that we have thereby got command of the better commodity.

THERE are many edicts of the FRENCH King, prohibiting the planting of new vineyards, and ordering all those already planted to be grubbed up : So sensible are they in that country, of the superior value of corn, above every other product.

MARESCHAL VAUBAN complains often, and with reason, of the absurd duties which load the entry of those wines of LANGUEDOC, GUIENNE, and other southern provinces, that are imported into BRITANY and NORMANDY. He entertained no doubt but these latter provinces could preserve their balance, notwithstanding the open commerce which he recommends. And 'tis evident, that a few leagues more navigation to ENGLAND would make no difference ;  
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or if it did, that it must operate alike on the commodities of both kingdoms.

THERE is indeed one expedient by which it is possible to sink, and another by which we may raise, money beyond its natural level in any kingdom ; but these cases, when examined, will be found to resolve into our general theory, and to bring additional authority to it.

I SCARCE know any method of sinking money below its level, but those institutions of banks, funds, and paper-credit, with which we are in this kingdom so much infatuated. These render paper equivalent to money, circulate it thro' the whole state, make it supply the place of gold and silver, raise proportionably the price of labour and commodities, and by that means either banish a great part of those precious metals, or prevent their farther increase. What can be more shortighted than our reasonings on this head ? We fancy, because an individual would be much richer, were his stock of money doubled, that the same good effect would follow were the money of every one increased ; not considering, that this would raise as much the price of every commodity, and reduce every man, in time, to the same condition as before. 'Tis only in our public negotiations and transactions with foreigners, that a greater stock of money is advantageous ; and as our paper is there absolutely insignifi-

insignificant, we feel, by its means, all the ill effects arising from a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advantages \*.

SUPPOSE that there are 12 millions of paper, which circulate in the kingdom as money, (for we are not to imagine, that all our enormous funds are employed in that shape), and suppose the real cash of the kingdom to be 18 millions: Here is a state which is found by experience able to hold a stock of 30 millions. I say, if it be able to hold it, it must of necessity have acquired it in gold and silver, had we not obstructed the entrance of these metals by this new invention of paper. *Whence would it have acquired that sum?* From all the kingdoms of the world. *But why?* Because, if you remove these 12 millions, money in this state is below its level, compared with our neighbours; and we must immediately draw from all of them, till we be full and saturate, so to speak, and can hold no more. By our wise politics, we are careful to stuff

\* We observed in Essay III. that money, when increasing, gives encouragement to industry, during the interval between the increase of money and rise of the prices. A good effect of this nature may follow too from paper credit; but 'tis dangerous to precipitate matters, at the risk of losing all by the failing of that credit, as must happen upon any violent shock in public affairs.

the nation with this fine commodity of bank-bills and chequer notes, as if we were afraid of being over-burthened with the precious metals.

'Tis not to be doubted, but the great plenty of bullion in FRANCE is, in a great measure, owing to the want of paper-credit. The FRENCH have no banks : Merchants bills do not there circulate as with us : Usury or lending on interest is not directly permitted ; so that many have large sums in their coffers : Great quantities of plate are used in private houses ; and all the churches are full of it. By this means, provisions and labour still remain much cheaper among them, than in nations that are not half so rich in gold and silver. The advantages of this situation in point of trade, as well as in great public emergencies, are too evident to be disputed.

THE same fashion a few years ago prevailed in GENOA, which still has place in ENGLAND and HOLLAND, of using services of CHINA ware instead of plate ; but the senate, wisely foreseeing the consequence, prohibited the use of that brittle commodity beyond a certain extent ; while the use of silver plate was left unlimited. And I suppose, in their late distresses, they felt the good effect of this ordinance. Our tax on plate is, perhaps, in this view, somewhat impolitic.

BEFORE the introduction of paper-money into our colonies, they had gold and silver sufficient for their circulation. Since the introduction of that commodity, the least inconveniency that has followed is the total banishment of the precious metals. And after the abolition of paper, can it be doubted but money will return, while these colonies possess manufactures and commodities, the only thing valuable in commerce, and for whose sake alone all men desire money?

WHAT pity LYCURGUS did not think of paper-credit, when he wanted to banish gold and silver from SPARTA! It would have served his purpose better than the lumps of iron he made use of as money; and would also have prevented more effectually all commerce with strangers, as being of so much less real and intrinsic value.

BUT as our darling projects of paper-credit are pernicious, being almost the only expedient by which we can sink money below its level; so, in my opinion, the only expedient by which we can raise money above its level, is a practice which we should all exclaim against as destructive, *viz.* the gathering large sums into a public treasure, locking them up, and absolutely preventing their circulation. The fluid, not communicating with the neighbouring element, may, by such an artifice, be raised to what height we please.

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To prove this, we need only return to our first supposition, of the annihilating the half or any part of our cash; where we found, that the immediate consequence of such an event would be the attraction of an equal sum from all the neighbouring kingdoms. Nor does there seem to be any necessary bounds set, by the nature of things, to this practice of hoarding. A small city, like GENEVA, continuing this policy for ages, might ingross nine tenths of the money of EUROPE. There seems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obstacle to that immense growth of riches. A weak state, with an enormous treasure, would soon become a prey to some of its poorer, but more powerful neighbours. A great state would dissipate its wealth on dangerous and ill-concerted projects; and probably destroy, with it, what is much more valuable, the industry, morals, and numbers of its people. The fluid in this case, raised to too great a height, bursts and destroys the vessel that contains it; and mixing itself with the surrounding element, soon falls to its proper level.

So little are we commonly acquainted with this principle, that tho' all historians agree in relating uniformly so recent an event, as the immense treasure amassed by HARRY VII. (which they make amount to 1,700,000 pounds,) we rather reject their concurring testimony, than admit of a fact which agrees so ill  
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with our inveterate prejudices. 'Tis indeed probable, that that sum might be three fourths of all the money in ENGLAND. But where is the difficulty that such a sum might be amassed in twenty years, by a cunning, rapacious, frugal, and almost arbitrary monarch? Nor is it probable, that the diminution of circulating money was ever sensibly felt by the people, or ever did them any prejudice. The sinking of the prices of all commodities would immediately replace it, by giving ENGLAND the advantage in its commerce with all the neighbouring kingdoms.

HAVE we not an instance in the small republic of ATHENS with its allies, who in about fifty years between the MEDIAN and PELOPONNESIAN wars, amassed a sum greater than that of HARRY VII. \*? For all the GREEK historians † and orators ‡ agree, that the ATHENIANS collected in the citadel more than 10,000 talents, which they afterwards dissipated to their own ruin, in rash and imprudent enterprizes. But when this money was set a-running, and began to communicate with the surrounding fluid; 'what was the consequence? Did it remain in the state? No. For we find by the memorable *census* mentioned by

\* There were about eight ounces of silver in a pound *Sterling* in HARRY VII.'s time.

† THUCYDIDES, lib. 2. and DION. SIC. lib. 12.

‡ *Vid. ÆSCHINIS et DEMOSTHENIS epist.*



DEMOSTHENES \* and POLYBIUS †, that, in about fifty years afterwards, the whole value of the republic, comprehending lands, houses, commodities, slaves, and money, was less than 6000 talents.

WHAT an ambitious high-spirited people was this, to collect and keep in their treasury, with a view to conquests, a sum, which it was every day in the power of the citizens, by a single vote, to distribute among themselves, and which would go near to triple the riches of every individual ! For we must observe, that the numbers and private riches of the ATHENIANS are said by ancient writers to have been no greater at the beginning of the PELOPONNESIAN war, than at the beginning of the MACEDONIAN.

MONEY was little more plentiful in GREECE during the age of PHILIP and PERSEUS, than in ENGLAND during that of HARRY VII. : Yet these two monarchs in thirty years ‡ collected from the small kingdom of MACEDON, a much larger treasure than that of the ENGLISH monarch. PAULUS ÆMILIUS brought to ROME about 1,700,000 pounds *Sterling* ||. PLINY says 2,400,000 †. And that was but a

\* Περὶ Συμφορίας.

† Lib. 2. cap. 62.

‡ TITI LIVII, lib. 45. cap. 40.

|| VEL. PATERC. lib. 1. cap. 9.

† Lib. 33. cap. 3.

part of the MACEDONIAN treasure. The rest was dissipated by the resistance and flight of PERSEUS \*.

WE may learn from STANYAN, that the canton of BERNE had 300,000 pounds lent at interest, and had above six times as much in their treasury. Here then is a sum hoarded of 1,800,000 pounds *Sterling*, which is at least quadruple of what should naturally circulate in such a petty state; and yet no one who travels into the PAIS DE VAUX, or any part of that canton, observes any want of money more than could be supposed in a country of that extent, soil, and situation. On the contrary, there are scarce any inland provinces in the continent of FRANCE or GERMANY, where the inhabitants are at this time so opulent, tho' that canton has vastly increased its treasure since 1714, the time when STANYAN wrote his judicious account of SWITZERLAND †.

THE account given by APPIAN ‡ of the treasure of the PTOLOMIES, is so prodigious, that one cannot admit of it; and so much the less, that the historian

\* TITI LIVII, *ibid.*

† The poverty which STANYAN speaks of is only to be seen in the most mountainous cantons, where there is no commodity to bring money; And even there the people are not poorer than in the diocess of SALTZBURG on the one hand, or SAVOY on the other.

‡ *Proem.*

says, the other successors of ALEXANDER were also frugal, and had many of them treasures not much inferior. For this saving humour of the neighbouring princes must necessarily have checked the frugality of the ÆGYPTIAN monarchs, according to the foregoing theory. The sum he mentions is 740,000 talents, or 191,166,666 pounds 13 shillings and 4 pence, according to Dr. ARBUTHNOT's computation. And yet APPIAN says, that he extracted his account from the public records; and he was himself a native of ALEXANDRIA.

FROM these principles we may learn what judgment we ought to form of those numberless bars, obstructions, and imposts, which all nations of EUROPE, and none more than ENGLAND, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant desire of amassing money, which never will heap up beyond its level, while it circulates; or from an ill grounded apprehension of losing their specie, which never will sink below it. Could any thing scatter our riches, it would be such impolitic contrivances. But this general ill effect, however, results from them, that they deprive neighbouring nations of that free communication and exchange, which the author of the world has intended, by giving them soils, climates, and geniuses, so different from each other.

OUR modern politics embrace the only method of banishing money, the using paper-credit ; they reject the only method of amassing it, the practice of hoarding ; and they adopt a hundred contrivances, which serve to no purpose but to check industry, and rob ourselves and our neighbours of the common benefits of art and nature.

ALL taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as prejudicial or usefess, but those only which are founded on the jealousy above-mentioned. A tax on GERMAN linen encourages home manufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and industry. A tax on brandy increases the sale of rum, and supports our southern colonies. And as 'tis necessary imposts should be levied, for the support of government, it may be thought more convenient to lay them on foreign commodities, which can easily be intercepted at the port, and subjected to the impost. We ought, however, always to remember the maxim of Dr. SWIFT, That, in the arithmetic of the customs, two and two make not four, but often make only one. It can scarcely be doubted, but if the duties on wine were lowered to a third, they would yield much more to the government than at present : Our people might thereby afford to drink commonly a better and more wholesome liquor ; and no prejudice would ensue to the balance of trade, of which we are so jealous. The manufacture of ale, beyond  
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the agriculture, is but inconsiderable, and gives employment to few hands. The transport of wine and corn would not be much inferior.

BUT are there not frequent instances, you will say, of states and kingdoms, which were formerly rich and opulent, and are now poor and beggarly? Has not the money left them, with which they formerly abounded? I answer, If they lose their trade, industry, and people, they cannot expect to keep their gold and silver: For these precious metals will hold proportion to the former advantages. When LISBON and AMSTERDAM got the EAST-INDIA trade from VENICE and GENOA, they also got the profits and money which arose from it. Where the seat of government is transferred, where expensive armies are maintained at a distance, where great funds are possessed by foreigners; there naturally follows from these causes a diminution of the specie. But these, we may observe, are violent and forcible methods of carrying away money, and are in time commonly attended with the transport of people and industry. But where these remain, and the drain is not continued, the money always finds its way back again, by a hundred canals, of which we have no notion or suspicion. What immense treasures have been spent, by so many nations, in FLANDERS since the revolution, in the course of three long wars? More money perhaps than the half of what is at present in all EUROPE.

But

But what has now become of it? Is it in the narrow compass of the AUSTRIAN provinces? No, surely: It has most of it returned to the several countries whence it came, and has followed that art and industry by which at first it was acquired. For above a thousand years, the money of EUROPE has been flowing to ROME, by an open and sensible current; but it has been emptied by many secret and insensible canals: And the want of industry and commerce renders at present the papal dominions the poorest territory in all ITALY.

IN short, a government has great reason to preserve with care its people and its manufactures. Its money, it may safely trust to the course of human affairs, without fear or jealousy. Or if it ever give attention to this latter circumstance, it ought only to be so far as it affects the former.





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## ESSAY VI.

### Of the JEALOUSY of TRADE.

**H**AVING endeavoured to remove one species of ill-founded jealousy, which is so prevalent among commercial nations, it may not be amiss to mention another, which seems equally groundless. Nothing is more usual, among states which have made some advances in commerce, than to look on the progress of their neighbours with a suspicious eye, to consider all trading states as their rivals, and to suppose that it is impossible for any of them to flourish, but at their expence. In opposition to this narrow and malignant opinion, I will venture to assert, that the increase of riches and commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a state can scarcely carry its trade and industry very far, where all the surrounding states are buried in ignorance, sloth, and barbarism.



It is obvious, that the domestic industry of a people cannot be hurt by the greatest prosperity of their neighbours; and as this branch of commerce is undoubtedly the most important in any extensive kingdom, we are so far removed from all reason of jealousy. But I go farther, and observe, that where an open communication is preserved among nations, it is impossible but the domestic industry of every one must receive an increase from the improvements of the others. Compare the situation of GREAT BRITAIN at present, with what it was two centuries ago. All the arts both of agriculture and manufactures were then extremely rude and imperfect. Every improvement which we have since made, has arisen from our imitation of foreigners; and we ought so far to esteem it happy, that they had previously made advances in arts and ingenuity. But this intercourse is still upheld to our great advantage: Notwithstanding the advanced state of our manufactures, we daily adopt in every art, the inventions and improvements of our neighbours. The commodity is first imported from abroad, to our great discontent, while we imagine that it drains us of our money: Afterwards, the art itself is gradually imported, to our visible advantage: Yet we continue still to repine, that our neighbours should possess any art, industry, and invention; forgetting that had they not first instructed us, we should have been at present barbarians; and did they not still continue their instructions, the arts must fall into a state

of

of languor, and lose that emulation and novelty which contribute so much to their advancement.

THE increase of domestic industry lays the foundation of foreign commerce. Where a great number of commodities are raised and perfected for the home-market, there will always be found some which can be exported with advantage. But if our neighbours have no art nor cultivation, they cannot take them; because they will have nothing to give in exchange. In this respect, states are in the same condition as individuals. A single man can scarce be industrious, where all his fellow-citizens are idle. The riches of the several members of a community contribute to increase my riches, whatever profession I may follow. They consume the product of my industry, and afford me the product of theirs in return.

NOR need any state entertain apprehensions, that their neighbours will improve to such a degree in every art and manufacture, as to have no demand from them. Nature, by giving a diversity of geniuses, climates, and soils to different nations, has secured their mutual intercourse and commerce, as long as they all remain industrious and civilized. Nay, the more the arts increase in any state, the more will be its demands from its industrious neighbours. The inhabitants having become opulent and skilful, desire to have every commodity in the utmost perfection ;

and

and as they have plenty of commodities to give in exchange, they make large importations from every foreign nation. The industry of the nations from whom they import it, receives encouragement : Their own is also increased, by the sale of the commodities which they give in exchange.

BUT what if a nation has any staple commodity, such as the woollen manufacture is to England ? Must not the interfering of their neighbours in that manufacture be a loss to them ? I answer, that when any commodity is denominated the staple of a kingdom, it is supposed that that kingdom has some peculiar and natural advantages for raising the commodity ; and if, notwithstanding these advantages, they lose such a manufactory, they ought to blame their own idleness, or bad government, not the industry of their neighbours. It ought also to be considered, that by the increase of industry among the neighbouring nations, the consumption of every particular species of commodity is also increased ; and though foreign manufactures interfere with us in the market, the demand for our product may still continue, or even increase. And even should it diminish, ought the consequence to be esteemed so fatal ? If the spirit of industry be preserved, it may easily be diverted from one branch to another ; and the manufacturers of wool, for instance, be employed in linen, silk, iron, or any other commodities, for which there appears to be

be a demand. We need not apprehend, that all the objects of industry will be exhausted, or that our manufacturers, while they remain on an equal footing with those of our neighbours, will be in danger of wanting employment. The emulation among rival nations serves rather to keep industry alive in all of them : And any people is happier who possess a variety of manufactures, than if they enjoyed one single great manufactory, in which they are all employed. Their situation is less precarious, and they will feel less sensibly those revolutions and uncertainties to which every particular species of commerce will always be exposed.

THE only commercial state which ought to dread the improvements and industry of their neighbours, is such a one as Holland, which enjoying no extent of land, nor possessing any native commodity, flourish only by being the brokers, and factors, and carriers of others. Such a people may naturally apprehend, that as soon as the neighbouring states come to know and pursue their interest, they will take into their own hands the management of their affairs, and deprive their brokers of that profit, which they formerly reaped from it. But though this consequence may naturally be dreaded, it is very long before it takes place ; and by art and industry it may be ward- ed for many generations, if not wholly eluded. The advantage of superior stock and correspondence is so great, that it is not easily overcome ; and as all the trans-

transactions increase by the increase of industry in the neighbouring states, even a people whose commerce stands on this precarious basis, may at first reap a considerable profit from the flourishing condition of their neighbours. The Dutch, having mortgaged all their revenues, make not such a figure in political transactions as formerly ; but their commerce is surely equal to what it was in the middle of the last century, when they were reckoned among the great powers of Europe.

WERE our narrow and malignant politics to meet with success, we should reduce all our neighbouring nations to the same state of sloth and ignorance that prevails in Morocco and the coast of Barbary. But what would be the consequence ? They could send us no commodities : They could take none from us : Our domestic commerce itself would languish for want of emulation, example, and instruction : And we ourselves should soon fall into the same abject condition to which we had reduced them. I shall therefore venture to acknowledge, that not only as a man, but as a British subject, I pray for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France itself. I am at least certain, that Great Britain, and all these nations, would flourish more, did their sovereigns and ministers adopt such enlarged and benevolent sentiments towards each other.

## ESSAY VII.

### Of the BALANCE of POWER.

**I**T is a question, whether the *idea* of the balance of power be owing intirely to modern policy, or whether the *phrase* only has been invented in these latter ages? 'Tis certain, that XENOPHON \*, in his institution of CYRUS, represents the combination of the ASIATIC powers to have arisen from a jealousy of the increasing force of the MEDES and PERSIANS; and tho' that elegant composition should be supposed altogether a romance, this sentiment, ascribed by the author to the eastern princes, is at least a proof of the prevailing notions of antient times.

IN the whole politics of GREECE, the anxiety with regard to the balance of power, is most apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us, even by the antient historians. THUCYDIDES † represents the league which was formed against ATHENS, and which pro-

\* Lib. I.

† Lib. I.

duced the PELOPONNESIAN war, as intirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of ATHENS, when the THEBANS and LACEDEMONIANS disputed for sovereignty, we find, that the ATHENIANS (as well as many other republics) threw themselves always into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported THEBES against SPARTA, till the great victory gained by EPAMINONDAS at LEUCTRA; after which they immediately went over to the conquered, from generosity, as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealousy of the conquerors \*.

WHOEVER will read DEMOSTHENES's oration for the MEGALOPOLITANS, may see the utmost refinements on this principle, which ever entered into the head of a VENETIAN or ENGLISH speculatist. And upon the first rise of the MACEDONIAN power, this orator immediately discovered the danger, sounded the alarm thro' all GREECE, and at last assembled that confederacy under the banners of ATHENS, which fought the great and decisive battle of CHAERONEA.

'TIS true, the GRECIAN wars are regarded by historians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each state seems to have had more in view the honour of leading the rest, than any well-grounded

\* XENOPH. Hist. GRÆC. lib. 6. & 7.

hopes of authority and dominion. If we consider, indeed, the small number of inhabitants in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming sieges in those times, and the extraordinary bravery and discipline of every freeman among that noble people; we shall conclude, that the balance of power<sup>1</sup> was of itself sufficiently secured in GREECE, and needed not to be guarded with that caution which may be requisite in other ages. But whether we ascribe the shifting sides in all the GRECIAN republics to *jealous emulation* or *cautious politics*, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was sure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often composed of its former friends and allies.

THE same principle, call it envy or prudence, which produced the *Ostracism* of ATHENS and *Petalism* of SYRACUSE, and expelled every citizen whose fame or power overtopped the rest; the same principle, I say, naturally discovered itself in foreign politics, and soon raised enemies to the leading state, however moderate in the exercise of its authority.

THE PERSIAN monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince, compared to the GRECIAN republics; and therefore it behoved him, from views of safety more than from emulation, to interest himself in their quarrels, and to support the weaker side in every contest. This was the advice given by ALCE-



BIADES TO TYSSAPHERNES\*, and it prolonged near a century the date of the PERSIAN empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the first appearance of the aspiring genius of PHILIP, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with a rapidity of which there are few instances in the history of mankind.

THE successors of ALEXANDER showed an infinite jealousy of the balance of power; a jealousy founded on true politics and prudence, and which preserved distinct for several ages the partitions made after the death of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of ANTIGONUS † threatened them anew with an universal monarchy; but their combination, and their victory at IPSUS saved them. And in after times, we find, that as the Eastern princes considered the GREEKS and MACEDONIANS as the only real military force with whom they had any intercourse, they kept always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The PTOLEMIES, in particular, supported first ARATUS and the ACHAEANS, and then CLEOMENES king of SPARTA, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the MACEDONIAN monarchs. For this is the account which POLYBIUS gives of the EGYPTIAN politics ‡.

\* THUCYD. lib. 8. † DIOD. SIC. lib. 20. ‡ Lib. 2. cap. 51.

THE reason why 'tis supposed, that the antients were intirely ignorant of the *balance of power*, seems to be drawn from the ROMAN history more than the GRECIAN; and as the transactions of the former are generally the most familiar to us, we have thence formed all our conclusions. It must be owned, that the ROMANS never met with any such general combination or confederacy against them, as might naturally be expected from their rapid conquests and declared ambition; but were allowed peaceably to subdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous history of their ITALIC wars; there was, upon HANNIBAL's invasion of the ROMAN state, a very remarkable crisis, which ought to have called up the attention of all civilized nations. It appeared afterwards (nor was it difficult to be observed at the time) \* that this was a contest for universal empire; and yet no prince or state seems to have been in the least alarmed about the event or issue of the quarrel. PHILIP of MACEDON remained neuter, till he saw the victories of HANNIBAL; and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms still more imprudent. He stipulated, that he was to assist the CARTHAGINIAN state

\* It was observed by some, as appears by the speech of AGE-LAUS of NAUPACTUM, in a general congress of GREECE. See POLYB. lib. 5. cap. 104.

in their conquest of ITALY ; after which they engaged to send over forces into GREECE, to assist him in subduing the GRECIAN commonwealths \*.

THE RHODIAN and ACHAEAN republics are much celebrated by antient historians for their wisdom and sound policy ; yet both of them assisted the ROMANS in their wars against PHILIP and ANTIOCHUS. And what may be esteemed still a stronger proof, that this maxim was not familiarly known in those ages ; no antient author has ever remarked the imprudence of these measures, nor has even blamed that absurd treaty above mentioned, made by PHILIP with the CARTHAGINIANS. Princes and statesmen may in all ages be blinded in their reasonings with regard to events, beforehand : But 'tis somewhat extraordinary, that historians, afterwards, should not form a sounder judgment of them.

MASSINISSA, ATTALUS, PRUSIAS, in satisfying their private passions, were, all of them, the instruments of the ROMAN greatness ; and never seem to have suspected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanced the conquests of their ally. A simple treaty and agreement between MASSINISSA and the CARTHAGINIANS, so much required by mutual interest, barred the ROMANS from all en-

\* TITI LIVII lib. 23. cap. 33.

trance into AFRICA, and preserved liberty to mankind.

THE only prince we meet with in the ROMAN history, who seems to have understood the balance of power, is HIERO king of SYRACUSE. Tho' the ally of ROME, he sent assistance to the CARTHAGINIANS, during the war of the auxiliaries: "Esteeming it requisite," says POLYBIUS\*, "both in order to retain his dominions in SICILY, and to preserve the ROMAN friendship, that CARTHAGE should be safe; lest by its fall the remaining power should be able, without contrast or opposition, to execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence. For that is never, on any account, to be overlooked; nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights against it." Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express terms.

In short, the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that 'tis impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and discernment. If it was not so generally known and ac-

\* Lib. i. cap. 83.

knowledge as at present, it had, at least an influence on all the wiser and more experienced princes and politicians. And indeed, even at present, however generally known and acknowledged among speculative reasoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extensive among those who govern the world.

AFTER the fall of the ROMAN empire, the form of government established by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great measure, from farther conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper boundaries. But when vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished, mankind were anew alarmed by the danger of universal monarchy, from the union of so many kingdoms and principalities in the person of the emperor CHARLES. But the power of the house of AUSTRIA, founded on extensive but divided dominions, and their riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and silver, were more likely to decay, of themselves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised against them. In less than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was shattered, their opulence dissipated, their splendour eclipsed. A new power succeeded, more formidable to the liberties of EUROPE, possessing all the advantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects; except a share of that spirit of bigotry and persecution, with which the house  
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of AUSTRIA were so long, and still are so much infatuated.

EUROPE has now, for above a century, remained on the defensive against the greatest force that ever, perhaps, was formed by the civil or political combination of mankind. And such is the influence of the maxim here treated of, that tho' that ambitious nation, in the five last general wars, have been victorious in four\*, and unsuccessful only in one†, they have not much enlarged their dominions, nor acquired a total ascendant over EUROPE. There remains rather room to hope, that, by maintaining the resistance some time, the natural revolutions of human affairs, together with unforeseen events and accidents, may guard us against universal monarchy, and preserve the world from so great an evil.

IN the three last of these general wars, BRITAIN has stood foremost in the glorious struggle; and she still maintains her station, as guardian of the general liberties of EUROPE, and patron of mankind. Beside her advantages of riches and situation, her people are animated with such a national spirit, and are so fully sensible of the inestimable blessings of their government, that we may hope their vigour never will lan-

\* Those concluded by the peace of the PYRENEES, NIMEGUEN, RYSWICK, and AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

† That concluded by the peace of UTRECHT.

guish in so necessary and so just a cause. On the contrary, if we may judge by the past, their passionate ardour seems rather to require some moderation ; and they have oftener erred from a laudable excess than from a blameable deficiency.

IN the *first* place, we seem to have been more possessed with the antient GREEK spirit of jealous emulation, than actuated with the prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with FRANCE have been begun with justice, and even, perhaps from necessity ; but have always been too far pushed from obstinacy and passion. The same peace which was afterwards made at RYSWICK in 1697, was offered so early as the ninety-two ; that concluded at UTRECHT in 1712 might have been finished on as good conditions at GERTRUYTENBERG in the eight ; and we might have given at FRANCFORT, in 1743, the same terms, which we were glad to accept of at AIX LA-CHAPPELLE in the forty-eight. Here then we see, that above half of our wars with FRANCE, and all our public debts, are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours.

IN the *second* place, we are so declared in our opposition to FRENCH power, and so alert in defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own ; and expecting to carry on war at our expence, refuse all reasonable terms of accommodation.

ation. *Habent subjeq̃s, tanquam suos; viles, ut alienos.* All the world knows, that the factious vote of the House of Commons, in the beginning of the last parliament, with the professed humour of the nation, made the queen of HUNGARY inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with PRUSSIA, which would immediately have restored the general tranquillity of EUROPE.

IN the *third* place, we are such true combatants, that, when once engaged, we lose all concern for ourselves and our posterity, and consider only how we may best annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues at so deep a rate, in wars, where we were only accessories, was surely the most fatal delusion, that a nation, who had any pretension to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That remedy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poison, ought, in all reason, to be reserved to the last extremity; and no evil, but the greatest and most urgent, should ever induce us to embrace so dangerous an expedient.

THESE excesses, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial; and may, perhaps, in time, become still more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is usual, the opposite extreme, and rendering us totally careless and supine with regard to the fate of EUROPE.

The ATHENIANS, from the most bustling, intriguing,



warlike people of GREECE, finding their error in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs; and in no contest ever took party on either side, except by their flatteries and complaisance to the victor.

ENORMOUS monarchies, such as EUROPE at present is threatened with, are, probably, destructive to human nature; in their progress, in their continuance\*, and even in their downfall, which never can be very distant from their establishment. The military genius which aggrandized the monarchy, soon leaves the court, the capital, and the center of such a government; while the wars are carried on at a great distance, and interest so small a part of the state. The antient nobility, whose affections attach them to their sovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of military employments, which would carry them to remote and barbarous frontiers, where they are distant both from their pleasure and their fortune. The arms of the state must, therefore, be trusted to mercenary strangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour; ready on every occasion to turn them against the prince, and join each desperate discontent, who offers pay and plunder. This is the necessary progress of human affairs: Thus human

\* If the ROMAN empire was of advantage, it could only proceed from this, that mankind were generally in a very disorderly, uncivilized condition, before its establishment.

nature checks itself in its airy elevations : Thus ambition blindly labours for the destruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The **BOURBONS**, trusting to the support of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would push their advantage, without reserve or limitation. These, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war ; but never would submit to languish in the garrisons of **HUNGARY** or **LITHUANIA**, forgot at court, and sacrificed to the intrigues of every minion or mistress, who approaches the prince. The troops are filled with **CRAVATES** and **TARTARS**, **HUSSARS** and **COSSACS** ; intermingled, perhaps, with a few soldiers of fortune from the better provinces : And the melancholy fate of the **ROMAN** emperors, from the same cause, is renewed over and over again, till the final dissolution of the monarchy.



# ESSAY VIII.

## OF TAXES.

**T**HERE is a maxim, that prevails among those whom in this country we call *ways and means men*, and who are denominated *Financiers* and *Malotiers* in FRANCE, *That every new tax creates a new ability in the subject to bear it, and that each increase of public burdens increases proportionably the industry of the people.* This maxim is of such a nature as is most likely to be extremely abused; and is so much the more dangerous, that its truth cannot be altogether denied; but it must be owned, when kept within certain bounds, to have some foundation in reason and experience.

WHEN a tax is laid upon commodities, which are consumed by the common people, the necessary consequence may seem to be, that either the poor must retrench something from their way of living, or raise their wages, so as to make the burden of the tax fall intirely upon the rich. But there is a third consequence, which very often follows upon taxes, *viz.*

that the poor increase their industry, perform more work, and live as well as before, without demanding more for their labour. Where taxes are moderate, are laid on gradually, and affect not the necessities of life, this consequence naturally follows; and 'tis certain, that such difficulties often serve to excite the industry of a people, and render them more opulent and laborious, than others, who enjoy the greatest advantages. For we may observe, as a parallel instance, that the most commercial nations have not always possessed the greatest extent of fertile land; but on the contrary, that they have laboured under many natural disadvantage. TYRE, ATHENS, CARTHAGE, RHODES, GENOA, VENICE, HOLLAND, are strong examples to this purpose. And in all history, we find only three instances of large and fertile countries, which have possessed much trade; the NETHERLANDS, ENGLAND, and FRANCE. The two former seem to have been allured by the advantages of their maritime situation and the necessity they lay under of frequenting foreign ports, in order to procure what their own climate refused them. And as to FRANCE, trade has come very late into that kingdom, and seems to have been the effect of reflection and observation in an ingenious and enterprising people, who remarked the immense riches acquired by such of the neighbouring nations as cultivated navigation and commerce.

THE places mentioned by CICERO \*, as possessed of the greatest commerce in his time, are ALEXANDRIA, COLCHOS, TYRE, SIDON, ANDROS, CYPRUS, PAMPHYLIA, LYCIA, RHODES, CHIOS, BYZANTIUM, LESBOS, SMYRNA, MILETUM, COOS. All these, except ALEXANDRIA, were either small islands, or narrow territories. And that city owed its trade intirely to the happiness of its situation.

SINCE therefore some natural necessities or disadvantages may be thought favourable to industry, why may not artificial burdens have the same effect? Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE †, we may observe, ascribes the industry of the DUTCH intirely to necessity, proceeding from their natural disadvantages; and illustrates his doctrine by a very striking comparison with IRELAND; “where,” says he, “by the largeness and  
“ plenty of the soil, and scarcity of people, all things  
“ necessary to life are so cheap, that an industrious  
“ man, by two days labour, may gain enough to  
“ feed him the rest of the week, Which I take to  
“ be a very plain ground of the laziness attributed to  
“ the people. For men naturally prefer ease before  
“ labour, and will not take pains if they can live  
“ idle; tho’ when, by necessity, they have been in-  
“ ued to it, they cannot leave it, being grown a

\* Epist. ad ATT. lib. 9. ep. 11.

† Account of the NETHERLANDS, Chap. 6.

“ custom necessary to their health, and to their very  
 “ entertainment. Nor perhaps is the change harder,  
 “ from constant ease to labour, than from constant  
 “ labour to ease.” After which the author proceeds  
 to confirm his doctrine, by enumerating, as above,  
 the places where trade has most flourished, in antient  
 and modern times ; and which are commonly observ-  
 ed to be such narrow confined territories, as beget a  
 necessity for industry.

’Tis always observed, in years of scarcity, if it be  
 not extreme, that the poor labour more, and really  
 live better, than in years of great plenty, when they  
 indulge themselves in idleness and riot. I have been  
 told, by a considerable manufacturer, that in the year  
 1740, when bread and provisions of all kinds were  
 very dear, his workmen not only made a shift to live,  
 but paid debts, which they had contracted in former  
 years, that were much more favourable and abun-  
 dant †.

THIS doctrine, therefore, with regard to taxes,  
 may be admitted in some degree : But beware of the  
 abuse. Exorbitant taxes, like extreme necessity, de-  
 stroy industry, by producing despair ; and even be-  
 fore they reach this pitch, they raise the wages of the  
 labourer and manufacturer, and heighten the price of  
 all commodities. An attentive disinterested legislature

† To this purpose see also Essay I. at the end.

will observe the point, when the emolument ceases, and the prejudice begins : But as the contrary character is much more common, 'tis to be feared that taxes, all over EUROPE, are multiplying to such a degree, as will intirely crush all art and industry ; tho', perhaps, their first increase, together with other circumstances, might have contributed to the growth of these advantages.

THE best taxes are such as are levied upon consumptions, especially those of luxury ; because such taxes are less felt by the people. They seem, in some measure, voluntary ; since a man may chuse how far he will use the commodity which is taxed : They are paid gradually and insensibly : And being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only disadvantage is, that they are expensive in the levying.

TAXES upon possessions are levied without expence ; but have every other disadvantage. Most states, however, are obliged to have recourse to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the other.

BUT the most pernicious of all taxes are those which are arbitrary. They are commonly converted, by their management, into punishments on industry ; and also, by their unavoidable inequality, are more grievous than by the real burden which they impose.



'Tis surprising, therefore, to see them have place among any civilized people.

In general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbitrary, which they commonly are, may be esteemed dangerous: Because it is so easy for the sovereign to add a little more, and a little more, to the sum demanded, that these taxes are apt to become altogether oppressive and intolerable. On the other hand, a duty upon commodities checks itself; and a prince will soon find, that an increase of the impost is no increase of his revenue. It is not easy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by such taxes.

HISTORIANS inform us, that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the ROMAN state, was the alteration which CONSTANTINE introduced into the finances, by substituting an universal poll-tax, in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excises, which formerly composed the revenue of the empire. The people, in all the provinces, were so grinded and oppressed by the *publicans*, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians; whose dominion, as they had fewer necessities and less art, was found preferable to the refined tyranny of the ROMANS.

THERE is a prevailing opinion, that all taxes, however levied, fall upon the land at last. Such an opinion

opinion may be useful in **BRITAIN**, by checking the landed gentlemen, in whose hands our legislature is lodged, and making them preserve great regard for trade and industry. But I must confess, that this principle, tho' first advanced by a celebrated writer, has so little appearance of reason, that, were it not for his authority, it had never been received by any body. Every man, to be sure, is desirous of pushing off from himself the burden of any tax, which is imposed, and laying it upon others : But as every man has the same inclination, and is upon the defensive ; no set of men can be supposed to prevail altogether in this contest. And why the landed gentleman should be the victim of the whole, and should not be able to defend himself, as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradesmen, indeed, would willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they could : But this inclination they always have, tho' no taxes were levied ; and the same methods, by which he guards against the imposition of tradesmen before taxes, will serve him afterwards, and make them share the burden with him.

I SHALL conclude this subject with observing, that we have, with regard to taxes, an instance of what frequently happens in political institutions, that the consequences of things are diametrically opposite to what we should expect on the first appearance. 'Tis regarded as a fundamental maxim of the **TURKISH**

government, That the *Grand Signior*, tho' absolute master of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impose a new tax; and every OTTOMAN prince, who has made such an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perseverance. One would imagine, that this prejudice or established opinion were the firmest barrier in the world against oppression; yet 'tis certain, that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of increasing his revenue, must allow all the bashaws and governors to oppress and abuse the subjects: And these he squeezes after their return from their government. Whereas, if he could impose a new tax, like our EUROPEAN princes, his interest would so far be united with that of his people, that he would immediately feel the bad effects of these disorderly levies of money, and would find, that a pound, raised by general imposition, would have less pernicious effects, than a shilling taken in so unequal and arbitrary a manner.

# ESSAY IX.

## OF PUBLIC CREDIT.

**I**T appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make provision, in time of peace, for the necessities of war, and to hoard up treasures before-hand, as the instruments either of conquest or defence; without trusting to extraordinary imposts, much less to borrowing, in times of disorder and confusion. Besides the immense sums above mentioned\*, which were amassed by ATHENS, and by the PROLEMIES, and other successors of ALEXANDER; we learn from PLATO†, that the frugal LACEDÆMONIANS had also collected a great treasure; and ARRIAN‡ and PLUTARCH§ specify the riches which

\* Essay V. † ALCEB. 1. ‡ Lib. 3.

§ PLUT. *in vita* ALEX. He makes these treasures amount to 80,000 talents, or about 15 millions sterl. QUINTUS CURTIUS (Lib. 5. Cap. 2.) says, that ALEXANDER found in SUSA above 50,000 talents.

ALEX-

ALEXANDER got possession of on the conquest of SUSAN and ECBATANA, and which were reserved, some of them, from the time of CYRUS. If I remember right, the scripture also mentions the treasure of HEZEKIAH and the JEWISH princes; as profane history does that of PHILIP and PERSEUS, kings of MACEDON. The antient republics of GAUL had commonly large sums in reserve †. Every one knows the treasure seized in ROME by JULIUS CÆSAR, during the civil wars; and we find afterwards, that the wiser emperors, AUGUSTUS, TIBERIUS, VESPASIAN, SEVERUS, &c. always discovered the prudent foresight, of saving great sums against any public exigency.

ON the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to trust that posterity, during peace, will pay off the incumbrances contracted during the preceding war: And they having before their eyes, so good an example of their wise fathers, have the same prudent reliance on their posterity; who, at last, from necessity more than choice, are obliged to place the same confidence in a new posterity. But not to waste time in declaiming against a practice which appears ruinous, beyond the evidence of an hundred demonstrations; it seems pretty apparent, that the antient

† STRABO, Lib. 4.

maxims are, in this respect, much more prudent than the modern ; even though the latter had been confined within some reasonable bounds, and had ever, in any instance, been attended with such frugality, in time of peace, as to discharge the debts incurred by an expensive war. For why should the case be so very different between the public and an individual, as to make us establish such different maxims of conduct for each ? If the funds of the former be greater, its necessary expences are proportionably larger ; if its resources be more numerous, they are not infinite ; and as its frame should be calculated for a much longer duration, than the date of a single life, or even of a family, it should embrace maxims, large, durable, and generous, suitable to the supposed extent of its existence. To trust to chances and temporary expedients, is, indeed, what the necessity of human affairs frequently reduces us to ; but whoever voluntarily depend on such resources, have not necessity, but their own folly, to accuse for their misfortunes, when any such befall them.

If the abuses of treasures be dangerous, either by engaging the state in rash enterprizes, or making it neglect military discipline, in confidence of its riches, the abuses of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable ; poverty, impotence, and subjection to foreign powers.

According to modern policy, war is attended with every destructive circumstance; loss of men, increase of taxes, decay of commerce, dissipation of money, plunder by sea and land. According to ancient maxims, the opening of the public treasure, as it produced an uncommon affluence of gold and silver, served as a temporary encouragement to industry, and atoned, in some degree, for the inevitable calamities of war.

WHAT then shall we say to the new paradox, That public incumbrances are, of themselves, advantageous, independent of the necessity of contracting them; and that any state, even though it were not pressed by a foreign enemy, could not possibly have embraced a wiser expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than to create funds, and debts, and taxes, without limitation? Discourses, such as these, might naturally have passed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on BUSIRIS and NERO, had we not seen such absurd maxims patronized by great ministers, and by a whole party among us. And these puzzling arguments, (for they deserve not the name of specious) though they could not be the foundation of Lord ORFORD's conduct; for he had more sense; served at least to keep his partizans in countenance, and perplex the understanding of the nation.

LET us examine the consequences of public debts, both in our domestic management, by their influence on commerce and industry; and in our foreign transactions, by their effect on wars and negotiations.

THERE is a word, which is here in the mouth of every body, and which, I find, has also got abroad, and is much employed by foreign writers \*, in imitation of the ENGLISH; and this is, CIRCULATION. This word serves as an account of every thing; and though I confess, that I have sought for its meaning in the present subject, ever since I was a school-boy, I have never yet been able to discover it. What possible advantage is there which the nation can reap by the easy transference of stock from hand to hand? Or is there any parallel to be drawn from the circulation of other commodities, to that of chequer-notes and INDIA bonds? Where a manufacturer has a quick sale of his goods to the merchant, the merchant to the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper to his customers; this enlivens industry, and gives new encouragement to the first dealer or the manufacturer, and all his tradesmen, and makes them produce more and better commodities of the same species. A stagnation is here pernicious, wherever it happens; because it operates backwards, and stops or benumbs the industrious hand in

\* MIELON, DU TOT, LAW, in the pamphlets published in FRANCE.



its production of what is useful to human life. But what production we owe to CHANGE-ALLEY, or even what consumption, except that of coffee, and pen, ink, and paper, I have not yet learned ; nor can one foresee the loss or decay of any one beneficial commerce or commodity, though that place and all its inhabitants were for ever buried in the ocean.

BUT though this term has never been explained by those who insist so much on the advantages that result from a circulation, there seems, however, to be some benefit of a similar kind, arising from our incumbrances : As, indeed, what human evil is there, which is not attended with some advantage ? This we shall endeavour to explain, that we may estimate the weight which we ought to allow it.

PUBLIC securities are with us become a kind of money, and pass as readily at the current price as gold or silver. Where-ever any profitable undertaking offers itself, however expensive, there are never wanting hands enough to embrace it ; nor need a trader, who has sums in the public stocks, fear to launch out into the most extensive trade ; since he is possessed of funds, which will answer the most sudden demand that can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it necessary to keep by him any considerable cash. Bank-stock, or INDIA bonds, especially the latter, serve all the same purposes ; because he can dispose of them, or  
pledge

pledge them to a banker, in a quarter of an hour; and at the same time they are not idle, even when in his *scritoire*, but bring him in a constant revenue. In short, our national debts furnish merchants with a species of money, that is continually multiplying in their hands, and produces sure gain, besides the profits of their commerce. This must enable them to trade upon less profit. The small profit of the merchant renders the commodity cheaper, causes a greater consumption, quickens the labour of the common people, and helps to spread arts and industry through the whole society.

THERE are also, we may observe, in ENGLAND, and in all states, which have both commerce and public debts, a set of men, who are half-merchants, half-stock-holders, and may be supposed willing to trade for small profits; because commerce is not their principal or sole support, and their revenues in the funds are a sure resource for themselves and their families. Were there no funds, great merchants would have no expedient for realizing or securing any part of their profit, but by making purchases of land; and land has many disadvantages in comparison of funds. Requiring more care and inspection, it divides the time and attention of the merchant; upon any tempting offer or extraordinary accident in trade, it is not so easily converted into money; and as it attracts too much, both  
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by the many natural pleasures it affords, and the authority it gives, it soon converts the citizen into the country gentleman. More men, therefore, with large stocks and incomes, may naturally be supposed to continue in trade, where there are public debts : and this, it must be owned, is of some advantage to commerce, by diminishing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging industry \*.

BUT, in opposition to these two favourable circumstances, perhaps of no very great importance, weigh the many disadvantages which attend our public debts, in the whole *interior* oeconomy of the state : You will find no comparison between the ill and the good which result from them.

*First*, 'Tis certain, that national debts cause a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital, by the great sums which are levied in the provinces to pay the interest of those debts ; and perhaps, too, by the advantages in trade above mentioned, which they give the merchants in the capital above the rest of the kingdom. The question is, Whether, in our

\* On this head, I shall observe, without interrupting the thread of the argument, that the multiplicity of our public debts serves rather to sink the interest, and that the more the government borrows, the cheaper may they expect to borrow ; contrary to first appearance, and contrary to common opinion. The profits of trade have an influence on interest. See Essay IV.

safe,

case, it be for the public interest, that so many privileges should be conferred on LONDON, which has already arrived at such an enormous size, and seems still increasing? Some men are apprehensive of the consequences. For my part, I cannot forbear thinking, that tho' the head is undoubtedly too big for the body, yet that great city is so happily situated, that its excessive bulk causes less inconvenience than even a smaller capital to a greater kingdom. There is more difference between the prices of all provisions in PARIS and LANGUEDOC, than between those in LONDON and YORKSHIRE.

*Secondly*, PUBLIC stocks, being a kind of paper-credit, have all the disadvantages attending that species of money. They banish gold and silver from the most considerable commerce of the state, reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all provisions and labour dearer than otherwise they would be.

*Thirdly*, THE taxes which are levied to pay the interests of these debts, are a check upon industry, heighten the price of labour, and are an oppression on the poorer sort.

*Fourthly*, As foreigners possess a share of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occasion the transport of our people and our industry.

*Fifthly*,

*Fifthly,* The greatest part of public stock being always in the hands of idle people, who live on their revenue, our funds give great encouragement to an useless and inactive life.

BUT tho' the injury which arises to commerce and industry from our public funds, will appear, upon balancing the whole, very considerable, it is trivial, in comparison of the prejudice which results to the state considered as a body politic, which must support itself in the society of nations, and have various transactions with other states, in wars and negotiations. The ill, there, is pure and unmixed, without any favourable circumstance to atone for it: and 'tis an ill too of a nature the highest and most important.

We have, indeed, been told, that the public is no weaker upon account of its debts; since they are mostly due among ourselves, and bring as much property to one as they take from another. 'Tis like transferring money from the right hand to the left; which leaves the person neither richer nor poorer than before. Such loose reasonings and specious comparisons will always pass, where we judge not upon principles. I ask, Is it possible, in the nature of things, to overburthen a nation with taxes, even where the sovereign resides among them? The very doubt seems extravagant; since 'tis requisite in every commonwealth, that there be a certain proportion observed between the

the laborious and the idle part of it. But if all our present taxes be mortgaged, must we not invent new ones? And may not this matter be carried to a length that is ruinous and destructive?

In every nation, there are always some methods of levying money more easy than others, suitable to the way of living of the people, and the commodities they make use of. In BRITAIN, the excises upon malt and beer afford a very large revenue; because the operations of malting and brewing are very tedious, and are impossible to be concealed; and at the same time, these commodities are not so absolutely necessary to life, as that the raising their price would very much affect the poorer sort. These taxes being all mortgaged, what difficulty to find new ones! what vexation and ruin of the poor!

DUTIES upon consumptions are more equal and easy than those upon possessions. What a loss to the public, that the former are all exhausted, and that we must have recourse to the more grievous method of levying taxes!

WERE all the proprietors of land only stewards to the public, must not necessity force them to practise all the arts of oppression used by stewards, where the absence or negligence of the proprietor render them secure against enquiry?

It will scarce be asserted, that no bounds ought ever to be set to national debts; and that the public would be no weaker, were twelve or fifteen shillings in the pound, land-tax, mortgaged, with all the present customs and excises. There is something therefore in the case, beside the mere transferring of property from one hand to another. In 500 years, the posterity of those now in the coaches, and of those upon the boxes, will probably have changed places, without affecting the public by these revolutions.

I must confess, that there is a strange supineness, from long custom, crept into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts, not unlike what divines so vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, that the most sanguine imagination cannot hope, either that this or any future ministry will be possessed of such rigid and steady frugality, as to make any considerable progress in the payment of our debts; or that the situation of foreign affairs will, for any long time, allow them leisure and tranquility for such an undertaking\*. *What then*

\* In times of peace and security, when alone it is possible to pay debt, the monied interest are averse to receive partial payments, which they know not how to dispose of to advantage; and the landed interest are averse to continue the taxes requisite for that purpose. Why therefore should a minister persevere in a measure so disagreeable to all parties? For the sake, I suppose, of  
of

*then is to become of us?* Were we ever so good Christians, and ever so resigned to Providence; this, methinks, were a curious question, even considered as a speculative one, and what it might not be altogether impossible to form some conjectural solution of. The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negotiations, intrigues and factions. There seems to be a natural progress of things, which may guide our reasoning. As it would have required but a moderate share of prudence, when we first began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of ministers, that things would necessarily be carried to the length we see; so now that they have at last happily reached it, it may not be difficult to guess at the consequences. It must, indeed, be one of these two events; either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation. 'Tis impossible they can both subsist, after the manner they have been hitherto managed, in this, as well as in some other nations.

THERE was, indeed, a scheme for the payment of our debts, which was proposed by an excellent citi-

of a posterity, which he will never see, or of a few reasonable reflecting people, whose united interest, perhaps, will not be able to secure him the smallest burrough in ENGLAND. 'Tis not likely we shall ever find any minister so bad a politician. With regard to these narrow destructive maxims of politics, all ministers are expert enough.



zen, Mr. HUTCHINSON, above thirty years ago, and which was much approved of by some men of sense, but never was likely to take effect. He asserted, that there was a fallacy in imagining that the public owed this debt; for that really every individual owed a proportional share of it, and paid, in his taxes, a proportional share of the interest, beside the expences of levying these taxes. Had we not better, then, says he, make a proportional distribution of the debt among us, and each of us contribute a sum suitable to his property, and by that means discharge at once all our funds and public mortgages? He seems not to have considered, that the laborious poor pay a considerable part of the taxes by their annual consumptions, tho' they could not advance, at once, a proportional part of the sum required. Not to mention, that property in money and stock in trade might easily be concealed or disguised; and that visible property in lands and houses would really at last answer for the whole: An inequality and oppression which never would be submitted to. But tho' this project is never likely to take place; 'tis not altogether improbable, that when the nation become heartily sick of their debts, and are cruelly oppressed by them, some daring projector may arise with visionary schemes, for their discharge. And as public credit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, the least touch will

destroy it, as happened in FRANCE; and in this manner it will *die of the doctor*\*:

BUT 'tis more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the necessary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of victories and conquests. I must confess, when I see princes and states fighting and quarrelling, amidst their debts, funds, and public mortgages, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a *China* shop. How can it be expected, that sovereigns will spare a species of property, which is pernicious to themselves and to the public, when they have so little compassion on lives and properties, which are useful to both? Let the time come (and

\* Some neighbouring states practise an easy expedient, by which they lighten their public debts. The FRENCH have a custom (as the ROMANS formerly had) of augmenting their money; and this the nation has been so much familiarized to, that it hurts not public credit, tho' it be really cutting off at once, by an edict, so much of their debts. The DUTCH diminish the interest, without the consent of their creditors; or, which is the same thing, they arbitrarily tax the funds as well as other property. Could we practise either of these methods, we need never be oppressed by the national debt; and 'tis not impossible but one of these, or some other method, may, at all adventures, be tried, on the augmentation of our incumbrances and difficulties. But people in this country are so good reasoners upon whatever regards their interest, that such a practice will deceive no body; and public credit will probably tumble at once by so dangerous a trial.

surely it will come) when the new funds, created for the exigencies of the year, are not subscribed to, and raise not the money projected. Suppose, either that the cash of the nation is exhausted; or that our faith, which has been hitherto so ample, begins to fail us. Suppose, that, in this distress, the nation is threatened with an invasion; ; a rebellion is suspected or broke out at home; a squadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign subsidy cannot be advanced. What must a prince or minister do in such an emergence? The right of self-preservation is analienable in every individual, much more in every community. And the folly of our statesmen must then be greater than the folly of those who first contracted debt, or, what is more, than that of those who trusted, or continue to trust this security, if these statesmen have the means of safety in their hands, and do not employ them. The funds, created and mortgaged, will, by that time, bring in a large yearly revenue, sufficient for the defence and security of the nation: Money is perhaps lying in the exchequer, ready for the discharge of the quarterly interest: Necessity calls, fear urges, reason exhorts, compassion alone exclaims: The money will immediately be seized for the current service, under the most solemn protestations, perhaps, of being immediately replaced. But no more is requisite. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thousands in its ruins. And this, I think, may  
be

be called the *natural death* of public credit: For to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to its dissolution and destruction †.

THESE

† So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, notwithstanding such a violent shock to public credit, as a voluntary bankruptcy in ENGLAND would occasion, it would not probably be long, ere credit would again revive in as flourishing a condition as before. The present king of FRANCE, during the late war, borrowed money at lower interest than ever his grandfather did; and as low as the BRITISH parliament, comparing the natural rate of interest in both kingdoms. And tho' men are commonly more governed by what they have seen, than by what they foresee, with whatever certainty; yet promises, protestations, fair appearances, with the allurements of present interest, have such powerful interest as few are able to resist. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the same baits: The same tricks, played over and over again, still trepan them. The heights of popularity and patriotism are still the beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; standing armies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal interest of the clergy. The fear of an everlasting destruction of credit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needless bugbear. A prudent man, in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after they had taken a sponge to their debts, as at present; as much as an opulent knave, even tho' one could not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honest bankrupt: For the former, in order to carry on business, may find it his interest to discharge his debts, where they are not exorbitant: The latter has it not in his power. The reasoning of TACITUS, *Hist. lib. 3.* as it is eternally true, is very applicable to our present case. *Sed vulgus ad*

THESE two events, supposed above, are calamitous, but not the most calamitous. Thousands are hereby sacrificed to the safety of millions. But we are not without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be sacrificed for ever to the temporary safety of thousands\*. Our popular

*magnitudinem beneficiorum aderat: Stultissimus quisque petitiis mercabatur: Apud sapientes cassa habebantur, quæ neque dari neque accipi, salva republica, poterant.* The public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check which the creditors have on it, is the interest of preserving credit; an interest, which may easily be overbalanced by a very great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even supposing that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention, that a present necessity often forces states into measures which are, strictly speaking, against their interest.

\* I have heard it has been computed, that the whole creditors of the public, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000. These make a figure at present on their income; but, in case of a public bankruptcy, would, in an instant, become the lowest, as well as the most wretched of the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted; and would render the contention very unequal, if ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to assign to this event a very near period, such as half a century, had not our fathers' prophecies of this kind been already found fallacious, by the duration of our public credit, so much beyond all reasonable expectation. When the astrologers in FRANCE were every year foretelling the death of HARRY IV. *These fellows, says he, must*  
be

popular government, perhaps, will render it difficult or dangerous for a minister to venture on so desperate an expedient, as that of a voluntary bankruptcy. And tho' the house of Lords be altogether composed of the proprietors of lands, and the house of Commons chiefly; and consequently neither of them can be supposed to have great property in the funds: Yet the connections of the members may be so great with the proprietors, as to render them more tenacious of public faith, than prudence, policy, or even justice, strictly speaking, requires. And perhaps, too, our foreign enemies, or rather enemy (for we have but one to dread) may be so politic as to discover, that our safety lies in despair, and may not, therefore, show the danger, open and barefaced, till it be inevitable. The balance of power in EUROPE, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all justly esteemed too unequal to be preserved without our attention and assistance. But our children, weary with the struggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may sit down secure, and see their neighbours oppressed and conquered; till, at last, they themselves and their creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror. And this may properly enough be denominated the *violent death* of our public credit.

*be right at last.* We shall, therefore, be more cautious than to assign any precise date; and shall content ourselves with pointing out the event in general.

THESE seem to be the events which are not very remote, and which reason foresees as clearly almost as she can do any thing that lies in the womb of time. And tho' the antients maintained that, in order to reach the gift of prophecy, a certain divine fury or madness was requisite, one may safely affirm, that, in order to deliver such prophecies as these, no more is necessary, than merely to be in one's senses, free from the influence of popular madness and delusion.

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# ESSAY X.

## OF SOME REMARKABLE CUSTOMS.

**I** SHALL observe three remarkable customs in three celebrated governments; and shall conclude from the whole, that all general maxims in politics ought to be established with great reserve; and that irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently discovered in the moral, as well as in the physical world. The former, perhaps, we can better account for, after they happen, from springs and principles, of which every one has, within himself, or from obvious observation, the strongest assurance and conviction: But 'tis often fully as impossible for human prudence, beforehand, to foresee and foretel them.

I. ONE would think it essential to every supreme council or assembly, which debates, that intire liberty of speech should be granted to every member, and that all motions or reasonings should be received, which can any way tend to illustrate the point under deliberation. One would conclude, with still greater



assurance, that, after a motion was made, which was voted and approved by that assembly in which the legislature is lodged, the member who made the motion must for ever be exempted from farther trial or inquiry. But no political maxim can, at first sight, appear more undisputable, than that he must, at least, be secured from all inferior jurisdiction; and that nothing less than the same supreme legislative assembly, in their subsequent meetings, could render him accountable for those motions and harangues which they had before approved of. But these axioms, however irrefragable they may appear, have all failed in the ATHENIAN government, from causes and principles too, which appear almost inevitable.

By the *γὰρ τὸν ἀνόμιμον* or indictment of illegality, (tho' it has not been remarked by antiquaries or commentators) any man was tried and punished in a common court of judicature, for any law which had passed upon his motion, in the assembly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjust, or prejudicial to the public. Thus DEMOSTHENES, finding that ship-money was levied irregularly, and that the poor bore the same burden as the rich in equipping the galleys, corrected this inequality by a very useful law, which proportioned the expence to the revenue and income of each individual. He moved for this law in the assembly; he proved its advantages \*; he

\* His harangue for it is still extant; *ὡς ἐστὶν ὑπομνηστικόν.*

convinced

convinced the people, the only legislature in ATHENS ; the law passed, and was carried into execution : And yet he was tried in a criminal court for that law, upon the complaint of the rich, who resented the alteration he had introduced into the finances \*. He was indeed acquitted, upon proving anew the usefulness of this law.

CTESIPHON moved in the assembly of the people, that particular honours should be conferred on DEMOSTHENES, as on a citizen affectionate and useful to the commonwealth : The people, convinced of this truth, voted those honours : Yet was CTESIPHON tried by the *γερύνη παρανομία*. It was asserted, among other topics, that DEMOSTHENES was not a good citizen, nor affectionate to the commonwealth : And the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and consequently himself ; which he executed by that sublime piece of eloquence, that has ever since been the admiration of mankind.

AFTER the battle of CHÆRONEA, a law was passed, upon the motion of HYPERIDES, giving liberty to slaves, and inrolling them in the troops †. On

\* PRO CTESIPHONTE.

† PLUTARCHUS in *vita decem oratorum*. DEMOSTHENES gives a different account of this law. *Contra* ARISTOGITON. *orat.* II. He says, That its purport was, to render the *αἰχμῶτες*

On account of this law, the orator was afterward tried by the indictment above mentioned, and defended himself, among other topics, by that stroke celebrated by PLUTARCH and LONGINUS. *It was not I, said he, that moved for this law: It was the necessities of war; it was the battle of CHÆRONÆA.* The orations of DEMOSTHENES abound with many instances of trials of this nature, and prove clearly, that nothing was more commonly practised.

THE ATHENIAN Democracy was such a tumultuary government, as we can scarce form a notion of in the present age of the world. The whole collective body of the people voted in every law, without any limitation of property, without any distinction of rank, without controul from any magistracy or senate\*; and consequently without regard to order, justice, or prudence. The ATHENIANS soon became sensible of the mischiefs attending this constitution: But being averse to the checking themselves by any rule or restriction, they resolved, at least, to check

extrajudicial, or to restore the privilege of bearing offices to those who had been declared incapable. Perhaps these were both clauses of the same law.

\* The senate of the Bean was only a less numerous mob, chosen by lot from among the people; and their authority was not great.

their

their demagogues or counsellors, by the fear of future punishment and inquiry. They accordingly instituted this remarkable law; a law esteemed so essential to their government, that *ÆSCHINES* insists on it as a known truth, that, were it abolished or neglected, it were impossible for the Democracy to subsist †.

THE people feared not any ill consequences to liberty from the authority of the criminal courts; because these were nothing but very numerous juries, chosen by lot from among the people. And they considered themselves justly as in a state of pupillage; where they had an authority, after they came to the use of reason, not only to retract and controul whatever had been determined, but to punish any guardian for measures which they had embraced by his persuasion. The same law had place in *THEBES* ‖; and for the same reason.

It appears to have been an usual practice in *ATHENS*, on the establishment of any law esteemed

† *Is Ctesiphontem*. 'Tis remarkable, that the first step after the dissolution of the Democracy by *CRITIAS* and the Thirty, was to annul the *γραφη παρανομων*, as we learn from *DEMOSTHENES κατὰ Τιμόκλ.* The orator in this oration gives us the words of the law, establishing the *γραφη παρανομων*, pag. 297. *ex edit.* ALDI. And he accounts for it, from the same principles that we here reason upon.

‖ *PEUT. in vita PELOR.*

very

very useful or popular, to prohibit for ever its abrogation and repeal. Thus the demagogue, who diverted all the public revenues to the support of shows and spectacles, made it criminal so much as to move for a repeal of this law †. Thus LEFTINES moved for a law, not only to recall all the immunities formerly granted,\* but to deprive the people for the future of the power of granting any more ‡. Thus all bills of attainder || were forbid, or laws that affect one ATHENIAN, without extending to the whole commonwealth. These absurd clauses, by which the legislature vainly attempted to bind itself for ever, proceeded from an universal sense of the levity and inconstancy of the people.

II. A WHEEL within a wheel, such as we observe in the GERMAN empire, is considered by Lord SHAFTESBURY \* as an absurdity in politics : But what must we say to two equal wheels, which govern the same political machine, without any mutual check, controul, or subordination ; and yet preserve the greatest harmony and concord ? To establish two distinct legislatures, each of which possesses full and

† DEMOST. *Olynth.* l. 2.

‡ DEMOST. *contra LEFT.*

|| DEMOST. *contra ARISTOCRATUM.*

\* Essay on the freedom of wit and humour, part 3. § 2.

absolute authority within itself, and stands in no need of the other's assistance, in order to give validity to its acts; this may appear, beforehand, altogether impracticable, as long as men are actuated by the passions of ambition, emulation, and avarice, which have been hitherto their chief governing principles. And should I assert, that the state I have in my eye was divided into two distinct factions, each of which predominated in a distinct legislature, and yet produced no clashing in these independent powers; the supposition may appear almost incredible. And if, to augment the paradox, I should affirm, that this disjointed, irregular government, was the most active, triumphant, and illustrious commonwealth, that ever yet appeared on the stage of the world; I should certainly be told, that such a political chimera was as absurd as any vision of the poets. But there is no need for searching long, in order to prove the reality of the foregoing suppositions: For this was actually the case with the ROMAN republic.

THE legislative power was there lodged both in the *comitia centuriata* and *comitia tributa*. In the former, 'tis well known, the people voted according to their *census*; so that when the first class was unanimous, tho' it contained not, perhaps, the hundredth part of the commonwealth, it determined the whole; and, with the authority of the senate, established a law. In the latter, every vote was alike; and as  
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the authority of the senate was not there requisite, the lower people intirely prevailed, and gave law to the whole state. In all party-divisions, at first between the PATRICIANS and PLEBEIANS, afterwards between the nobles and the people, the interest of the Aristocracy was predominant in the first legislature; that of the Democracy in the second: The one could always destroy what the other had established: Nay, the one, by a sudden and unforeseen motion, might take the start of the other, and totally annihilate its rival, by a vote, which, from the nature of the constitution, had the full authority of a law. But no such contest or struggle is observed in the history of ROME: No instance of a quarrel between these two legislatures; tho' many between the parties that governed in each. Whence arose this concord, which may seem so extraordinary?

THE legislature established at ROME, by the authority of SERVIUS TULLIUS, was the *comitia centuriata*, which, after the expulsion of the kings, rendered the government, for some time, altogether aristocratical. But the people, having numbers and force on their side, and being elated with frequent conquests and victories in their foreign wars, always prevailed when pushed to extremities, and first extorted from the senate the magistracy of the tribunes, and then the legislative power of the *comitia tributa*. It then behoved the nobles to be more careful than ever

not

not to provoke the people. For beside the force which the latter were always possessed of, they had now got possession of legal authority, and could instantly break in pieces any order or institution which directly opposed them. By intrigue, by influence, by money, by combination, and by the respect paid their character, the nobles might often prevail, and direct the whole machine of government: But had they openly set their *comitia centuriata* in opposition to the *tributa*, they had soon lost the advantage of that institution, together with their consuls, prætors, ædiles, and all the magistrates elected by it. But the *comitia tributa*, not having the same reason for respecting the *centuriata*, frequently repealed laws favourable to the Aristocracy: They limited the authority of the nobles, protected the people from oppression, and controlled the actions of the senate and magistracy. The *centuriata* found it convenient always to submit; and tho' equal in authority, yet being inferior in power, durst never directly give any shock to the other legislature, either by repealing its laws, or establishing laws, which, it foresaw, would soon be repealed by it.

No instance is found of any opposition or struggle between these *comitia*; except one slight attempt of this kind, mentioned by APPIAN in the third book of his civil wars. MARK ANTHONY, resolving to deprive DECIMUS BRUTUS of the government of

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CISALPINE GAUL, railed in the *Forum*; and called one of the *comitia*, in order to prevent the meeting of the other, which had been ordered by the senate. But affairs were then fallen into such confusion, and the ROMAN constitution was so near its final dissolution, that no inference can be drawn from such an expedient. This contest, besides, was founded more on form than party. It was the senate who ordered the *comitia tributa*, that they might obstruct the meeting of the *centuriata*, which, by the constitution, or at least forms of the government, could alone dispose of provinces.

CICERO was recalled by the *comitia centuriata*, tho' banished by the *tributa*, that is, by a *pletiscitum*. But his banishment, we may observe, never was considered as a legal deed, arising from the free choice and inclination of the people. It was always ascribed to the violence alone of CLODIUS, and the disorders introduced by him into the government.

III. THE *third* custom which we proposed to observe, regards ENGLAND; and tho' it be not so important as those which we have pointed out in ATHENS and ROME, it is no less singular and remarkable. 'Tis a maxim in politics, which we readily admit as undisputed and universal, That a power, however great, when granted by law to an eminent magistrate, is not so dangerous to liberty, as an authority,

thority, however inconsiderable, which he acquires from violence and usurpation. For, besides that the law always limits every power which it bestows, the very receiving it as a concession establishes the authority whence it is derived, and preserves the harmony of the constitution. By the same right that one prerogative is assumed without law, another may also be claimed, and another, with still greater facility; while the first usurpations both serve as precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroism of HAMPDEN, who sustained the whole violence of royal prosecution, rather than pay a tax of twenty shillings not imposed by parliament; hence the care of all ENGLISH patriots to guard against the first encroachments of the crown; and hence alone the existence, at this day, of ENGLISH liberty.

THERE is, however, one occasion, where the parliament has departed from this maxim; and that is, in the *pressing of seamen*. The exercise of an illegal power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and tho' it has frequently been under deliberation, how that power might be rendered legal, and granted, under proper restrictions to the sovereign, no safe expedient could ever be proposed for that purpose, and the danger to liberty always appeared greater from law than from usurpation. While this power is exercised to no other end than to man the navy, men willingly submit

submit to it, from a sense of its use and necessity ; and the sailors, who are alone affected by it, find no body to support them, in claiming the rights and privileges which the law grants, without distinction, to all ENGLISH subjects. But were this power, on any occasion, made an instrument of faction or ministerial tyranny, the opposite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, would immediately take the alarm, and support the injured party ; the liberty of ENGLISHMEN would be asserted ; juries would be implacable ; and the tools of tyranny, acting both against law and equity, would meet with the severest vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to grant such an authority, they would probably fall into one of these two inconveniencies : They would either bestow it under so many restrictions as would make it lose its effects, by cramping the authority of the crown ; or they would render it so large and comprehensive, as might give occasion to great abuses, for which we could, in that case, have no remedy. The very illegality of the power, at present, prevents its abuses, by affording so easy a remedy against them.

I PRETEND not, by this reasoning, to exclude all possibility of contriving a register for seamen, which might man the navy, without being dangerous to liberty. I only observe, that no satisfactory scheme of that nature has yet been proposed. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a  
practice

practice seemingly the most absurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of full internal peace and concord, is armed against law. A continued and open usurpation in the crown is permitted, amidst the greatest jealousy and watchfulness in the people; nay proceeding from those very principles: Liberty, in a country of the highest liberty, is left intirely to its own defence, without any countenance or protection: The wild state of nature is renewed, in one of the most civilized societies of mankind: And great violences and disorders among the people, the most humane and the best natured, are committed with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the supreme magistrate, the other the sanction of fundamental laws.



# ESSAY XI.

Of the POPULOUSNESS OF ANTIENT NATIONS \*.

**T**HERE is very little ground, either from reason or experience, to conclude the universe eternal or incorruptible. The continual and rapid motion of

\* An ingenious writer has honoured this discourse with an answer, full of politeness, erudition, and good sense. So learned a refutation would have made the author suspect, that his reasonings were entirely overthrown, had he not used the precaution, from the beginning, to keep himself on the sceptical side; and having taken this advantage of the ground, he was enabled, tho' with much inferior forces, to preserve himself from a total defeat. That Reverend gentleman will always find, where his antagonist is so entrenched, that it will be very difficult to force him. VARRO, in such a situation, could defend himself against HANNIBAL, PHARNACES against CÆSAR. The author, however, very willingly acknowledges, that his antagonist has detected many mistakes both in his authorities and reasonings; and it was owing entirely to that gentleman's indulgence, that many more errors were not remarked. In this edition, advantage has been taken of his learned animadversions, and the Essay has been rendered less imperfect than formerly.

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matter, the violent revolutions with which every part is agitated, the changes remarked in the heavens, the plain traces as well as tradition of an universal deluge, or general convulsion of the elements; all these prove strongly the mortality of this fabric of the world, and its passage, by corruption or dissolution, from one state or order to another. It must, therefore, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age, as well as each individual form which it contains; and 'tis probable, that, in all these variations, man, equally with every animal and vegetable, will partake. In the flourishing age of the world, it may be expected, that the human species should possess greater vigour both of mind and body, more prosperous health, higher spirits, longer life, and a stronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general system of things, and human society of course, have any such gradual revolutions, they are too slow to be discernible in that short period which is comprehended by history and tradition. Stature and force of body, length of life, even courage and extent of genius, seem hitherto to have been naturally, in all ages, pretty much the same. The arts and sciences, indeed, have flourished in one period, and have decayed in another. But we may observe, that at the time when they rose to greatest perfection among one people, they were perhaps totally unknown to all the neighbouring nations; and

and tho' they universally decayed in one age; yet in a succeeding generation they again revived, and diffused themselves over the world. As far, therefore, as observation reaches, there is no universal difference discernible in the human species: And tho' it were allowed, that the universe, like an animal body, had a natural progress from infancy to old age; yet as it must still be uncertain whether, at present, it be advancing to its point of perfection, or declining from it, we cannot thence presuppose any decay in human nature \*. To prove, therefore, or account for the greater populousness of antiquity, by the imaginary youth or vigour of the world, will scarce be admitted by any just reasoner. These *general physical* causes ought entirely to be excluded from that question.

THERE are indeed some more *particular physical* causes of great importance. Diseases are mentioned

\* COLUMELLA says, lib. 3. cap. 8. that in ÆGYPT and AFRICA the bearing of twins was frequent, and even customary; *gemini partus familiares, ac pæne solennes sunt*. If this was true, there is a physical difference both in countries and ages. For travellers make no such remarks of these countries at present. On the contrary, we are apt to suppose the northern nations more fertile. As those two countries were provinces of the Roman empire, 'tis difficult, tho' not altogether absurd, to suppose that such a man as COLUMELLA might be mistaken with regard to them.



in antiquity, which are almost unknown to modern medicine; and new diseases have arisen, and propagated themselves, of which there are no traces in ancient history. And in this particular we may observe, upon comparison, that the disadvantage is very much on the side of the moderns. Not to mention some others of less importance; the small pox commits such ravages, as would almost alone account for the great superiority ascribed to ancient times. The tenth or the twelfth part of mankind, destroyed every generation, should make a vast difference, it may be thought, in the numbers of the people; and when joined to venereal distempers, a new plague diffused every where, this disease is perhaps equivalent, by its constant operation, to the three great scourges of mankind, war, pestilence, and famine. Were it certain, therefore, that ancient times were more populous than the present, and could no moral causes be assigned for so great a change; these physical causes alone, in the opinion of many, would be sufficient to give us satisfaction on that head.

BUT is it certain, that antiquity was so much more populous, as is pretended? The extravagancies of VOSSIUS, with regard to his subject, are well known. But an author of much greater genius and discernment has ventured to affirm, that, according to the best computations which these subjects will admit of, there are not now, on the face of the earth, the fiftieth.

tieth part of mankind, which existed in the time of JULIUS CÆSAR \*. It may easily be observed, that the comparisons, in this case, must be very imperfect, even tho' we confine ourselves to the scene of antient history; EUROPE, and the nations about the MEDITERRANEAN. We know not exactly the numbers of any EUROPEAN kingdom, or even city, at present: How can we pretend to calculate those of antient cities and states, where historians have left us such imperfect traces? For my part, the matter appears to me so uncertain, that, as I intend to throw together some reflections on that head, I shall intermingle the inquiry concerning *causes* with that concerning *facts*; which ought never to be admitted, where the facts can be ascertained with any tolerable assurance. We shall, *first*, consider, whether it be probable, from what we know of the situation of society in both periods, that antiquity must have been more populous; *secondly*, whether in reality it was so. If I can make it appear, that the conclusion is not so certain as is pretended, in favour of antiquity, 'tis all I aspire to.

IN general, we may observe, that the question with regard to the comparative populousness of ages or kingdoms implies very important consequences, and commonly determines concerning the preference of their

\* *Lettres PERSANES*, See also *L'Esprit des Loix*, liv. 23, cap. 17, 18, 19.

whole police, their manners, and the constitution of their government. For as there is in all men, both male and female, a desire and power of generation, more active than is ever universally exerted, the restraints which they lie under, must proceed from some difficulties in their situation, which it belongs to a wise legislature carefully to observe and remove. Almost every man who thinks he can maintain a family, will have one; and the human species, at this rate of propagation, would more than double every generation. How fast do mankind multiply in every colony or new settlement; where it is an easy matter to provide for a family; and where men are no way straitened or confined, as in long established governments? History tells us frequently of plagues, which have swept away the third or fourth part of a people: Yet in a generation or two, the destruction was not perceived; and the society had again acquired their former number. The lands which were cultivated, the houses built, the commodities raised, the riches acquired, enabled the people who escaped, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which supplied the place of those who had perished \*. And for a like reason,  
every

\* This too is a good reason why the small-pox does not depopulate countries so much as may at first sight be imagined. Where there is room for more people, they will always arise, even without the assistance of naturalization-bills. 'Tis remarked by Don

every wise, just, and mild government, by rendering the condition of its subjects easy and secure, will always abound most in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whose climate and soil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which produces only corn, and that more populous than one which is only fitted for pasturage. But if every thing else be equal, it seems natural to expect, that where-ever there are most happiness and virtue, and the wisest institutions, there will also be most people.

THE question, therefore, concerning the populousness of antient and modern times, being allowed of great importance, it will be requisite, if we would bring it to some determination, to compare both the *domestic* and *political* situation of these two periods, in order, to judge of the facts by their moral causes; which is the *first* view in which we proposed to consider them.

THE chief difference between the *domestic* oeconomy of the ancients and that of the moderns consists in the practice of slavery, which prevailed among the former, and which has been abolished for some cen-

GERONIMO DE USTARIZ, that the provinces of SPAIN which send most people to the INDIES, are most populous; which proceeds from their superior riches.

turies thro'out the greatest part of EUROPE. Some passionate admirers of the antients, and zealous partizans of civil liberty, (for these sentiments, as they are both of them, in the main, extremely just, are found to be almost inseparable) cannot forbear regretting the loss of this institution; and whilst they brand all submission to the government of a single person with the harsh denomination of slavery, they would gladly reduce the greatest part of mankind to real slavery and subjection. But to one who considers coolly on the subject, it will appear, that human nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at present, in the most arbitrary government of EUROPE, than it ever did during the most flourishing period of antient times. As much as submission to a petty prince, whose dominions extend not beyond a single city, is more grievous than obedience to a great monarch; so much is domestic slavery more cruel and oppressive than any civil subjection whatsoever. The more the master is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we enjoy; the less are our actions inspected and controled; and the fainter that cruel comparison becomes between our own subjection, and the freedom, and even dominion of another. The remains that are found of domestic slavery, in the AMERICAN colonies, and among some EUROPEAN nations, would never surely create a desire of rendering it more universal. The little humanity commonly  
observed

observed in persons accustomed, from their infancy, to exercise so great authority over their fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were sufficient alone to disgust us with that authority. Nor can a more probable reason be given for the severe, I might say, barbarous, manners of antient times, than the practice of domestic slavery; by which every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidst the flattery, submission, and low debasement of his slaves.

ACCORDING to the antient practice, all checks were on the inferior, to restrain him to the duty of submission; none on the superior, to engage him to the reciprocal duties of gentleness and humanity. In modern times, a bad servant finds not easily a good master, nor a bad master a good servant; and the checks are mutual, suitable to the inviolable and eternal laws of reason and equity.

THE custom of exposing old, useless, or sick slaves in an island of the TYBER, there to starve, seems to have been pretty common in ROME; and whoever recovered, after having been so exposed, had his liberty given him, by an edict of the emperor CLAUDIUS; where it was likewise forbid to kill any slave merely for old age or sickness\*. But supposing that this

\* SUTTONIUS in vita CLAUDII.

edict was strictly obeyed, would it better the domestic treatment of slaves, or render their lives much more comfortable? We may imagine what others would practise, when it was the professed maxim of the elder CATO, to sell his superannuated slaves for any price, rather than maintain what he esteemed an useless burthen \*.

THE *ergastula*, or dungeons, where slaves in chains were forced to work, were very common all over ITALY. COLUMELLA † advises, that they be always built under ground; and recommends ‡ it as the duty of a careful overseer, to call over every day the names of these slaves, like the mustering of a regiment or ship's company, in order to know presently when any of them had deserted. A proof of the frequency of these *ergastula*; and of the great number of slaves usually confined in them.

A CHAINED slave for a porter was usual in ROME, as appears from OVID §, and other authors †. Had not these people shaken off all sense of compassion towards that unhappy part of their species, would

\* PLUT. in vita CATONIS.

† Lib. 1. cap. 6.

‡ Id. lib. 11. cap. 1.

§ Amor. lib. 1. eleg. 6.

† SUTTON. de claris rhetor. So also the antient poet. *Janitoris tintinnare impediuntur audio.*

they

they have presented all their friends, at the first entrance, with such an image of the severity of the master, and misery of the slave?

NOTHING so common in all trials, even of civil causes, as to call for the evidence of slaves; which was always extorted by the most exquisite torments. DEMOSTHENES says\*, that where it was possible to produce, for the same fact, either freemen or slaves as witnesses, the judges always preferred the torturing of slaves, as a more certain and infallible evidence†.

SENECA draws a picture of that disorderly luxury; which changes day into night, and night into day, and inverts every stated hour of every office in life. Among other circumstances, such as displacing the meals and times of bathing, he mentions, that regularly, about the third hour of the night, the neighbours of one who indulges this false refinement, hear the noise of whips and lashes; and, upon inquiry, find that he is then taking an account of the conduct of his servants, and giving them due correction and discipline. This is not remarked as an instance of cruelty, but only of disorder, which, even in actions the most

\* In *Oniterem orat.* 1.

† The same practice was common in ROME; but CICERO seems not to think this evidence so certain as the testimony of free-citizens. *Pro Coelio.*



usual and methodical, changes the fixed hours that an established custom had assigned them \*.

BUT our present business is only to consider the influence of slavery on the populousness of a state. 'Tis pretended, that, in this particular, the antient practice had infinitely the advantage, and was the chief cause of that extreme populousness which is supposed in those times. At present, all masters discourage the marrying of their male servants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the female, who are then supposed altogether incapacitated for

\* *Epist.* 122. The inhuman sports exhibited at ROME, may justly be considered too as an effect of the people's contempt for slaves, and was also a great cause of the general inhumanity of their princes and rulers. Who can read the accounts of the amphitheatrical entertainments without horror? Or who is surprised, that the emperors should treat that people in the same way the people treated their inferiors? One's humanity, on that occasion, is apt to renew the barbarous wish of CALIGULA, that the people had but one neck. A man could almost be pleased, by a single blow, to put an end to such a race of monsters. You may thank God, says the author above cited, (*epist.* 7.) addressing himself to the ROMAN people, that you have a master, (*viz.* the mild and merciful NERO), who is incapable of learning cruelty from your example. This was spoke in the beginning of his reign: But he fitted them very well afterwards; and no doubt was considerably improved by the sight of the barbarous objects, to which he had, from his infancy, been accustomed.

their

their service. But where the property of the servants is lodged in the master, their marriage and fertility form his riches, and bring him a succession of slaves, that supply the place of those whom age and infirmity have disabled. He encourages, therefore, their propagation as much as that of his cattle; rears the young with the same care; and educates them to some art or calling, which may render them more useful or valuable to him. The opulent are, by this policy, interested in the being at least, tho' not the well-being of the poor; and enrich themselves, by increasing the number and industry of those who are subjected to them. Each man, being a sovereign in his own family, has the same interest with regard to it, as the prince with regard to the state; and has not, like the prince, any opposite motives of ambition or vain-glory, which may lead him to depopulate his little sovereignty. All of it is, at all times, under his eye; and he has leisure to inspect the most minute detail of the marriage and education of his subjects\*.

\* We may here observe, that if domestic slavery really increased populousness, it would be an exception to the general rule, that the happiness of any society and its populousness are necessary attendants. A master, from humour or interest, may make his slaves very unhappy, and yet be careful, from interest, to increase their number. Their marriage is not a matter of choice with them, no more than any other action of their life.

SUCH are the consequences of domestic slavery, according to the first aspect and appearance of things; But if we enter more deeply into the subject, we shall perhaps find reason to retract our hasty determinations: The comparison is shocking between the management of human creatures and that of cattle; but being extremely just, when applied to the present subject, it may be proper to trace the consequences of it. At the capital, near all great cities, in all populous, rich, industrious provinces, few cattle are bred. Provisions, lodging, attendance, labour, are there dear; and men find better their account in buying the cattle, after they come to a certain age, from the remoter and cheaper countries. These are consequently the only breeding countries for cattle; and by a parity of reason, for men too, when the latter are put on the same footing with the former. To rear a child in LONDON till he could be servicable, would cost much dearer, than to buy one of the same age from SCOTLAND or IRELAND; where he had been raised in a cottage, covered with rags, and fed on oatmeal or potatoes. Those who had slaves, therefore, in all the richer and more populous countries, would discourage the pregnancy of the females, and either prevent or destroy the birth. The human species would perish in those places where it ought to increase the fastest; and a perpetual recruit be needed from all the poorer and more desert provinces. Such a continued drain would tend mightily to depopulate the  
 state,

state, and render great cities ten times more destructive than with us; where every man is master of himself, and provides for his children from the powerful instinct of nature, not the calculations of sordid interest. If LONDON, at present, without much increasing, needs a yearly recruit from the country of 5000 people, as is commonly computed; what must it require, if the greatest part of the tradesmen and common people were slaves, and were hindered from breeding by their avaricious masters?

ALL antient authors tell us, that there was a perpetual flux of slaves to ITALY from the remoter provinces, particularly SYRIA, CILICIA\*, CAPPADOCIA, the Lesser ASIA, THRACE, and EGYPT: Yet the number of people increased not in ITALY; and writers complain of the continual decay of industry and agriculture†. Where then is that extreme fertility of the ROMAN slaves, which is commonly supposed? So far from multiplying, they could not, it seems, so much as keep up the stock, without im-

\* Ten thousand slaves in a day have been often sold for the use of the ROMANS, at DELUS in CILICIA. STRABO, lib. 14.

† COLUMELLA, lib. 1. *proem.* et cap. 2. et 7. VARRO, lib. 3. cap. 1. HORAT. lib. 2. od. 15. TACIT. *annal.* lib. 3. cap. 54. SEXTON, *in vita AUG.* cap. 72. PLINE. lib. 18. cap. 13.

menſe

menſe recruits. And tho' great numbers were continually manumitted, and converted into ROMAN citizens, the numbers even of theſe did not increaſe \*, till the freedom of the city was communicated to foreign provinces.

THE term for a ſlave born and bred in the family, was *verna* † ; and theſe ſlaves ſeem to have been intitled

\* *Minoris indici plebs ingenua*, ſays TACITUS, *ann. lib. 24. cap. 7.*

† As *ſervus* was the name of the genus, and *verna* of the ſpecies, without any correlative, this forms a ſtrong preſumption, that the latter were by far the leaſt numerous. 'Tis an univerſal obſervation which we may form upon language, that where two related parts of a whole bear any proportion to each other, in numbers, rank, or conſideration, there are always correlative terms invented, which answer to both the parts, and expreſs their mutual relation. If they bear no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the leſs, and marks its diſtinction from the whole. Thus *man* and *woman*, *maſter* and *ſervant*, *father* and *ſon*, *prince* and *ſubject*, *ſtranger* and *citizen*, are correlative terms. But the words, *ſeaman*, *carpenter*, *ſmith*, *tailor*, &c. have no correſpondent terms, which expreſs thoſe who are no ſeamen, no carpenter, &c. Languages differ very much with regard to the particular words where this diſtinction obtains; and may thence afford very ſtrong inferences, concerning the manners and cuſtoms of different nations. The military government of the ROMAN emperors had exalted the ſoldiery ſo high, that they balanced all the other orders of the ſtate : Hence *miles* and *paga-*

titled by custom to privileges and indulgences beyond others; a sufficient reason why the masters would not be fond of rearing many of that kind \*. Whoever is acquainted with the maxims of our planters, will acknowledge the justness of this observation †.

ATTICUS is much praised by his historian for the care which he took in recruiting his family from the

*ens* became relative terms; a thing, till then, unknown to antient, and still so to modern languages. Modern superstition exalted the clergy so high, that they overbalanced the whole state: Hence *clergy* and *laity* are terms opposed in all modern languages; and in these alone. And from the same principles I infer, that if the number of slaves bought by the ROMANS from foreign countries, had not extremely exceeded those bred at home, *verna* would have had a correlative, which would have expressed the former species of slaves. But these, it would seem, composed the main body of the antient slaves, and the latter were but a few exceptions.

\* *Verna* is used by ROMAN writers as a word equivalent to *scurra*, on account of the petulance and impudence of those slaves. MART. lib. I. ep. 42. HORACE also mentions the *vernae provocaci*; and PETRONIUS, cap. 24. *vernula urbanitas*. SENECA, *de provid.* cap. 1. *vernularum licentia*.

† 'Tis computed in the WEST-INDIES, that a stock of slaves grow worse five per cent. every year, unless new slaves be bought to recruit them. They are not able to keep up their number, even in those warm countries, where cloaths and provisions are so easily got. How much more must this happen in EUROPEAN countries, and in or near great cities?

slaves

slaves born in it †: May we not thence infer, that that practice was not then very common?

THE names of slaves in the GREEK comedies, SYRUS, MYRUS, GETA, THRAX, DAVUS, LYDUS, PHRYX, &c. afford a presumption, that at ATHENS, at least, most of the slaves were imported from foreign nations. The ATHENIANS, says STRABO \*, gave to their slaves, either the names of the nations whence they were bought, as LYDUS, SYRUS; or the names that were most common among those nations; as MANES or MIDAS to a PHRYGIAN, TIBIAS to a PAPHLAGONIAN.

DEMOSTHENES, after having mentioned a law which forbid any man to strike the slave of another, praises the humanity of this law; and adds, that if the barbarians from whom slaves were bought had information that their countrymen met with such gentle treatment, they would entertain a great esteem for the ATHENIANS †. ISOCRATES || too insinuates, that the slaves of the GREEKS were generally or very com-

† CORN. NEPOS in vita ATTICI. We may remark, that ATTICUS's estate lay chiefly in EPIRUS, which being a remote, desolate place, would render it profitable for him to rear slaves there.

\* LIB. 7.

† In MIDIAM, p. 221. ex edit. ALDI.

|| Panegy.

monly

monly barbarians. ARISTOTLE in his Politics \* plainly supposes, that a slave is always a foreigner. The antient comic writers represented the slaves, as speaking a barbarous language †. This was an imitation of nature.

\*Tis well known that DEMOSTHENES, in his nonage, had been defrauded of a large fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he recovered, by a prosecution at law, the value of his patrimony. His orations, on that occasion, still remain, and contain a very exact detail of the whole substance left by his father ‡, in money, merchandise, houses, and slaves, together with the value of each particular. Among the rest were 52 slaves, handicraftsmen, viz. 32 sword-cutlers, and 20 cabinet-makers||; all males; not a word of any wives, children, or family, which they certainly would have had, had it been a common custom at ATHENS to breed from the slaves: And the value of the whole must have depended very much on that circumstance. No female slaves are even so much as mentioned, except some house-maids, who belonged to his mo-

\* Lib. 7. cap. 16. sub. fin. I

† ARISTOTELIS Equites, l. 17. The antient scholiast remarks on this passage βαρβαρίζειν ὡς δακνόν.

‡ In *Apbobum orat.* 1.

|| κλανεποιοι, makers of those beds which the antients lay upon at meals.



ther. This argument has great force, if it be not altogether decisive.

CONSIDER this passage of PLUTARCH †, speaking of the elder CATO. “ He had a great number of  
“ slaves, whom he took care to buy at the sales of  
“ prisoners of war; and he chose them young, that  
“ they might easily be accustomed to any diet or manner of life, and be instructed in any business or labour, as men teach any thing to young dogs or horses.—And esteeming love the chief source of  
“ all disorders, he allowed the male slaves to have a  
“ commerce with the female in his family, upon paying a certain sum for this privilege: But he strictly  
“ forbade all intrigues out of his family.” Are there any symptoms in this narration of that care which is supposed in the antients, of the marriage and propagation of their slaves? If that was a common practice, founded on general interest, it would surely have been embraced by CATO, who was a great oeconomist, and lived in times when the antient frugality and simplicity of manners were still in credit and reputation.

It is expressly remarked by the writers of the ROMAN law, that scarce any ever purchase slaves with a view of breeding from them \*.

OUR

† In vita CATONIS.

• “ Non temere ancillae ejus rei causa comparantur ut pariant.” *Digest.* lib. 5. tit. 3. *de hered. petit. lex 27.* The following

OUR lackeys and house maids, I own, do not serve much to multiply their species; But the antients, besides those who attended on their person, had all their labour performed by slaves, who lived, many of them, in their family; and some great men possessed to the number of 10,000. If there be any suspicion, therefore, that this institution was unfavourable to propagation, (and the same reason, at least in part, holds

following texts are to the same purpose. "Spadonem morbosum non esse, neque vitiosum, verius, mihi videtur; sed sanum esse, sicuti illum qui unum testiculum habet, qui etiam generare potest." *Digest. lib. 2. tit. 1. de aedilitis edicto, lex 6. § 2.* "Sin autem quis ita spado sit, ut tam necessaria pars corporis penitus absit, morbosus est." *Id. lex 7.* His impotence, it seems, was only regarded so far as his health or life might be affected by it. In other respects, he was full as valuable. The same reasoning is employed with regard to female slaves. "Quaeritur de ea muliere quae semper mortuos parit, an morbosam sit? et ait Sabinus, si vulvae vitio hoc contingit, morbosam esse." *Id. lex 14.* It has even been doubted, whether a woman pregnant was morbid or vitiated; and it is determined, that she is sound, not on account of the value of her offspring, but because it is the natural part or office of women to bear children, "Si mulier praegrans venerit, inter omnes convenit sanam eam esse. Maximum enim ac praecipuum munus foeminarum accipere ac tueri conceptum. Puerperam quoque sanam esse; si modo nihil extrinsecus accedit, quod corpus ejus in aliquam valetudinem immitteret. De sterili Coelius distinguere Trebatium dicit, ut si natura sterilis sit, sana sit; si vitio corporis, contra." *Id.*

with

with regard to antient slaves as well as modern servants) how destructive must slavery have proved?

HISTORY mentions a ROMAN nobleman, who had 400 slaves under the same roof with him: and having been assassinated at home by the furious revenge of one of them, the law was executed with rigour, and all without exception were put to death\*. Many other ROMAN noblemen had families equally, or more numerous; and I believe every one will allow, that this would scarce be practicable, were we to suppose all the slaves married, and the females to be breeders †.

So early as the poet HESIOD ‡, married slaves, whether male or female, were esteemed very inconvenient. How much more, where families had increased to such an enormous size, as in ROME, and the antient simplicity of manners was banished from all ranks of people?

\* TACIT. *ann.* lib. 14. cap. 43.

† The slaves in the great houses, had little rooms assigned them, called *cellae*. Whence the name of cell was transferred to the monks room in a convent. See farther on this head, JUST: LIPSIUS, Saturn. 1. cap. 14. These form strong presumptions against the marriage and propagation of the family-slaves.

‡ Opera et Dies, lib. 2. l. 24. also l. 220.

XENOPHON in his *Oeconomics*, where he gives directions for the management of a farm, recommends a strict care and attention of laying the male and the female slaves at a distance from each other. He seems not to suppose that they are ever married. The only slaves among the GREEKS that appear to have continued their own breed, were the HELOTES, who had houses apart, and were more the slaves of the public than of individuals \*.

THE same author † tells us, that NICIAS's overseer, by agreement with his master, was obliged to pay him an obolus a day for each slave; besides maintaining them, and keeping up the number. Had the antient slaves been all breeders, this last circumstance of the contract had been superfluous.

THE antients talk so frequently of a fixed, stated portion of provisions assigned to each slave ‡, that we are naturally led to conclude, that slaves lived almost all single, and received that portion as a kind of board-wages.

THE practice, indeed, of marrying the slaves seems not to have been very common, even among the

\* STRABO, lib. 8.

† De ratione reddituum.

‡ See CATO de re rustica, cap. 56. Donatus in Phormion.

I. I 9. SENECAE epist. 80.

country-labourers, where it is more naturally to be expected. CATO \*, enumerating the slaves requisite to labour a vineyard of a hundred acres, makes them amount to 15; the overseer and his wife, *villicus* and *villica*, and 13 male slaves; for an olive plantation of 240 acres, the overseer and his wife, and 11 male slaves; and so in proportion to a greater or less plantation or vineyard.

VARRO †, citing this passage of CATO, allows his computation to be just in every respect, except the last. For as it is requisite, says he, to have an overseer and his wife, whether the vineyard or plantation be great or small, this must alter the exactness of the proportion. Had CATO's computation been erroneous in any other respect, it had certainly been corrected by VARRO, who seems fond of discovering so trivial an error.

THE same author ‡, as well as COLUMELLA §, recommends it as requisite to give a wife to the overseer, in order to attach him the more strongly to his master's service. This was therefore a peculiar indul-

\* De re rust. cap. 10, 11.

† Lib. 1. cap. 18.

‡ Lib. 1. cap. 17.

§ Lib. 1. cap. 18.

gence granted to a slave, in whom so great a confidence was reposed.

IN the same place, VARRO mentions it as an useful precaution, not to buy too many slaves from the same nation, lest they beget factions and seditions in the family: A presumption that in ITALY the greatest part, even of the country labouring slaves, (for he speaks of no other) were bought from the remoter provinces. All the world knows, that the family-slaves in ROME, who were instruments of show and luxury, were commonly imported from the east. *Hec proficere*, says PLINY, speaking of the jealous care of masters, *mancipiorum legiones, et in domo turba externa ac servorum quoque causa nomenclator adhibendus* \*.

IT is indeed recommended by VARRO †, to propagate young shepherds in the family from the old ones. For as grasing farms were commonly in remote and cheap places, and each shepherd lived in a cottage apart, his marriage and increase were not liable to the same inconveniencies as in dearer places, and where many servants lived in a family; which was universally the case in such of the ROMAN farms as produced wine or corn. If we consider this exception

\* Lib. 33. cap. 1. So likewise TACITUS, *annal.* lib. 14. cap. 44.

† Lib. 2. cap. 10.

with regard to the shepherds, and weigh the reason of it, it will serve for a strong confirmation of all our foregoing suspicions \*.

COLUMELLA †, I own, advises the master to give a reward, and even liberty to a female slave, that had reared him above three children : A proof, that sometimes the antients propagated from their slaves ; which, indeed, cannot be denied. Were it otherwise, the practice of slavery, being so common in antiquity, must have been destructive to a degree which no expedient could repair. All I pretend to infer from these reasonings, is, that slavery is in general disadvantageous both to the happiness and populousness of mankind, and that its place is much better supplied by the practice of hired servants.

THE laws, or, as some writers call them, the seditions of the GRACCHI, were occasioned by their observing the increase of slaves all over ITALY, and the diminution of free citizens. APPIAN ‖ ascribes this increase to the propagation of the slaves ; PLUTARCH † to the purchasing of barbarians, who were

\* *Pastoris duri est hic filius, ille bubulci.* JUVEN. sat. II.  
151.

† Lib. I. cap. 8.

‖ De bel. civ. lib. I.

† In vita TIM. & C. GRACCHI.

chained and imprisoned, βαρβαρικά δεσμοῦται†. 'Tis to be presumed, that both causes concurred.

SICILY, says FLORUS\*, was full of *ergastula*, and was cultivated by labourers in chains. EUNUS and ATHENIO excited the servile war, by breaking up these monstrous prisons, and giving liberty to 60,000 slaves. The younger POMPEY augmented his army in SPAIN by the same expedient†. If the country-labourers, throughout the ROMAN empire, were so generally in this situation, and if it was difficult or impossible to find separate lodgings for the families of the city-servants, how unfavourable to propagation,

‡ To the same purpose is that passage of the elder SENECA, ex controversia 5. lib. 5. "Arata quondam populis rura, singulorum *ergastulorum* sunt; latiusque nunc villici, quam olim *reges*, imperant. At nunc eadem," says PLINY, "vincti *pedes damnatae manus*, inscripti vultus exercent." lib. 18. cap. 3. So also MARTIAL.

"Et sonet innumera compede *Thuscus ager*."

lib. 9. ep. 23.

And LUCAN: "Tum longos jungere fines  
Agrorum, et quondam duro sulcata Camilli,  
Vomere et antiquas Curiorum passa ligones,  
Longa sub ignotis extendere rura colonis.

lib. 7.

Vincto foffore coluntur

Hesperiae fegetes. —

lib. 7.

\* Lib. 3. cap. 19.

† Id. lib. 4. cap. 8.



as well as humanity, must the institution of domestic slavery be esteemed ?

CONSTANTINOPLE, at present, requires the same recruits of slaves from all the provinces, which ROME did of old ; and these provinces are of consequence far from being populous.

EGYPT, according to Mons. MAILLET, sends continual colonies of black slaves to the other parts of the TURKISH empire ; and receives annually an equal return of white : The one brought from the inland parts of AFRICA ; the other from MINGRELLA, CIRCASSIA, and TARTARY.

Our modern convents are, no doubt, very bad institutions : But there is reason to suspect, that antiently every great family in ITALY, and probably in other parts of the world, was a species of convent. And tho' we have reason to detest all those popish institutions, as nurseries of the most abject superstition, burthensome to the public, and oppressive to the poor prisoners, male as well as female ; yet may it be questioned whether they be so destructive to the populousness of a state as is commonly imagined. Were the land which belongs to a convent, bestowed on a nobleman, he would spend its revenue on dogs, horses, grooms, footmen, cooks, and house-maids ; and his family

family would not furnish many more citizens than the convent.

THE common reason why parents thrust their daughters into nunneries, is, that they may not be overburthened with too numerous a family; but the antients had a method almost as innocent, and more effectual to that purpose, *viz.* the exposing their children in the earliest infancy. This practice was very common; and is not mentioned by any author of those times with the horror it deserves, or scarce\* even with disapprobation. PLUTARCH, the humane, good natured PLUTARCH, † recommends it as a virtue in ATTALUS, king of PERGAMUS, that he murdered, or, if you will, exposed all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the son of his brother, EUMENES; signalizing in this manner his gratitude and affection to EUMENES; who had left him his heir preferable to that son. It was SOLON, the most celebrated of the sages of GREECE, who gave parents permission by law to kill their children ‡.

SHALL we then allow these two circumstances to compensate each other, *viz.* monastic vows and the exposing of children, and to be unfavourable, in

\* TACITUS blames it, De morib. Germ.

† De fraterno amore. SENECA also approves of the exposing of sickly, infirm children. De ira, lib. I. cap. 25.

‡ SEXT. EMP. lib. 3. cap. 24.

equal degrees, to the propagation of mankind? I doubt the advantage is here on the side of antiquity. Perhaps, by an odd connection of causes, the barbarous practice of the antients might rather render those times more populous. By removing the terrors of too numerous a family, it would engage many people in marriage; and such is the force of natural affection, that very few, in comparison, would have resolution enough, when it came to the push, to carry into execution their former intentions.

CHINA, the only country where this cruel practice of exposing children prevails at present, is the most populous country we know; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages could scarce be general, had not men the prospect of so easy a method of getting rid of their children. I own, that PLUTARCH \* speaks of it as a very universal maxim of the poor to expose their children; and as the rich were then averse to marriage, on account of the courtship they met with from those who expected legacies from them, the public must have been in a bad situation betwixt them †.

OF

\* De amore proliis.

† The practice of leaving great sums of money to friends, tho' one had near relations, was common in GREECE as well as

ROME;

Of all sciences there is none, where first appearances are more deceitful than in politics. Hospitals for foundlings seem favourable to the increase of numbers; and, perhaps, may be so, when kept under proper restrictions. But when they open the door to every one, without distinction, they have probably a contrary effect, and are pernicious to the state. 'Tis computed, that every ninth child born at PARIS, is sent to the hospital; tho' it seems certain, according to the common course of human affairs, that 'tis not a hundredth part whose parents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate them. The infinite difference, for health, industry, and morals, between an education in an hospital and that in a private family, should induce us not to make the entrance into an hospital too easy and engaging. To kill one's own

ROME; as we may gather from LUCIAN. This practice prevails much less in modern times; and BEN. JOHNSON'S VOLPONE is therefore almost entirely extracted from antient authors, and suits better the manners of those times.

It may justly be thought, that the liberty of divorces in Rome was another discouragement to marriage. Such a practice prevents not quarrels from *hunger*, but rather increases them; and occasions also those from *interest*, which are much more dangerous and destructive. See farther on this head, Essays moral, political, and literary, Part I. essay XXI. Perhaps too the unnatural lusts of the antients ought to be taken into consideration, as of some moment.

child is shocking to nature, and must therefore be pretty unusual; but to turn over the care of him upon others is very tempting to the natural indolence of mankind.

HAVING considered the domestic life and manners of the antients, compared to those of the moderns; where, in the main, we seem rather superior, so far as the present question is concerned; we shall now examine the *political* customs and institutions of both ages, and weigh their influence in retarding or forwarding the propagation of mankind.

BEFORE the increase of the ROMAN power, or rather till its full establishment, almost all the nations which are the scene of ancient history, were divided into small territories or petty commonwealths, where of course a great equality of fortune prevailed; and the center of the government was always very near its frontiers.

THIS was the situation of affairs not only in GREECE and ITALY, but also in SPAIN, GAUL, GERMANY, AFRIC, and a great part of the Lesser ASIA. And it must be owned, that no institution could be more favourable to the propagation of mankind. For tho' a man of an overgrown fortune, not being able to consume more than another, must share it with those  
who

who serve and attend him ; yet their possession being precarious, they have not the same encouragement to marriage, as if each had a small fortune, secure and independent. Enormous cities are, besides, destructive to society, beget vice and disorder of all kinds, starve the remoter provinces, and even starve themselves, by the prices to which they raise all provisions. Where each man had his little house and field to himself, and each county had its capital, free and independent ; what a happy situation of mankind ! How favourable to industry and agriculture ; to marriage and propagation ! The prolific virtue of men, were it to act in its full extent, without that restraint which poverty and necessity imposes on it, would double the number every generation : And nothing surely can give it more liberty, than such small common-wealths, and such an equality of fortune among the citizens. All small states naturally produce equality of fortune, because they afford no opportunities of great increase ; but small commonwealths much more, by that division of power and authority which is essential to them.

WHEN XENOPHON \* returned after the famous expedition with CYRUS, he hired himself and 6000 of the GREEKS into the service of SEUTHES, a prince of THRACE ; and the articles of his agreement were,

\* *De exp. Cyr.* lib. 7.



that each soldier should receive a *daric* a month, each captain two *darics*, and he himself, as general, four : A regulation of pay which would not a little surprise our modern officers.

DEMOSTHENES and ÆCHINES, with eight more, were sent ambassadors to PHILIP of MACEDON, and their appointments for above four months were a thousand *drachmas*, which is less than a *drachma* a day for each ambassador †. But a *drachma* a day, nay sometimes two ‡, was the pay of a common foot-soldier.

A CENTURION among the Romans had only double pay to a private man, in POLYBIUS's time §, and we accordingly find the gratuities after a triumph regulated by that proportion §. But MARK ANTHONY and the triumvirate gave the centurions five times the reward of the other †. So much had the increase of the commonwealth increased the inequality among the citizens \*.

† DEMOST. *de falsa leg.* He calls it a considerable sum.

‡ THUCYD. lib. 3.

§ Lib. 6. cap. 37.

§ TIT. LIV. lib. 41. cap. 7. 23. & *alibi passim*.

† APPIAN. *De bell. civ.* lib. 4.

\* CÆSAR gave the centurions ten times the gratuity of the common soldiers, *De bell. Gallico*, lib. 8. In the RHODIAN cartel, mentioned afterwards, no distinction in the ransom was made on account of ranks in the army.

IT must be owned, that the situation of affairs in modern times, with regard to civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near so favourable, either to the propagation or happiness of mankind. EUROPE is shared out mostly into great monarchies; and such parts of it as are divided into small territories, are commonly governed by absolute princes, who ruin their people by a ridiculous mimicry of the greater monarchs, in the splendor of their court and number of their forces. SWISSERLAND alone and HOLLAND resemble the antient republics; and tho' the former is far from possessing any advantage either of soil, climate, or commerce, yet the numbers of people, with which it abounds, notwithstanding their inlisting themselves into every service in EUROPE, prove sufficiently the advantages of their political institutions.

THE antient republics derived their chief or only security from the numbers of their citizens. The TRACHINIANS having lost great numbers of their people, the remainder, instead of enriching themselves by the inheritance of their fellow-citizens, applied to SPARTA, their metropolis, for a new stock of inhabitants. The SPARTANS immediately collected ten thousand men: among whom the old citizens divided the lands of which the former proprietors had perished\*.

\* DIOD. SIC. lib. 12. TRUCYD. lib. 3.



AFTER TIMOLEON had banished DIONYSIUS from SYRACUSE, and had settled the affairs of SICILY, finding the cities of SYRACUSE and MELLINUM extremely depopulated by tyranny, war, and faction, he invited over from GREECE some new inhabitants to repeople them\*. Immediately forty thousand men (PLUTARCH † says sixty thousand) offered themselves; and he distributed so many lots of land among them, to the great satisfaction of the antient inhabitants: A proof at once of the maxims of antient policy, which affected populousness more than riches; and of the good effects of these maxims, in the extreme populousness of that small country, GREECE, which could at once supply so large a colony. The case was not much different with the ROMANS in early times. He is a pernicious citizen, said M. CURIUS, who cannot be contented with seven acres ‡. Such ideas of equality could not fail of producing great numbers of people.

We

\* DION. SIC. lib. 18.

† In vita TIMOL.

‡ PLIN. lib. 18. cap. 3. The same author, in cap. 6. says, *Verumque fatentibus latifundia perdidere ITALIAM; jam vero et provincias. Sex domi-scissim AFRICAM possidebant, cum interfecti eos NERO princeps.* In this view, the barbarous butchery committed by the first ROMAN emperors, was not, perhaps, so destructive to the public as we may imagine. These never ceased till they had extinguished all the illustrious families, which had

WE must now consider what disadvantages the antients lay under with regard to populousness, and what checks they received from their political maxims and institutions. There are commonly compensations in every human condition; and tho' these compensations be not always perfectly equal, yet they serve, at least, to restrain the prevailing principle. To compare them and estimate their influence, is indeed very difficult, even where they take place in the same age, and in neighbouring countries: But where several ages have intervened, and only scattered lights are afforded us by antient authors; what can we do but amuse ourselves by talking, *pro* and *con*, on an interesting subject, and thereby correcting all hasty and violent determinations?

*First*, WE may observe, that the antient republics were almost in perpetual war; a natural effect of their martial spirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred which generally prevails among nations that live in a close neighbourhood. Now, war in a small state is much more destructive than in a great one; both because all the inhabitants, in the former case, must serve in the armies; and because the state is all frontier, and all exposed to the inroads of the enemy.

had enjoyed the plunder of the world, during the latter ages of the republic. The new nobles who rose in their place, were less splendid, as we learn from *TACIT. ann. lib. 3. cap. 55.*

THE maxims of antient war were much more destructive than those of modern; chiefly by the distribution of plunder, in which the soldiers were indulged. The private men in our armies are such a low rascally set of people, that we find any abundance beyond their simple pay, breeds confusion and disorder, and a total dissolution of discipline. The very wretchedness and meanness of those who fill the modern armies, render them less destructive to the countries which they invade: One instance, among many, of the deceitfulness of first appearances in all political reasonings\*.

ANTIENT battles were much more bloody by the very nature of the weapons employed in them. The antients drew up their men 16 or 20, sometimes 50 men deep, which made a narrow front; and it was not difficult to find a field, in which both armies might be marshalled, and might engage with each other. Even where any body of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow ways, the battle was not so soon decided betwixt the contending parties, but that the others had time to overcome the

\* The antient soldiers, being free citizens, above the lowest rank, were all married. Our modern soldiers are either forced to live unmarried, or their marriages turn to small account towards the increase of mankind. A circumstance which ought, perhaps, to be taken into consideration, as of some consequence in favour of the antients.

difficulties which opposed them, and take part in the engagement. And as the whole armies were thus engaged, and each man closely buckled to his antagonist, the battles were commonly very bloody, and great slaughter was made on both sides, but especially on the vanquished. The long thin lines required by fire-arms, and the quick decision of the fray, render our modern engagements but partial rencounters, and enable the general, who is foiled in the beginning of the day, to draw off the greatest part of his army, sound and intire. Could FOLARD's project of the column take place (which seems impracticable †) it would render modern battles as destructive as the antient.

THE battles of antiquity, both by their duration, and their resemblance of single combats, were wrought up to a degree of fury quite unknown to latter ages. Nothing could then engage the combatants to give quarter, but the hopes of profit, by making slaves of their prisoners. In civil wars, as we learn from TACITUS \*, the battles were the most bloody, because the prisoners were not slaves.

† What is the advantage of the column after it has broke the enemy's line? only, that it then takes them in flank, and dissipates whatever stands near it by a fire from all sides. But till it has broke them, does it not present a flank to the enemy, and that exposed to their musquetry, and, what is much worse, to their cannon?

\* Hist, lib. 2. cap. 44.

WHAT a stout resistance must be made, where the vanquished expected so hard a fate! How inveterate the rage, where the maxims of war were, in every respect, so bloody and severe!

INSTANCES are very frequent, in antient history, of cities besieged, whose inhabitants, rather than open their gates, murdered their wives and children, and rushed themselves on a voluntary death, sweetened perhaps with a little prospect of revenge upon the enemy. GREEKS †, as well as BARBARIANS, have been often wrought up to this degree of fury. And the same determined spirit and cruelty must, in many other instances, less remarkable, have been extremely destructive to human society, in those petty commonwealths, which lived in a close neighbourhood, and were engaged in perpetual wars and contentions.

SOMETIMES the wars in GREECE, says PLUTARCH ‡, were carried on intirely by inroads, and robberies, and piracies. Such a method of war must be more destructive, in small states, than the bloodiest battles and sieges.

By the laws of the twelve tables, possession for two years formed a prescription for land; one year for

† As ARYDUS, mentioned by LIVO, lib. 31. cap. 17, 18. and POTO. lib. 16. As also the XANTHIANE, ARRIAN. de bell. civil. lib. 4.

‡ In vita ARATI.

moveables \* : An indication, that there was not in ITALY, during that period, much more order, tranquillity, and settled police, than there is at present among the TARTARS.

THE only contest I remember in ancient history, is that between DEMETRIUS POLIORCHETES and the MACEDONIANS; when it was agreed, that a free citizen should be restored for 1000 drachmas, a slave bearing arms for 500 †.

BUT, *secondly*, it appears that ancient manners were more unfavourable than the modern, not only in times of war, but also in those of peace; and that too in every respect, except the love of civil liberty and equality, which is, I own, of considerable importance. To exclude faction from a free government, is very difficult, if not altogether impracticable; but such inveterate rage between the factions, and such bloody maxims, are found, in modern times, amongst religious parties alone, where bigotted priests are the accusers, judges, and executioners. In ancient history, we may always observe, where one party prevailed, whether the nobles or people (for I can ob-

\* INST. lib. 2. cap. 6. 'Tis true, the same law seems to have been continued till the time of JUSTINIAN. But customs introduced by barbarism, are not always corrected by civility.

† DIOD. SICUL. lib. 20.

serve no difference in this respect ||) that they immediately butchered all of the opposite party who fell into their hands, and banished such as had been so fortunate as to escape their fury. No form of process, no law, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near a half of the city, were slaughtered, or expelled, every revolution; and the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the mischief possible to their fellow-citizens; till Fortune put it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolution. And as these were very frequent in such violent governments, the disorder, diffidence, jealousy, enmity, which must prevail, are not easy for us to imagine in this age of the world.

THERE are only two revolutions I can recollect in antient history, which passed without great severity, and great effusion of blood in massacres and assassinations, *viz.* the restoration of the ATHENIAN Democracy by THRASYBULUS, and the subduing the ROMAN republic by CÆSAR. We learn from antient history, that THRASYBULUS passed a general amnesty for all past offences; and first introduced that word, as well as practice, into GREECE \*. It ap-

|| LYSIAS, who was himself of the popular faction, and very narrowly escaped from the thirty tyrants, says, that the Democracy was as violent a government as the Oligarchy, *Orat. 24. de statu popul.*

\* CICERO, PHILIP. I.

pears,

pears, however, from many orations of **LYSIAS** †, that the chief, and even some of the subaltern offenders, in the preceding tyranny, were tried, and capitally punished. This is a difficulty not cleared up, and even not observed by antiquarians and historians. And as to **CÆSAR**'s clemency, tho' much celebrated, it would not gain great applause in the present age. He butchered, for instance, all **CATO**'s senate, when he became master of **UTICA** ‡; and these, we may readily believe, were not the most worthless of the party. All those who had borne arms against that usurper, were forfeited; and, by **HIRTIVS**'s law, declared incapable of all public offices.

**THESE** people were extremely fond of liberty; but seem not to have understood it very well. When the thirty tyrants first established their dominion at **ATHENS**; they began with seizing all the sycophants and informers, who had been so troublesome during the Democracy, and putting them to death by an arbitrary sentence and execution. *Every man, says SALLUST* \*

† *As erat, II. contra ERATOST. orat. 12. contra AGORAT. orat. 25. pro MANTITH.*

‡ *APPIAN. de bell. civ. lib. 2.*

\* See **CÆSAR**'s speech, *de bell. Civil.*



and *LYSIAS* †, *was rejoiced at these punishments*; not considering, that liberty was from that moment annihilated.

THE utmost energy of the nervous style of *THUCYDIDES*, and the copiousness and expression of the *GREEK* language, seem to sink under that historian, when he attempts to describe the disorders which arose from faction thro'out all the *GREEK* commonwealths. You would imagine, that he still labours with a thought greater than he can find words to communicate. And he concludes his pathetic description with an observation, which is at once very refined and very solid. “ In these contests,” says he, “ those who were dull-  
“ est and most stupid, and had the least foresight,  
“ commonly prevailed. For being conscious of this  
“ weakness, and dreading to be over-reached by  
“ those of greater penetration, they went to work  
“ hastily, without premeditation, by the sword and  
“ poniard, and thereby prevented their antagonists,  
“ who were forming fine schemes and projects for  
“ their destruction ‡.”

Not

† *Orat.* 24. And in *orat.* 29. he mentions the factious spirit of the popular assemblies as the only cause why these illegal punishments should displease.

‡ *Lib.* 3. The country in *EUROPE* in which I have observed the factions to be most violent, and party-hatred the strongest, is *IRELAND*. This goes so far as to cut off even the most common  
intercourse

NOT to mention DIONYSIUS || the elder, who is computed to have butchered in cold blood above 10,000 of his fellow-citizens; nor AGATHOCLES \*, NABIS †, and others, still more bloody than he; the transactions, even in free governments, were extremely violent and destructive. At ATHENS, the thirty tyrants and the nobles, in a twelvemonth, murdered, without trial, about 1200 of the people, and banished above the half of the citizens that remained ‡. In ARGOS, near the same time, the people killed 1200 of the nobles; and afterwards their own demagogues, because they had refused to carry their prosecutions farther §. The people also in CORCYRA

intercourse of civilities between the Protestants and Catholics. Their cruel insurrections, and the severe revenges which they have taken of each other, are the cause of this mutual ill will, which is the chief source of the disorder, poverty, and depopulation of that country. The Greek factions I imagine to have been inflamed still to a higher degree of rage; the revolutions being commonly more frequent, and the maxims of assassination much more avowed and acknowledged.

|| P. 47. de vit. & fort. Acad.

\* DIOD. SIC. lib. 18, 19.

† TIT. LIV. lib. 31, 33, 34.

‡ DIOD. SIC. lib. 14. ISOCRATES says there were only 500 banished. He makes the number of those killed amount to 1500. ANTO. RESPONDENS contra CRESIM. assigns precisely the same number. SENECA (de tranquill. anim. cap. 5.) says 1200.

§ DIOD. SIC. lib. 15.

killed

killed 1500 of the nobles, and banished a thousand \*. These numbers will appear the more surprising, if we consider the extreme smallness of these states. But all antient history is full of such instances †.

WHEN

\* DIOD. SIC. lib. 13.

† We shall mention from DIODORUS SICULUS alone a few, which passed in the course of sixty years during the most shining age of GREECE. There were banished from SYBARIS 500 of the nobles and their partisans; lib. 12. p. 77. *ex edit.* RHODOMANNI. Of CHIANS, 600 citizens banished; lib. 13. p. 189. At EPHEBUS, 340 killed, 2000 banished; lib. 13. p. 223. Of CYRENIANS, 500 nobles killed, all the rest banished; lib. 14. p. 263. The CORINTHIANS killed 120, banished 500; lib. 14. p. 304. PHÆRIDAS the SPARTAN banished 300 BÆOTIANS; lib. 15. p. 342. Upon the fall of the LACEDÆMONIANS, Democracies were restored in many cities, and severe vengeance taken of the nobles, after the GREEK manner. But matters did not end there. For the banished nobles, returning in many places, butchered their adversaries at PHIALÆ, in CORINTH, in MEGARA, in PHLIASIA. In this last place they killed 300 of the people; but these again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles; and banished the rest; lib. 15. p. 357. In ARCADIA 1400 banished, besides many killed. The banished retired to SPARTA and to PALÆANTUM: The latter delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed, lib. 15. p. 373. Of the banished from ARGOS and THEBES, there were 500 in the SPARTAN army; *id.* p. 374. Here is a detail of the most remarkable of AGATHOCLES's cruelties from the same author. The people before his usurpation had banished 600 nobles; lib. 19. p. 655. Afterwards, that tyrant, in con-

currency

WHEN ALEXANDER ordered all the exiles to be restored thro' all the cities; it was found, that the whole amounted to 20,000 men \*; the remains probably of still greater slaughters and massacres. What an astonishing multitude in so narrow a country as antient GREECE! And what domestic confusion, jealousy, partiality, revenge, heart-burnings, must tear those cities, where factions were wrought up to such a degree of fury and despair!

IT would be easier, says ISOCRATES to PHILIP, to raise an army in GREECE at present from the vagabonds than from the cities.

EVEN where affairs came not to such extremities (which they failed not to do almost in every city twice or thrice every century) property was rendered very precarious by the maxims of antient government.

currence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and banished 6000; *id.* p. 647. He killed 4000 people at GELA; *id.* p. 741. By AGATHOCLES's brother 8000 banished from SYRACUSE; lib. 20. p. 757. The inhabitants of ÆGESTA, to the number of 40,000, were killed, man, woman, and child; and with tortures, for the sake of their money; *id.* p. 802. All their relations, viz. father, brother, children, grandfather, of his LIBYAN army, killed; *id.* p. 103. He killed 7000 exiles after capitulation; *id.* p. 816. 'Tis to be remarked, that AGATHOCLES was a man of great sense and courage.

\* DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.

XENOPHON, in the banquet of SOCRATES, gives us a very natural unaffected description of the tyranny of the ATHENIAN people. "In my poverty," says CHARMIDES, "I am much more happy than ever I was while possess'd of riches; as much as it is happier to be in security than in terrors, free than a slave, to receive than to pay court, to be trusted than suspected. Formerly I was obliged to caress every informer; some imposition was continually laid upon me; and it was never allowed me to travel, or be absent from the city. At present, when I am poor, I look big, and threaten others. The rich are afraid of me, and show me every kind of civility and respect; and I am become a kind of tyrant in the city †."

IN one of the pleadings of LYSIAS ‡, the orator very coolly speaks of it, by the by, as a maxim of the ATHENIAN people, That whenever they wanted money, they put to death some of the rich citizens as well as strangers, for the sake of the forfeiture. In mentioning this, he seems to have no intention of blaming them; still less of provoking them who were his audience and judges.

WHETHER a man was a citizen or a stranger among that people, it seems indeed requisite, either

† Pag. 885. *ex edit. LEUNCLAV.*

‡ *Quat. 29. in NICOM.*

that

that he should impoverish himself, or the people would impoverish him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain. The orator last mentioned gives a pleasant account of an estate laid out in the public service \*;

\* In order to recommend his client to the favour of the people, he enumerates all the sums he had expended. When *χωρηγος*, 30 minas: Upon a chorus of men 20 minas; *εισωυρηγος* 8 minas; *συνδρασι χορων* 30 minas; *πυλινω χωρω* 3 minas; Seven times trierarch, where he spent 6 talents: Taxes, once 30 minas, another time 40; *γυμνασιαρχων*, 12 minas; *χορηγος παιδικω χωρω*, 15 minas; *κομοδοις χορων*, 18 minas; *συνερχισαις αγωνισις*, 7 minas; *τριησι αρμυλλομεν*, 15 minas; *αρχιβαυγος*, 30 minas: In the whole ten talents 38 minas. An immense sum for an ATHENIAN fortune, and what alone would be esteemed great riches, *Orat.* 20. 'Tis true, he says, the law did not oblige him absolutely to be at so much expence, not above a fourth. But without the favour of the people, no body was so much as safe; and this was the only way to gain it. See farther, *orat.* 24. *de pop. statu*. In another place, he introduces a speaker, who says that he had spent his whole fortune, and an immense one, eighty talents, for the people. *Orat.* 25. *de prob.* EVANDRI. The *μετοικοι*, or strangers, And, says he, if they do not contribute largely enough to the people's fancy, that they have reason to repent. *Orat.* 30. *contra PHIL.* You may see with what care DEMOSTHENES displays his expences of this nature, when he pleads for himself *de corona*; and how he exaggerates MIDIAS's stinginess in this particular, in his accusation of that criminal. All this, by the by, is a mark of a very iniquitous judicature: And yet the ATHENIANS valued themselves on having the most legal and regular administration of any people in GREECE,

that

that is, above the third of it in rare shows and figured dances.

I NEED not insist on the GREEK tyrannies, which were altogether horrible. Even the mixed monarchies, by which most of the antient states of GREECE were governed, before the introduction of republics, were very unsettled. Scarce any city, but ATHENS, says ISOCRATES, could show a succession of kings for four or five generations\*.

BESIDES many other obvious reasons for the instability of ancient monarchies, the equal division of property among the brothers in private families, must, by a necessary consequence, contribute to unsettle and disturb the state. The universal preference given to the elder by modern laws, tho' it increases the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accustoms men to the same idea of public succession, and cuts off all claim and pretension of the younger.

THE new settled colony of HERACLEA, falling immediately into factions, applied to SPARTA, who sent HERIPIDAS with full authority to quiet their dissensions. This man, not provoked by any opposition, not inflamed by party rage, knew no better expedient than immediately putting to death about 500

\* Panath.

of the citizens †. A strong proof how deeply rooted these violent maxims of government were thro'out all GREECE.

IF such was the disposition of mens minds among that refined people, what may be expected in the commonwealths of ITALY, AFRIC, SPAIN, and GAUL, which were denominated barbarous? Why otherwise did the Greeks so much value themselves on their humanity, gentleness and moderation, above all other nations? This reasoning seems very natural. But unluckily the history of the ROMAN commonwealth, in its earlier times, if we give credit to the received accounts, stands against us. No blood was ever shed in any sedition at ROME, till the murder of the GRACCHI. DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSÆUS ||, observing the singular humanity of the ROMAN people in this particular, makes use of it as an argument that they were originally of GRECIAN extraction: Whence we may conclude, that the factions and revolutions in the barbarous republics were more violent than even those of GREECE above-mentioned.

IF the ROMANS were so late in coming to blows, they made ample compensation after they had once entered upon the bloody scene; and APPIAN's history of their civil wars contains the most frightful picture of massacres, proscriptions, and forfeitures, that ever

† DIOD. SIC. lib. 14.

|| Lib. 1.



was presented to the world. What pleases most, in that historian, is, that he seems to feel a proper resentment of these barbarous proceedings; and talks not with that provoking coolness and indifference, which custom had produced in many of the GREEK historians\*.

THE maxims of antient politics contain, in general, so little humanity and moderation, that it seems su-

\* The authorities cited above, are all historians, orators, and philosophers, whose testimony is unquestioned. 'Tis dangerous to rely upon writers who deal in ridicule and satyr. What will posterity, for instance, infer from this passage of Dr. SWIFT? "I told him, that in the kingdom of *TAJENIA* (*BRITAIN*). "by the natives called *LANGDON* (*LONDON*) where I had "sojourned some time in my travels, the bulk of the people "consist, in a manner, wholly of discoverers, witnesses, inform- "ers, accusers, prosecutors, evidences, swearers, together with "their several subservient and subaltern instruments, all under "the colours, the conduct, and pay of ministers of state and "their deputies. The plots in that kingdom are usually the "workmanship of those persons," &c. *GULLIVER'S travels*. Such a representation might suit the government of *ATHENS*; but not that of *ENGLAND*, which is a prodigy even in modern times, for humanity, justice, and liberty. Yet the Doctor's satyr, tho' carried to extremes, as is usual with him, even beyond other satyrical writers, did not altogether want an object. The Bishop of *ROCHESTER*, who was his friend, and of the same party, had been banished a little before by a bill of attainder, with great justice, but without such a proof as was legal, or according to the strict forms of common law.

perfluous

persons to give any particular reason for the violence committed at any particular period. Yet I cannot forbear observing, that the laws, in the latter ages of the ROMAN commonwealth, were so absurdly contrived, that they obliged the heads of parties to have recourse to these extremities. All capital punishments were abolished: However criminal, or, what is more, however dangerous any citizen might be, he could not regularly be punished otherwise than by banishment: And it became necessary, in the revolutions of party, to draw the sword of private vengeance; nor was it easy, when laws were once violated, to set bounds to these sanguinary proceedings. Had BRUTUS himself prevailed over the *triumvirate*, could he, in common prudence, have allowed OCTAVIUS and ANTHONY to live, and have contented himself with banishing them to RHODUS or MARSILLAS, where they might still have plotted new commotions and rebellions. His executing C. ANTONIUS, brother to the *triumvir*, shows evidently his sense of the matter. Did not CICERO, with the approbation of all the wise and virtuous of ROME, arbitrarily put to death CATILINE'S associates, contrary to law, and without any trial or form of process? And if he moderated his executions, did it not proceed, either from the clemency of his temper, or the conjunctures of the times? A wretched security in a government which pretends to laws and liberty!

THUS, one extreme produces another. In the same manner as excessive severity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their execution; so their excessive lenity naturally produces cruelty and barbarity. 'Tis dangerous to force us, in any case, to pass their sacred boundaries.

ONE general cause of the disorders so frequent in all antient governments, seems to have consisted in the great difficulty of establishing any Aristocracy in those ages, and the perpetual discontents and seditions of the people, whenever even the meanest and most beggarly were excluded from the legislature and from public offices. The very quality of *freeman* gave such a rank, being opposed to that of *slave*, that it seemed to intitle the possessor to every power and privilege of the commonwealth. SOLON's \* laws excluded no free-man from votes or elections, but confined some magistracies to a particular *census*; yet were the people never satisfied till those laws were repealed. By the treaty with ANTIPATER †, no ATHENIAN had a vote whose *census* was less than 2000 *drachmas* (about 60 *l. Sterling*) And tho' such a government would to us appear sufficiently democratical, it was so disagreeable to that people, that above two thirds immediately left their country ‡. CASSANDER reduced that *census*

\* PLUTARCHUS in *vita* SOLON. † DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.

‡ Id. *ibid*.

to the half.\* ; yet still the government was considered as an oligarchical tyranny, and the effect of foreign violence.

SERVIUS TULLIUS's † laws seem very equal and reasonable, by fixing the power in proportion to the property : Yet the ROMAN people could never be brought quietly to submit to them.

IN those days there was no medium between a severe, jealous Aristocracy, ruling over discontented subjects ; and a turbulent, factious, tyrannical Democracy.

BUT, *thirdly*, there are many other circumstances, in which antient nations seem inferior to the modern, both for the happiness and increase of mankind. Trade, manufactures, industry, were no where, in former ages, so flourishing as they are at present in EUROPE. The only garb of the antients, both for males and females, seems to have been a kind of flannel, which they wore commonly white or grey, and which they scoured as often as it grew dirty. TYRE, which carried on, after CARTHAGE, the greatest commerce of any city in the MEDITERRANEAN, before it was destroyed by ALEXANDER, was no mighty city, if we credit ARRIAN's account of

\* DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.

† TIT. LIV. lib. 1. cap. 43:

its inhabitants †. ATHENS is commonly supposed to have been a trading city: But it was as populous before the MEDIAN war as at any time after it, according to HERODOTUS \*; and yet its commerce, at that time, was so inconsiderable, that, as the same historian observes ‡, even the neighbouring coasts of ASIA were as little frequented by the GREEKS as the pillars of HERCULES: For beyond these he conceived nothing.

GREAT interest of money, and great profits of trade, are an infallible indication, that industry and commerce are but in their infancy. We read in LYSIAS || of 100 *per cent.* profit made of a cargo of two talents, sent to no greater distance than from ATHENS to the ADRIATIC: Nor is this mentioned as an instance of exorbitant profit. ANTIDORUS, says DEMOSTHENES †, paid three talents and a half for

† Lib. 2. There were 8000 killed during the siege; and the whole captives amounted to 30,000. DIONYSIUS SICULUS, lib. 17. says only 13,000: But he accounts for this small number, by saying that the TYRIANS had sent away beforehand part of their wives and children to CARTAGO.

\* Lib. 5. he makes the number of the citizens amount to 30,000.

‡ Ib. 5. || Orat. 33. *advers. DIACET.* † *Contra APHOB.* p. 25. *ex edit. ALDI.*

a house, which he let at a talent a-year : And the orator blames his own tutors for not employing his money to like advantage. My fortune, says he, in eleven years minority, ought to have been tripled. The value of 20 of the slaves left by his father, he computes at 40 minas, and the yearly profit of their labour at 12 \*. The most moderate interest at ATHENS, (for there was higher † often paid) was 12 *per cent.* ‡, and that paid monthly. Not to insist upon the exorbitant interest of 34 *per cent.* to which the vast sums distributed in elections had raised money || at ROME, we find, that VERRÉS, before that factious period, stated 24 *per cent.* for money, which he left in the publicans hands. And tho' CICERO declaims against this article, it is not on account of the extravagant usury ; but because it had never been customary to state any interest on such occasions §. Interest, indeed, sunk at ROME, after the settlement of the empire : But it never remained any considerable time so low, as in the commercial states of modern ages †.

\* *Contra APHOR.* p. 19. *ex edit.* ALDI.

† *Id.* *ibid.*

‡ *Id.* *ibid.* and *ÆSCHINES contra CTESIPH.*

|| *Epist. ad ATTIC.* lib. 5. *epist.* 23.

§ *Contra VERR.* *orat.* 3.

† See Essay IV.

AMONG the other inconveniencies which the ATRENIANS felt from the fortifying DECELIA by the LAEDEMONIANS, it is represented by THUCYDIDES †, as one of the most considerable, that they could not bring over their corn from EUBÆA by land, passing by OROPUS ; but were obliged to imbark it, and to sail about the promontory of SUNIUM. A surprising instance of the imperfection of antient navigation : For the water-carriage is not here above double the land.

I DO not remember any passage in any antient author, where the growth of any city is ascribed to the establishment of a manufacture. The commerce which is said to flourish, is chiefly the exchange of those commodities for which different soils and climates were suited. The sale of wine and oil into AFRICA, according to DIODORUS SICULUS †, was the foundation of the riches of AGRIGENTUM. The situation of the city of SYBARIS, according to the same author \*, was the cause of its immense populousness ; being built near the two rivers CRATHYS and SYBARIS. But these two rivers, we may observe, are not navigable ; and could only produce some fertile valleys, for agriculture and husbandry ; an advantage so inconsiderable, that a modern writer would scarcely have taken notice of it.

† Lib. 7.

† Lib. 73.

\* Lib. 12.

THE barbarity of the antient tyrants, together with the extreme love of liberty, which animated those ages, must have banished every merchant and manufacturer; and have quite depopulated the state, had it subsisted upon industry and commerce. While the cruel and suspicious DIONYSIUS was carrying on his butcheries, who, that was not detained by his landed property, and could have carried with him any art or skill to procure a subsistence in other countries, would have remained exposed to such implacable barbarity? The persecutions of PHILIP II. and LEWIS XIV. filled all EUROPE with the manufacturers of FLANDERS and of FRANCE.

I GRANT, that agriculture is the species of industry which is chiefly requisite to the subsistence of multitudes; and it is possible, that this industry may flourish, even where manufactures and other arts are unknown or neglected. SWISSERLAND is at present a very remarkable instance; where we find, at once, the most skilful husbandmen and the most bungling tradesmen, that are to be met with in all EUROPE. That agriculture flourished mightily in GREECE and ITALY, at least in some parts of them, and at some periods, we have reason to presume: And whether the mechanical arts had reached the same degree of perfection, may not be esteemed so material; especially, if we consider the great equality in the antient republics, where each family was obliged to cultivate,



with the greatest care and industry, its own little field, in order to its subsistence.

BUT is it just reasoning, because agriculture may, in some instances, flourish without trade or manufactures, to conclude, that, in any great extent of country, and for any great tract of time, it would subsist alone? The most natural way, surely, of encouraging husbandry, is, first, to excite other kinds of industry, and thereby afford the labourer a ready market for his commodities, and a return of such goods as may contribute to his pleasure and enjoyment. This method is infallible and universal; and as it prevails more in modern government than in the antient, it affords a presumption of the superior populousness of the former.

EVERY man, says XENOPHON\*, may be a farmer: No art or skill is requisite: All consists in the industry, and attention to the execution. A strong proof, as COLUMELLA hints, that agriculture was but little known in the age of XENOPHON.

ALL our latter improvements and refinements, have they operated nothing towards the easy subsistence of men, and consequently towards their propagation and increase? Our superior skill in mechanics, the discovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been so much enlarged, the establishment of posts, and

\* Oecon.

the use of bills of exchange. These seem all extremely useful to the encouragement of art, industry, and populousness. Were we to strike off these, what a check should we give to every kind of business and labour, and what multitudes of families would immediately perish from want and hunger? And it seems not probable, that we could supply the place of these new inventions by any other regulation or institution.

HAVE we reason to think, that the police of antient states was any way comparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal security, either at home, or in their journies by land or water? I question not, but every impartial examiner would give us the preference in this particular \*.

THUS, upon comparing the whole, it seems impossible to assign any just reason, why the world should have been more populous in antient than in modern times. The equality of property, among the antients, liberty, and the small divisions of their states, were indeed favourable to the propagation of mankind: But their wars were more bloody and destructive, their governments more factious and unsettled, commerce and manufactures more feeble and languishing, and the general police more loose and irregular: These latter disadvantages seem to form a sufficient

\* See Part I. Essay XV.

counterbalance to the former advantages ; and rather favour the opposite opinion to that which commonly prevails with regard to this subject.

BUT there is no reasoning, it may be said, against matter of fact. If it appear, that the world was then more populous than at present, we may be assured, that our conjectures are false, and that we have overlooked some material circumstance in the comparison. This I readily own : All our preceding reasonings, I acknowledge to be mere trifling, or, at least, small skirmishes and frivolous rencounters, which decide nothing. But unluckily the main combat, where we compare facts, cannot be rendered much more decisive. The facts delivered by antient authors, are either so uncertain or so imperfect as to afford us nothing positive in this matter. How indeed could it be otherwise ? The very facts which we must oppose to them, in computing the greatness of modern states, are far from being either certain or compleat. Many grounds of calculation, proceeded on by celebrated writers, are little better than those of the Emperor HELIOGABALUS, who formed an estimate of the immense greatness of ROME, from ten thousand pound weight of cobwebs which had been found in that city \*.

\* *ÆLII LAMPID. in vita HELIOGAB. cap. 26.*

'Tis to be remarked, that all kinds of numbers are uncertain in antient manuscripts, and have been subject to much greater corruptions than any other part of the text; and that for a very obvious reason. Any alteration, in other places, commonly affects the sense or grammar, and is more readily perceived by the reader and transcriber.

Few enumerations of inhabitants have been made of any tract of country by any antient author of good authority, so as to afford us a large enough view for comparison.

'Tis probable, that there was formerly a good foundation for the number of citizens assigned to any free city; because they entered for a share of the government, and there were exact registers kept of them. But as the number of slaves is seldom mentioned, this leaves us in as great uncertainty as ever, with regard to the populousness even of single cities.

THE first page of THUCYDIDES is, in my opinion, the commencement of real history. All preceding narrations are so intermixed with fable, that philosophers ought to abandon them, in a great measure, to the embellishment of poets and orators\*.

WITH

\* In general, there is more candour and sincerity in antient historians, but less exactness and care, than in the moderns.

WITH regard to remote times, the numbers of people assigned are often ridiculous, and lose all credit and authority. The free citizens of SYBARIS, able to bear arms, and actually drawn out in battle, were 300,000. They encountered at SIAGRA with 100,000 citizens of CROTONA, another GREEK city contiguous to them; and were defeated. This is DIODORUS SICULUS's \* account; and is very seriously insisted on by that historian. STRABO † also mentions the same number of SYBARITES.

DIODORUS SICULUS ‡, enumerating the inhabitants of AGRIGENTUM, when it was destroyed by the CARTHAGINIANS, says, that they amounted to 20,000 citizens, 200,000 strangers, besides slaves, who, in so opulent a city as he represents it, would

Our speculative factions, especially those of religion, throw such an illusion over our minds, that men seem to regard impartiality to their adversaries and to heretics, as a vice or weakness: But the commonness of books, by means of printing, has obliged modern historians to be more careful in avoiding contradictions and incongruities. DIODORUS SICULUS is a good writer; but 'tis with pain I see his narration contradict, in so many particulars, the two most authentic pieces of all GREEK history, viz. XENOPHON's expedition, and DEMOSTHENES's orations. PLUTARCH and APPIAN seem scarce ever to have read CICERO's epistles.

\* Lib. 12.

† Lib. 6.

‡ Lib. 13.

probably

probably be, at least, as numerous. We must remark, that the women and the children are not included; and that therefore, upon the whole, the city must have contained near two millions of inhabitants ||. And what was the reason of so immense an increase? They were very industrious in cultivating the neighbouring fields, not exceeding a small ENGLISH country; and they traded with their wine and oil to AFRICA, which, at that time, had none of these commodities.

PTOLEMY, says THEOCRITUS \*, commands 33,339 cities. I suppose the singularity of the number was the reason of assigning it. DIOBORUS SICULUS † assigns three millions of inhabitants to ÆGYPT, a very small number: But then he makes the number of their cities amount to 18,000: An evident contradiction.

HE says ‡, the people were formerly seven millions. Thus remote times are always most envied and admired.

THAT XERXES'S army was extremely numerous, I can readily believe; both from the great extent of

¶ DIOGENES LAËRTIUS (*in vita EMPEDOCLES*) says, that AGRIAGENTUM contained only 800,000 inhabitants.

\* Idyll. 17.

† Lib. 1.

‡ Id. ibid.

his empire, and from the foolish practice of the Eastern nations, of encumbering their camp with a superfluous multitude: But will any reasonable man cite HERODOTUS's wonderful narrations as an authority? There is something very rational, I own, in LYSIAS's \* argument upon this subject. Had not XERXES's army been incredibly numerous, says he, he had never made a bridge over the HELLESPONT: It had been much easier to have transported his men, over so short a passage, with the numerous shipping of which he was master.

POLYBIUS † says, that the ROMANS, between the first and second PUNIC wars, being threatened with an invasion from the GAULS, mustered all their own forces, and those of their allies, and found them amount to seven hundred thousand men able to bear arms. A great number surely, and which, when joined to the slaves, is probably not less, if not rather more than that extent of country affords at present ‡. The enumeration too seems to have been made with some exactness; and POLYBIUS gives us the detail of

\* *Orat. funebri.* † *Lik. 2.*

‡ The country that supplied this number, was not above a third of ITALY, viz. the Pope's dominions, TUSCANY, and a part of the kingdom of NAPLES: But perhaps in those early times there were very few slaves, except in ROME or the great cities.

the particulars. But might not the number be magnified, in order to encourage the people?

DIODORUS SICULUS \*, makes the same enumeration amount to near a million. These variations are suspicious. He plainly too supposes, that ITALY in his time was not so populous: Another very suspicious circumstance. For who can believe, that the inhabitants of that country diminished from the time of the first PUNIC war to that of the *triumvirates*?

JULIUS CÆSAR, according to APPIAN †, encountered four millions of GAULS, killed one million, and took another million prisoners ‡. Supposing the numbers of the enemy's army and of the killed could be exactly assigned, which never is possible; how could it be known how often the same man returned into the armies, or how distinguish the new from the old levied soldiers? No attention ought ever to be given to such loose, exaggerated calculations; especially where the author tells us not the mediums upon which the calculations were formed.

PATERCULUS § makes the number killed by CÆSAR amount only to 400,000: A much more pro-

\* Lib. 2. † CELTICA.

‡ PLUTARCH (*in vita CÆS.*) makes the number that CÆSAR fought with amount only to three millions; JULIAN. (*in CÆSARIBUS*) to two.

§ Lib. 2. cap. 47.



bable account, and more easily reconciled to the history of these wars given by that conqueror himself in his Commentaries.

ONE would imagine, that every circumstance of the life and actions of DIONYSIUS the elder might be regarded as authentic, and free from all fabulous exaggeration; both because he lived at a time when letters flourished most in GREECE, and because his chief historian was PHILISTUS, a man allowed to be of great genius, and who was a courtier and minister of that prince. But can we admit, that he had a standing army of 100,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and a fleet of 400 gallies\*? These, we may observe, were mercenary forces, and subsisted upon their pay, like our armies in EUROPE. For the citizens were all disarmed; and when DION afterwards invaded SICILY, and called on his countrymen to vindicate their liberty, he was obliged to bring arms along with him, which he distributed among those who joined him †. In a state where agriculture alone flourishes, there may be many inhabitants; and if these be all armed and disciplined, a great force may be called out upon occasion: But great numbers of mercenary troops can never be maintained, without either trade and

\* DIOD. SIC. lib. 2.

† PLUTARCH, *in vita DIONIS*.

manufactures, or very extensive dominions. The United Provinces never were masters of such a force by sea and land, as that which is said to belong to DIONYSIUS; yet they possess as large a territory, perfectly well cultivated, and have infinitely more resources from their commerce and industry. DIODORUS SICULUS allows, that, even in his time, the army of DIONYSIUS appeared incredible; that is, as I interpret it, it was entirely a fiction, and the opinion arose from the exaggerated flattery of the courtiers, and perhaps from the vanity and policy of the tyrant himself.

\*Tis a very usual fallacy, to consider all the ages of antiquity as one period, and to compute the numbers contained in the great cities mentioned by ancient authors, as if these cities had been all cotemporary. The GREEK colonies flourished extremely in SICILY during the age of ALEXANDER: But in AUGUSTUS's time they were so decayed, that almost all the product of that fertile island was consumed in ITALY\*.

LET us now examine the numbers of inhabitants assigned to particular cities in antiquity; and omitting the numbers of NINEVEH, BABYLON, and the

\* STRABO, lib. 6.

EGYPTIAN THEBES, let us confine ourselves to the sphere of real history, to the GRECIAN and ROMAN states. I must own, the more I consider this subject, the more am I inclined to scepticism, with regard to the great populousness ascribed to antient times.

ATHENS is said by PLATO † to be a very great city; and it was surely the greatest of all the GREEK \* cities, except SYRACUSE, which was nearly about the same size in THUCYDIDES's † time, and afterwards increased beyond it. For CICERO ‖ mentions it as the greatest of all the GREEK cities in his time; not comprehending, I suppose, either ANTIOCH or ALEXANDRIA under that denomination. ATHE-NEUS § says, that, by the enumeration of DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS, there were in ATHENS 21,000 citizens, 10,000 strangers, and 400,000 slaves. This

† *Apolog. SOCR.*

\* ARGOS seems also to have been a great city: For LYSIAS contents himself with saying that it did not exceed ATHENS. Orat. 34.

‡ Lib. 6. See also PLUTARCH *in vita NICIAE*.

‖ *Orat. contra VERREM*, lib. 4. cap. 52. STRABO, lib. 6. says it was twenty-two miles in compass. But then we are to consider, that it contained two harbours within it; one of which was a very large one, and might be regarded as a kind of bay.

§ Lib. 6. cap. 20.

number

number is very much insisted on by those whose opinion I call in question, and is esteemed a fundamental fact to their purpose: But, in my opinion, there is no point of criticism more certain, than that **ATHENAEUS**, and **CTESICLES**, whom he cites, are here mistaken, and that the number of slaves is augmented by a whole cypher, and ought not to be regarded as more than 40,000.

*First*, When the number of citizens is said to be 21,000 by **ATHENAEUS**\*, men of full age are only understood. For, (1.) **HERODOTUS** says †, that **ARISTAGORAS**, ambassador from the **IONIANS**, found it harder to deceive one **SPARTAN** than 30,000 **ATHENIANS**; meaning, in a loose way, the whole state, supposed to be met in one popular assembly, excluding the women and children. (2.) **THUCYDIDES** ‡ says, that, making allowance for all the absentees in the fleet, army, garrisons, and for people employed in their private affairs, the **ATHENIAN** assembly never rose to five thousand. (3.) The forces, enumerated by the same historian ||, being all citizens, and amounting to 13,000 heavy-armed infantry, prove the same method of calculation; as also the whole

\* **DEMOSTHENES** assigns 20,000; *contra* **ARISTOT.**

† Lib. 5.

‡ Lib. 8.

|| Lib. 2. **DIDORUS SICULUS**'s account perfectly agrees, lib. 12.

tenor of the GREEK historians, who always understand men of full age, when they assign the number of citizens in any republic. Now, these being but the fourth of the inhabitants, the free ATHENIANS were by this account 84,000; the strangers 40,000; and the slaves, calculating by the smaller number, and allowing that they married and propagated at the same rate with freemen, were 160,000; and the whole inhabitants 284,000: A large enough number surely. The other number, 1,720,000, makes ATHENS larger than LONDON and PARIS united.

*Secondly*, THERE were but 10,000 houses in ATHENS.\*

*Thirdly*, THO' the extent of the walls, as given us by THUCYDIDES †, be great, (*viz.* eighteen miles, beside the sea-coast); yet XENOPHON ‡ says, there was much waste ground within the walls. They seemed indeed to have joined four distinct and separate cities §.

*Fourthly*,

\* XENOPHON. *Mem.* lib. 2.

† Lib. 2.

‡ *De ratione red.*

§ We are to observe, that when DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSÆUS says, that if we regard the antient walls of ROME, the extent of the city will not appear greater than that of ATHENS; he must mean the ACROPOLIS, and high town, only.

*Fourthly*, No insurrection of the slaves, nor suspicion of insurrection, are ever mentioned by historians; except one commotion of the miners\*.

*Fifthly*, THE ATHENIANS treatment of their slaves is said by XENOPHON †, and DEMOSTHENES ‡, and PLAUTUS §, to have been extremely gentle and indulgent: Which could never have been the case, had the disproportion been twenty to one. The disproportion is not so great in any of our colonies; and yet we are obliged to exercise a very rigorous military government over the negroes.

*Sixthly*, No man is ever esteemed rich for possessing what may be reckoned an equal distribution of property in any country, or even triple or quadruple that wealth. Thus every person in ENGLAND is computed by some to spend six-pence a-day: Yet is he esteemed only. No antient author ever speaks of the PYRUM, PHALERUS, and MUNYSICHIA, as the same with ATHENS. Much less can it be supposed, that DIONYSIUS would consider the matter in that light, after the walls of CIMON and PERICLES were destroyed, and ATHENS was entirely separated from these other towns. This observation destroys all VOSSIUS's reasonings, and introduces common sense into these calculations.

\* ATHEN. lib. 6.

† *De rep.* ATHEN.

‡ PHILIP. 3.

§ STICHO.

but poor who has five times that sum; Now, TIMARCHUS is said by ÆSCHINES § to have been left in easy circumstances; but he was master only of ten slaves employed in manufactures. LYSIAS and his brother, two strangers, were proscribed by the thirty for their great riches; tho' they had but sixty a-piece †. DEMOSTHENES was left very rich by his father; yet he had no more than fifty two slaves \*. His workhouse, of twenty cabinet-makers, is said to be a very considerable manufactory †.

*Seventhly*, DURING the DECELIAN war, as the GREEK historians call it, 20,000 slaves deserted, and brought the ATHENIANS to great distress, as we learn from THUCYDIDES †. This could not have happened, had they been only the twentieth part. The best slaves would not desert.

*Eighthly*, XENOPHON || proposes a scheme for entertaining by the public 10,000 slaves: And that so great a number may possibly be supported, any one will be convinced, says he, who considers the num-

§ *Contra* TIMARCH.

† *Orat.* II.

\* *Contra* APHOR.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Lib.* 7.

|| *De rat. red.*

bers we possessed before the DECELIAN war. A way of speaking altogether incompatible with the larger number of ATHENÆUS.

*Ninthly*, THE whole *census* of the state of ATHENS was less than 6000 talents. And tho' numbers in antient manuscripts be often suspected by critics, yet this is unexceptionable; both because DEMOSTHENES\*, who gives it, gives also the detail, which checks him; and because POLYBIUS † assigns the same number, and reasons upon it. Now, the most vulgar slave could yield by his labour an *obolus* a-day, over and above his maintenance, as we learn from XENOPHON ‡, who says, that NICIAS's overseer paid his master so much for slaves, whom he employed in digging of mines. If you will take the pains to estimate an *obolus* a-day, and the slaves at 400,000, computing only at four years purchase; you will find the sum above 12,000 talents; even tho' allowance be made for the great number of holidays in ATHENS. Besides, many of the slaves would have a much greater value from their art. The lowest that DEMOSTHENES || estimates any of his father's slaves, is two minas a-head. And upon this supposition, it is a little dif-

\* *De classibus.*

† Lib. 2. cap. 62.

‡ *De rat. red.*

|| *Contra APHORUM:*



ficult, I confess, to reconcile even the number of 40,000 slaves with the *census* of 6000 talents.

*Tenthly*, CHIOS is said by THUCYDIDES \*, to contain more slaves than any GREEK city, except SPARTA. SPARTA then had more than ATHENS, in proportion to the number of citizens. The SPARTANS were 9090 in the town, 30,000 in the country †. The male slaves, therefore, of full age, must have been more than 780,000; the whole more than 3,120,000. A number impossible to be maintained in a narrow barren country, such as LACONIA, which had no trade. Had the HELOTES been so very numerous, the murder of 2000 mentioned by THUCYDIDES ‡, would have irritated them, without weakening them.

BESIDES, we are to consider, that the number assigned by ATHENÆUS §, whatever it is, comprehends all the inhabitants of ATTICA, as well as those of

\* Lib. 2.

† PLUTARCH, *in vitæ LICURÆ*.

‡ Lib. 4.

§ The same author affirms, that CORINTH had once 460,000 slaves, ÆGINA 470,000. But the foregoing arguments hold stronger against these facts: 'Tis however remarkable, that ATHENÆUS cites so great an authority as ARISTOTLE for this last fact: And the scholiast on PINDAR mentions the same number of slaves in ÆGINA.

ATHENS. The ATHENIANS affected much a country life, as we learn from THUCYDIDES<sup>\*</sup>; and when they were all chased into town, by the invasion of their territory during the PELOPONNESIAN war, the city was not able to contain them; and they were obliged to lie in the porticoes, temples, and even streets, for want of lodging †.

THE same remark is to be extended to all the other GREEK cities; and when the number of the citizens is assigned, we must always understand it of the inhabitants of the neighbouring country, as well as of the city. Yet, even with this allowance, it must be confessed, that GREECE was a populous country, and exceeded what we could imagine of so narrow a territory, naturally not very fertile, and which drew no supplies of corn from other places. For excepting ATHENS, which traded to PONTUS for that commodity, the other cities seem to have subsisted chiefly from their neighbouring territory ‡.

M 2

RHODES

\* Lib. 2.

† THUCYD. lib. 2.

‡ DEMOST. contra LEPT. The ATHENIANS brought yearly from PONTUS 400,000 medimni or bushels of corn, as appeared from the custom-house books. And this was the greatest part of their importation. This by the by is a strong proof that there is some great mistake in the foregoing passage of ARISTOTELIS.

RHODES is well known to have been a city of extensive commerce, and of great fame and splendor; yet it contained only 6000 citizens able to bear arms, when it was besieged by DEMETRIUS\*.

THEBES was always one of the capital cities of GREECE †: But the number of its citizens exceeded not those of RHODES †. PHLIASIA is said to be a small

ÆTUS. For ATTICA itself was so barren in corn, that it produced not enough even to maintain the peasants. TIT. LIV. lib. 43. cap. 6. LUCIAN, in his *navigium fœc vote*, says, that a ship, which by the dimensions he gives, seems to have been about the size of our third rates, carried as much corn as would maintain all ATTICA for a twelvemonth. But perhaps ATHENS was decayed at that time; and besides, it is not safe to trust such loose rhetorical calculations.

\* DIOD. SIC. lib. 20.

† ISOCR. *paneg.*

† DIOD. SIC. lib. 17. When ALEXANDER attacked THEBES, we may safely conclude, that almost the whole inhabitants were present. Whoever is acquainted with the spirit of the GREEKS, especially of the THEBANS, will never suspect, that any of them would desert their country, when it was reduced to such extreme peril and distress. As ALEXANDER took the town by storm, all those who bore arms were put to the sword without mercy; and they amounted only to 6000 men. Among these were some strangers and manumitted slaves. The captives, consisting of old men, women, children, and slaves, were sold, and they amounted to 30,000. We may therefore conclude that the

free

small city by XENOPHON \*, yet we find, that it contained 6000 citizens †. I pretend not to reconcile these two facts. Perhaps, XENOPHON calls PHLIASIA a small town, because it made but a small figure in GREECE, and maintained only a subordinate alliance with SPARTA; or perhaps the country belonging to it, was extensive, and most of the citizens were employed in the cultivation of it, and dwelt in the neighbouring villages.

MANTINEA was equal to any city in ARCADIA ‡: Consequently it was equal to MEGALOPOLIS, which was fifty stadia, or six miles and a quarter in circum-

free citizens in THEBES, of both sexes and all ages, were near 24,000; the strangers and slaves about 12,000. These last, we may observe, were somewhat fewer in proportion than at ATHENS; as is reasonable to imagine from this circumstance, that ATHENS was a town of more trade to support slaves, and of more entertainment to allure strangers. It is also to be remarked, that thirty-six thousand was the whole number of people, both in the city of THEBES, and the neighbouring territory: A very moderate number, it must be confessed; and this computation, being founded in facts which appear undisputable, must have great weight in the present controversy. The above-mentioned number of RHODIANS too were the whole inhabitants of the island, who were free, and able to bear arms.

\* Hist. GRÆC. lib. 7.

† Id. lib. 7.

‡ POLYB. lib. 2.

ference\*. But MANTINÆA had only 3000 citizens†. The GREEK cities, therefore, contained often fields and gardens, together with the houses; and we cannot judge of them by the extent of their walls. Athens contained no more than 10,000 houses; yet its walls, with the sea-coast, were above twenty miles in extent. SYRACUSE was twenty-two miles in circumference; yet was scarce ever spoke of by the ancients as more populous than ATHENS. BABYLON was a square of fifteen miles, or sixty miles in circuit; but it contained large cultivated fields and inclosures, as we learn from PLINY. Tho' AURELIAN's wall was fifty miles in circumference‡; the circuit of all the thirteen divisions of ROME, taken apart, according to PUBLIUS VICTOR, was only about forty-three miles. When an enemy invaded the country, the whole inhabitants retired within the walls of the ancient cities, with their cattle and furniture, and instruments of husbandry; and the great height to which the walls were raised, enabled a small number to defend them with facility.

SPARTA, says XENOPHON §, is one of the cities of GREECE that has the fewest inhabitants. Yet POLY-

BIUS

\* POLYB. lib. 9. cap. 20.

† LYSIAS, orat. 34.

‡ VOPISCUS in vita AUREL.

§ De rep. LACED. This passage is not easily reconciled with that

BIUS † says, that it was forty-eight stadia in circumference, and was round.

ALL the ÆTOLIANS able to bear arms in ANTIPATER's time, deducting some few garrisons, were but ten thousand men \*.

POLYBIUS † tells us. that the ACHÆAN league might, without any inconvenience, march 30 or 40,000 men : And this account seems very probable : For that league comprehended the greatest part of PELOPONNESUS. Yet PAUSANIAS ‡, speaking of the same period, says, that all the ACHÆANS able to bear arms, even when several manumitted slaves were joined to them, did not amount to fifteen thousand.

THE THESSALIANS, till their final conquest by the ROMANS, were, in all ages, turbulent, factious, seditious, disorderly §. 'Tis not therefore natural to suppose, that that part of GREECE abounded much in people.

that of PLUTARCH above, who says, that SPARTA had 9000 citizens.

† POLYB. lib. 9. cap. 20.

\* DIOD. SIC. lib. 18.

† LEGAT.

‡ IN ACHAÏS.

§ TIT. LIV. lib. 34. cap. 51. PLATO IN CRITONE.

WE are told by THUCYDIDES †, that the part of PELOPONNESUS adjoining to PYLOS, was desert and uncultivated. HERODOTUS says \*, that MACEDONIA was full of lions and wild bulls; animals which can only inhabit vast unpeopled forests. These were the two extremities of GREECE.

THE whole inhabitants of EPIRUS, of all ages, sexes and conditions, who were sold by PAULUS ÆMILIUS, amounted only to 150,000 ‡. Yet EPIRUS might be double the extent of YORKSHIRE.

JUSTIN ¶ tells us, that when PHILIP of MACEDON was declared head of the GREEK confederacy, he called a congress of all the states, except the LA-CEDEMONIANS, who refused to concur; and he found the force of the whole, upon computation, to amount to 200,000 infantry, and 15,000 cavalry. This must be understood to be all the citizens capable of bearing arms. For as the GREEK republics maintained no mercenary forces, and had no militia distinct from the whole body of the citizens, it is not conceivable what other medium there could be of computation. That

† Lib. 7.

\* Lib. 7.

‡ TIT. LIV. lib. 45. cap. 34.

¶ Lib. 9. cap. 5.

such an army could ever by GREECE be brought into the field, and be maintained there, is contrary to all history. Upon this supposition, therefore, we may thus reason. The free GREEKS of all ages and sexes were 860,000. The slaves, estimating them by the number of ATHENIAN slaves as above, who seldom married or had families, were double the male citizens of full age, *viz.* 430,000. And the whole inhabitants of antient GREECE, excepting LACONIA, were about one million two hundred and ninety thousand: No mighty number, nor much exceeding what may be found at present in SCOTLAND, a country of not much greater extent, and very indifferently peopled.

WE may now consider the numbers of people in, ROME and ITALY, and collect all the lights afforded, us by scattered passages in antient authors. We shall find, upon the whole, a great difficulty in fixing any opinion on that head; and no reason to support those exaggerated calculations, so much insisted on by modern writers.

DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSÆUS \* says, that the antient walls of ROME were nearly of the same compass with those of ATHENS, but that the suburbs ran out to a great extent; and it was difficult to tell,



where the town ended or the country began. In some places of ROME, it appears, from the same author \* from JUVENAL †, and from other ancient writers ‡, that the houses were high, and families lived in separate storeys, one above another: But it is probable that these were only the poorer citizens, and only in some few streets. If we may judge from the younger PLINY's § account of his house, and from BARTOLI's plans

\* Lib. 16.

† Satyr 3. l. 183, 170.

‡ STRABO, lib. 5. says, that the Emperor AUGUSTUS prohibited the raising houses higher than seventy feet. In another passage, lib. 16, he speaks of the houses of ROME as remarkably high. See also to the same purpose VITRUVIUS, lib. 2. cap. 8. AMBROSIOSS the sophist, in his *Oratio de Populo*, says, that ROME consisted of cities on the top of cities; and that if one were to spread it out, and unfold it, it would cover the whole surface of ITALY. Where an author indulges himself in such extravagant declamations, and gives so much into the hyperbolical style, one knows not how far he must be reduced. But this reasoning seems natural: If ROME was built in so scattered a manner as DIONYSIUS says, and ran so much into the country, there must have been very few streets where the houses were raised so high. 'Tis only for want of ground, that any body builds in that inconvenient manner.

§ Lib. 2. epist. 16. lib. 5. epist. 6. 'Tis true, PLINY there describes a country-house: But since that was the idea which the ancients formed of a magnificent and convenient building, the great

plans of ancient buildings, the men of quality had very spacious palaces; and their buildings were like the CHINESE houses at this day, where each apartment is separated from the rest, and rises no higher than a single storey. To which if we add, that the ROMAN nobility much affected very extensive porticoes, and even woods† in town; we may perhaps allow VOSSIUS (tho' there is no manner of reason for it) to read the famous passage of the elder PLINY \*

his

great men would certainly build the same way in town. "In *laxitatem ruris excurrunt*," says SENECA of the rich and voluptuous, *epist.* 114. VALERIUS MAXIMUS, *lib.* 4. *cap.* 4. speaking of CINCINNATUS' field of four acres, says, "Auguste *se habitare nunc putat, cujus domus tantum patet quantum CINCINNATI rura patuerant.*" To the same purpose see *lib.* 36. *cap.* 15. also *lib.* 18. *cap.* 2.

† VITRUV. *lib.* 5. *cap.* 11. TACIT. *annal.* *lib.* 11. *cap.* 3. SUTTON. *in vita* OCTAV. *cap.* 72, &c.

\* "Moenia ejus (ROMAE) collegere ambitu imperatoribus, censoribusque VESPASIANIS, A. U. C. 828. pass. xiii. MCC. complexa montes septem, ipsa dividitur in regiones quatuordecim, compita earum 265. Ejusdem spatii mensura, currente a milliario in capite ROM. Fori statuto, ad singulas portas, quae sunt hodie numero 37, ita ut duodecim portae semel numerentur, praetereanturque ex veteribus septem, quae esse desierunt, efficit passuum per directum 30,775. Ad extrema vero sectorum cum castris praetoriis ab eodem Milliario, per

his own way without admitting the extravagant consequences which he draws from it.

THE

"vicos omnium viarum, mensura collegit paulo amplius septuaginta millia passuum. Quo si quis altitudinem tectorum addat, dignam profecto, aestimationem concipiat, fateaturque nullius urbis magnitudinem in toto orbe potuisse ei comparari."

PLIN. lib. 3. cap. 5.

All the best manuscripts of PLINY read the passage as here cited, and fix the compass of the walls of Rome to be thirteen miles. The question is, What PLINY means by 30,775 paces, and how that number was formed? The manner in which I conceive it, is this. ROME was a semicircular area of thirteen miles circumference. The Forum, and consequently the Milliarium, we know, was situated on the banks of the TYBER, and near the center of the circle, or upon the diameter of the semicircular area. Tho' there were thirty-seven gates to ROME, yet only twelve of them had straight streets, leading from them to the Milliarium. PLINY, therefore, having assigned the circumference of ROME, and knowing that that alone was not sufficient to give us a just notion of its surface, uses this farther method: He supposes all the streets, leading from the Milliarium to the twelve gates, to be laid together into one straight line, and supposes we run along that line, so as to count each gate once: In which case, he says, that the whole line is 30,775 paces: Or, in other words, that each street or radius of the semicircular area is upon an average two miles and a half; and the whole length of ROME is five miles, and its breadth about half as much, besides the scattered suburbs.

PLIN

THE number of citizens who received corn by the public distribution in AUGUSTUS's time, were two hundred

PÈRE HARDOUIN understands this passage in the same manner; with regard to the laying together the several streets of ROME into one line, in order to compose 30,775 paces: But then he supposes, that streets led from the Milliarium to every gate and that no street exceeded 800 paces in length. But (1.) a semicircular area, whose radius was only 800 paces, could never have a circumference near thirteen miles, the compass of ROME as assigned by PLINY. A radius of two miles and a half forms very nearly that circumference. (2.) There is an absurdity in supposing a city so built as to have streets running to its center from every gate in its circumference. These streets must interfere as they approach. (3.) This diminishes too much from the greatness of antient ROME, and reduces that city below even BRISTOL or ROTTERDAM.

The sense which VOSSIUS in his *Observationes variae* puts on this passage of PLINY, errs widely in the other extreme. One manuscript, of no authority, instead of thirteen miles, has assigned thirty miles for the compass of the walls of ROME. And VOSSIUS understands this only of the curvilinear part of the circumference; supposing, that as the TYBER formed the diameter, there were no walls built on that side. But (1.) this reading is allowed contrary to almost all the manuscripts. (2.) Why should PLINY, a concise writer, repeat the compass of the walls of ROME in two successive sentences? (3.) Why repeat it with so sensible a variation? (4.) What is the meaning of PLINY's mentioning twice the MILLIARIUM, if a line was measured that had no dependence on the MILLIARIUM? (5.)

hundred thousand \*. This one would esteem a pretty certain ground of calculation : Yet it is attended with such

AURELIAN's wall is said by VOPISCUS to have been drawn *longior semibis*, and to have comprehended all the buildings and suburbs on the north side of the TYBER ; yet its compass was only fifty miles ; and even here critics suspect some mistake or corruption in the text. It is not probable, that ROME would diminish from AUGUSTUS to AURELIAN. It remained still the capital of the same empire ; and none of the civil wars in that long period, except the tumults on the death of MAXIMUS and BALBINUS ever affected the city. CARACALLA is said by AURELIUS VICTOR to have increased ROME. (6.) There are no remains of antient buildings, which mark any such greatness of ROME. VOSSIUS's reply to this objection seems absurd, That the rubbish would sink sixty or seventy feet below ground. It appears from SPARTIAN (*in vita Severi*) that the five-mile stone in *via Laticlavia* was out of the city. (7.) OLYMPIODORUS and PUBLIUS VICTOR fix the number of houses in ROME to be betwixt forty and fifty thousand. (8.) The very extravagance of the consequences drawn by this critic, as well as LIPSIUS, if they be necessary, destroys the foundation on which they are grounded : That ROME contained fourteen millions of inhabitants ; while the whole kingdom of FRANCE contains only five, according to his computation, &c.

The only objection to the sense which we have affixed above to the passage of PLINY, seems to lie in this, That PLINY, after mentioning the thirty-seven gates of ROME, assigns only a reason for suppressing the seven old ones, and says nothing of the

eighteen

\* *In monument, Anoy.*

such circumstances as throw us back into doubt and uncertainty.

DID the poorer citizens only receive the distribution? It was calculated, to be sure, chiefly for their benefit. But it appears from a passage of CICERO\*, that the rich might also take their portion, and that it was esteemed no reproach in them to apply for it.

To whom was the corn given; whether only to heads of families, or to every man, woman, and child? The portion every month was five *modii* to each f, (about  $\frac{5}{8}$  of a bushel.) This was too little for a family, and too much for an individual. A very accurate antiquarian †, therefore, infers, that it was given to every man of full years: But he allows the matter to be uncertain.

eighteen gates, the streets leading from which terminated, according to my opinion, before they reached the Forum. But as PLINY was writing to the ROMANS, who perfectly knew the disposition of the streets, it is not strange he should take a circumstance for granted, which was so familiar to every body. Perhaps, too, many of these gates led to wharfs upon the river.

\* *Tusc. quæst. lib. 3. cap. 28.*

† *Letinins-episc. Salust. lib. 3.*

‡ *Nicolaus Hertenfius de re frumentaria Roman.*

Was it strictly inquired, whether the claimant lived within the precincts of ROME, or was it sufficient that he presented himself at the monthly distribution? This last seems more probable †.

WERE there no false claimants? We are told ‡, that CÆSAR struck off at once 170,000, who had crept in without a just title; and it is very little probable, that he remedied all abuses.

BUT, lastly, what proportion of slaves must we assign to these citizens? This is the most material question; and the most uncertain. 'Tis very doubtful, whether ATHENS can be established as a rule for ROME. Perhaps the ATHENIANS had more slaves, because they employed them in manufactures, for which a capital city, like ROME, seems not so proper. Perhaps, on the other hand, the ROMANS had more slaves, on account of their superior luxury and riches.

† Not to take the people too much from their business, AUGUSTUS ordained the distribution of corn to be made only thrice a-year: But the people finding the monthly distributions more convenient, (as preserving, I suppose, a more regular economy in their family) desired to have them restored: SUTTON. AUGUST. cap. 40. Had not some of the people come from some distance for their corn, AUGUSTUS's precaution seems superfluous.

‡ Sueton. in Jul. cap. 41.

THERE

THERE were exact bills of mortality kept in ROME; but no antient author has given us the number of burials, except SUETONIUS \*, who tells us, that in one season there were 30,000 names carried to the temple of LIBITINA: But this was during a plague; which can afford no certain foundation for any inference.

THE public corn, tho' distributed only to 200,000 citizens, affected very considerably the whole agriculture of IITALY †: A fact no way reconcilable to some modern exaggerations with regard to the inhabitants of that country.

THE best ground of conjecture I can find concerning the greatness of antient ROME, is this: WE are told by HERODIAN ‡, that ANTIOCH and AALEXANDRIA were very little inferior to ROME. It appears from DIODORUS SICULUS §, that one straight street of AALEXANDRIA, reaching from port to port, was five miles long; and as AALEXANDRIA was much more extended in length than breadth, it seems to have been a city nearly of the bulk of PARIS †; and ROME might be about the size of LLONDON.

THERE

\* *In vita Neronis.*

† *Sueton. Aug. cap. 42.*

‡ *Lib. 4. cap. 5.*

§ *Lib. 17.*

† *QUINTUS CURTIUS* says, its walls were only ten miles in circumference, when founded by AALEXANDER; *lib. 4. cap. 3.*

STRABO,



THESE lived in ALEXANDRIA, in DIODORUS SICULUS's time \*, 300,000 free people, comprehend-

STRABO, who had travelled to ALEXANDRIA, as well as DIODORUS SICULUS, says it was scarce four miles long, and in most places about a mile broad; lib. 17. PLINY says it resembled a MACEDONIAN cassock, stretching out in the corners; lib. 5. cap. 10. Notwithstanding this bulk of ALEXANDRIA, which seems but moderate, DIODORUS SICULUS, speaking of its circuit as drawn by ALEXANDER (which it never exceeded, as we learn from AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, lib. 22. cap. 16.) says it was *μυτῶσι διαφεύουσα*, *extremely great*, *ibid.* The reason which he assigns for its surpassing all cities of the world (for he excepts not ROME) is, that it contained 300,000 free inhabitants. He also mentions the revenues of the kings, viz. 6000 talents, as another circumstance to the same purpose: No such mighty sum in our eyes, even tho' we make allowances for the different value of money. What STRABO says of the neighbouring country, means only that it was well peopled, *οικυμένη πολλοῖς*. Might not one affirm, without any great hyperbole, that the whole banks of the river from GRAVESEND to WINDSOR are one city? This is even more than STRABO says of the banks of the lake MARBOTIS, and of the canal to CANOEUS. 'Tis a vulgar saying in ITALY, that the king of SARDINIA has but one town in PIEDMONT; for it is all a town. AGRIPPA in JOSEPHUS *de bello JUDÆIC.* lib. 2. cap. 16. to make his audience comprehend the excessive greatness of ALEXANDRIA, which he endeavours to magnify, describes only the compass of the city as drawn by ALEXANDER: A clear proof that, the bulk of the inhabitants were lodged there; and that the neighbouring country was no more than what might be expected about all great towns, very well cultivated, and well peopled. \* lib. 17.

ing.

ing, I suppose, women and children †. But what number of slaves? Had we any just ground to fix these at an equal number with the free inhabitants it would favour the foregoing calculation.

THERE is a passage in HERODIAN, which is a little surprising. He says positively, that the palace of the Emperor was as large as all the rest of the city †. This was NERO's golden house, which is indeed represented by SÜETONIUS ¶ and PLINY as of an enormous extent †; but no power of imagination

† He says *ελευθεροι*, not *πολιται*, which last expression must have been understood of citizens alone, and grown men.

‡ Lib. 4. cap. 1. *maxime exiliis*. POLITIAN interprets it “*sedibus majoribus etiam reliqua urbe.*”

¶ He says (in NERONE cap. 30.) that a portico or *πλατεια* of it was 3000 feet long; “*tanta laxitas ut porticus triplicis milliarias haberet.*” He cannot mean three miles. For the whole extent of the house from the PALATINE to the ESQUILINE was not near so great. So when VOPISC. in AURELIANO mentions a portico in SALUSTIUS's gardens, which he calls *porticus milliaria*; it must be understood of a thousand feet. So also HORACE;

“Nulla decempedis

Metata privatis opacum

Porticus excipiebat Anthon.” Lib. 2. ode 15.

So also in lib. 1. satyr. 8.

“Mille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum

Hic dabat.”

‡ PLINY, lib. 36. cap. 15. “*His videtur urbem totam singulis principum, CAIE ac NERONIS.*”

can make us conceive it to bear any proportion to such a city as LONDON.

WE may observe, had the Historian been relating NERO's extravagance, and had he made use of such an expression, it would have had much less weight; these rhetorical exaggerations being so apt to creep into an author's style, even when the most chaste and correct. But 'tis mentioned by HERODIAN only by the by, in relating the quarrels between GETA and CARACALLA.

It appears from the same historian \*, that there was then much land uncultivated, and put to no manner of use; and he ascribes it as a great praise to PERTINAX, that he allowed every one to take such land, either in ITALY or elsewhere, and cultivate it as he pleased, without paying any taxes. *Lands uncultivated, and put to no manner of use!* This is not heard of in any part of CHRISTENDOM; except perhaps in some remote parts of HUNGARY, as I have been informed. And it surely corresponds very well with that idea of the extreme populousness of antiquity, so much insisted on.

WE learn from VOPISCUS †, that there was in ETRURIA much fertile land uncultivated, which the

\* Lib. 2. cap. 15.

† In ALEXANDER, cap. 48.

Emperor

Emperor AUGUSTUS intended to convert into vineyards, in order to furnish the ROMAN people with a gratuitous distribution of wine : A very proper expedient to dispeople still farther that capital and all the neighbouring territories.

It may not be amiss to take notice of the account which POLYBIUS † gives of the great herds of swine to be met with, in TUSCANY and LOMBARDY, as well as in GREECE, and of the method of feeding them which was then practised. " There are great herds of swine," says he, " thro'out all ITALY, particularly, in former times, thro' ETRURIA and CISALPINE GAUL. And a herd frequently contains a thousand or more swine. When one of these herds in feeding meets with another, they mix together ; and the swine-herds have no other expedient to separate them than to go to different quarters, where they sound their horn ; and these animals, being accustomed to that signal, run immediately each to the horn of his own keeper. Whereas in GERMANY, if the herds of swine happen to mix in the forests, he who has the greatest flock, takes cunningly the opportunity of driving all away. And thieves are very apt to purloin the straggling hogs, which have wandered to a great distance from their keeper in search of food."

† Lib. 12. cap. 2.

MAY we not infer from this account, that the North of ITALY was then much less peopled, and worse cultivated, than at present? How could these vast herds be fed in a country so thick of inclosures, so improved by agriculture, so divided by farms, so planted with vines and corn intermingled together? I must confess, that POLYBIUS's relation has more the air of that oeconomy which is to be met with in our AMERICAN colonies, than the management of an EUROPEAN country.

WE meet with a reflection in ARISTOTLE's || ethics, which seems to me unaccountable on any supposition, and by proving too much in favour of our present reasoning, may be thought really to prove nothing. That philosopher, treating of friendship, and observing, that that relation ought neither to be contracted to a very few, nor extended over a great multitude, illustrates his opinion by the following argument. "In like manner," says he, "as a city cannot subsist, if it either have so few inhabitants as ten, or so many as a hundred thousand; so is there a mediocrity required in the number of friends; and you destroy the essence of friendship by running into either extreme." What! impossible that a city can contain a hundred thousand inhabitants! Had ARISTOTLE never seen nor heard

|| Lib. 9. cap. 10. His expression is ἀριθμὸς, not πολὺς, inhabitant, not citizen.

of a city which was near so populous? This, I must own, passes my comprehension.

PLINY † tells us that SELEUCIA, the seat of the GREEK empire in the East, was reported to contain 600,000 people. CARTHAGE is said by STRABO \* to have contained 700,000. The inhabitants of PEKIN are not much more numerous. LONDON, PARIS, and CONSTANTINOPLE, may admit of nearly the same computation; at least, the two latter cities do not exceed it. ROME, ALEXANDRIA, ANTIOCH, we have already spoke of. From the experience of past and present ages, one might conjecture, that there is a kind of impossibility, that any city could ever rise much beyond this proportion. Whether the grandeur of a city be founded on commerce or on empire, there seem to be invincible obstacles, which prevent its farther progress. The seats of vast monarchies, by introducing extravagant luxury, irregular expence, idleness, dependence, and false ideas of rank and superiority, are improper for commerce. Extensive commerce checks itself, by raising the price of all labour and commodities. When a great court engages the attendance of a numerous nobility, possessed of overgrown fortunes, the middling gentry remain in their provincial towns, where they can make a figure on a moderate income. And if the dominions of a state arrive at an enormous size, there necessarily

† Lib. 6. cap. 28.

\* Lib. 17.

arise many capitals, in the remoter provinces, whither all the inhabitants, except a few courtiers, repair, for education, fortune, and amusement †. LONDON, by uniting extensive commerce and middling empire, has, perhaps, arrived at a greatness, which no city will ever be able to exceed.

CHUSE DOYER OF CALAIS for a center: Draw a circle of two hundred miles radius: You comprehend LONDON, PARIS, the NETHERLANDS, the UNITED PROVINCES, and some of the best cultivated counties of FRANCE and ENGLAND. It may safely, I think, be affirmed that no spot of ground can be found, in antiquity, of equal extent, which contained near so many great and populous cities, and was so stocked with riches and inhabitants. To balance, in both periods, the states, which possessed most art, knowledge, civility, and the best police, seems the truest method of comparison.

’TIS an observation of L’ABBE DU BOS †, that ITALY is warmer at present than it was in antient times. “The annals of ROME tell us,” says he

† Such were ALEXANDRIA, ANTIOCH, CARTHAGE, EPHEBUS, LYONS, &c. in the ROMAN empire. Such are even BOURDEAUX, THOLOUSE, DIJON, RENNES, ROUEN, AIX, &c. in FRANCE; DUBLIN, EDINBURGH, YORK, in the BRITISH dominions.

† Vol. 2. §. 16.

“ that

“ that in the year 480 *ab U. C.* the winter was so  
 “ severe that it destroyed the trees. The TYBER  
 “ froze in ROME, and the ground was covered with  
 “ snow for forty days. When JUVENAL \* describes  
 “ a superstitious woman, he represents her as break-  
 “ ing the ice of the TYBER, that she might perform  
 “ her ablutions.

“ *Hybernum fracta glacie descendet in amnem,*

“ *Ter matutino Tyberi mergatur.*

“ He speaks of that river's freezing as a common  
 “ event. Many passages of HORACE suppose the  
 “ streets of ROME full of snow and ice. We should  
 “ have more certainty with regard to this point, had  
 “ the antients known the use of thermometers : But  
 “ their writers, without intending it, give us inform-  
 “ ation, sufficient to convince us, that the winters are  
 “ now much more temperate at ROME than formerly.  
 “ At present, the TYBER no more freezes at ROME  
 “ than the NILE at CAIRO. The ROMANS esteem  
 “ the winter very rigorous, if the snow lies two days,  
 “ and if one sees for eight and forty hours a few ici-  
 “ cles hang from a fountain that has a north expo-  
 “ sition.”

THE observation of this ingenious critic may be  
 extended to other EUROPEAN climates. Who could

\* Sat. 6.



discover the mild climate of FRANCE in DIODORUS SICULUS's † description of that of GAUL ? " As it is  
 " a northern climate," says he, " it is infested with  
 " cold to an extreme degree. In cloudy weather, in-  
 " stead of rain, there fall great snows ; and in clear  
 " weather it there freezes so excessive hard, that the  
 " rivers acquire bridges of their own substance, over  
 " which, not only single travellers may pass, but  
 " large armies, accompanied with all their baggage  
 " and loaded waggons. And there being many  
 " rivers in GAUL, the RHONE, the RHINE, &c. al-  
 " most all of them are froze over ; and 'tis usual, in  
 " order to prevent falling, to cover the ice with chaff  
 " and straw at the places where the road passes." *Colder than a GALLIC Winter*, is used by PETRONIUS, as a proverbial expression.

NORTH of the CEVENNES, says STRABO ‡, GAUL produces not figs and olives : And the vines, which have been planted, bear not grapes, that will ripen.

OVID positively maintains, with all the serious affirmation of prose, that the EUXINE sea was frozen over every winter in his time ; and he appeals to ROMAN governours, whom he names, for the truth of his assertion §. This seldom or never happens at pre-

† Lib. 4.

‡ Lib. 4.

§ *Triß.* lib. 3. eleg. 9. *De Ponto*, lib. 4. eleg. 7, 9, 10.

sent in the latitude of TOMI, whither OVID was banished. All the complaints of the same poet seem to mark a rigour of the seasons, which is scarce experienced at present in PETERSBURG or STOCKHOLM.

TOURNEFORT, a *Provençal*, who had travelled into the same countries, observes, that there is not a finer climate in the world: And he asserts, that nothing but OVID's melancholy could have given him such dismal ideas of it. But the facts mentioned by that poet, are too circumstantial to bear any such interpretation.

POLYBIUS\* says, that the climate in ARCADIA was very cold, and the air moist.

"ITALY," says VARRO†, "is the most temperate climate in EUROPE. The inland parts" (GAUL, GERMANY, and PANNONIA, no doubt) "have almost perpetual winter."

THE northern parts of SPAIN, according to STRABO‡, are but ill inhabited, because of the great cold.

ALLOWING, therefore, this remark to be just, that EUROPE is become warmer than formerly; how can we account for it? Plainly, by no other method, but by supposing, that the land is at present much better cultivated, and that the woods are cleared,

\* Lib. 4. cap. 27.

† Lib. 1. cap. 2.

‡ Lib. 3.

which formerly threw a shade upon the earth, and kept the rays of the sun from penetrating to it. Our northern colonies in AMERICA become more temperate, in proportion as the woods are felled \*; but in general, every one may remark, that cold still makes itself much more severely felt, both in North and South AMERICA, than in places under the same latitude in EUROPE.

SASERNA, quoted by COLUMELLA †, affirmed, that the disposition of the heavens was altered before his time, and that the air had become much milder and warmer; as appears, hence, says he, that many places now abound with vineyards and olive-plantations, which formerly, by reason of the rigour of the climate, could raise none of these productions. Such a change, if real, will be allowed an evident sign of the better cultivation and peopling of countries before the age of SASERNA †; and, if it be continued to

\* The warm southern colonies also become more healthful: And 'tis remarkable, that in the SPANISH histories of the first discovery and conquest of these countries, they appear to have been very healthful; being then well peopled and cultivated. No account of the sickness or decay of CORTES's or PIZZARRO's small armies.

† Lib. I, cap. 8.

‡ He seems to have lived about the time of the younger AFRICANUS; lib II, cap. 1.

the

the present times, is a proof, that these advantages have been continually increasing thro'out this part of the world.

LET us now cast our eye over all the countries which were the scene of antiënt and modern history, and compare their past and present situation. We shall not, perhaps, find such foundation for the complaint of the present emptiness and desolation of the world. *ÆGYPT* is represented by *MAILLET*, to whom we owe the best account of it, as extremely populous; tho' he esteems the number of its inhabitants to be diminished. *SYRIA*, and the Lesser *ASIA*, as well as the coast of *BARBARY*, I can readily own, to be very desert in comparison of their antiënt condition. The depopulation of *GREECE* is also very obvious. But whether the country now called *TURKY* in *EUROPE* may not, in general, contain as many inhabitants as during the flourishing period of *GREECE*, may be a little doubtful. The *THRACIANS* seem then to have lived like the *TARTARS* at present, by pasturage and plunder\*: The *GETES* were still more uncivilized†: And the *ILLYRIANS* were no better‡. These occupy nine tenths of that country:

\* *Xenoph.* *exp.* lib. 7. *Polyb.* lib. 4. *cap.* 45.

† *Ovid passim*, &c. *Strabo*, lib. 7.

‡ *Polyb.* lib. 2. *cap.* 12.

And tho' the government of the **TURKS** be not very favourable to industry and propagation ; yet it preserves at least peace and order among the inhabitants ; and is preferable to that barbarous, unsettled condition, in which they antiently lived.

**POLAND** and **MUSCOVY** in **EUROPE** are not populous ; but are certainly much more so than the antient **SARMATIA** and **SCYTHIA** ; where no husbandry or agriculture was ever heard of, and pasturage was the sole art by which the people were maintained. The like observation may be extended to **DENMARK** and **SWEDEN**. No one ought to esteem the immense swarms of people, which formerly came from the North, and over ran all **EUROPE**, to be any objection to this opinion. Where a whole nation, or even half of it remove their seat ; 'tis easy to imagine, what a prodigious multitude they must form ; with what desperate valour they must make their attacks ; and how the terror they strike into the invaded nations will make these magnify, in their imagination, both the courage and multitude of the invaders. **SCOTLAND** is neither extensive nor populous ; but were the half of its inhabitants to seek new seats, they would form a colony as large as the **TEUTONS** and **CIMBRI** ; and would shake all **EUROPE**, supposing it in no better condition for defence than formerly.

GERMANY has surely at present twenty times more inhabitants than in antient times, when they cultivated no ground, and each tribe valued itself on the extensive desolation which it spread around; as we learn from CÆSAR †, and TACITUS ‥, and STRABO ‡. A proof, that the division into small republics will not alone render a nation populous, unless attended with the spirit of peace, order, and industry.

THE barbarous condition of BRITAIN in former times is well known, and the thinness of its inhabitants may easily be conjectured, both from their barbarity, and from a circumstance mentioned by HERODIAN \*, that all BRITAIN was marshy, even in SEVERUS's time, after the ROMANS had been fully settled in it above a whole century.

• 'Tis not easily imagined, that the GAULS were antiently much more advanced in the arts of life than their northern neighbours; since they travelled to this island for their education in the mysteries of the religion and philosophy of the DRUIDS †. I

† *De bello Gallico*, lib. 6.

‡ *De moribus Germ.* † Lib. 7.

\* Lib. 3. cap. 47.

† CÆSAR *de bello Gallico*; lib. 16. STRABO, lib. 7. says, the GAULS were not much more improved than the GERMANS.

cannot, therefore, think, that GAUL was then near so populous as FRANCE is at present.

WERE we to believe, indeed, and join together the testimony of APPIAN, and that of DIODORUS SICULUS, we must admit an incredible populousness in GAUL. The former historian † says, that there were 400 nations in that country; the latter ‖ affirms, that the largest of the GALLIC nations consisted of 200,000 men, besides women and children, and the least of 50,000. Calculating, therefore, at a medium, we must admit of near 200 millions of people, in a country, which we esteem populous at present, tho' supposed to contain little more than twenty ‡. Such calculations, therefore, by their extravagance lose all manner of authority. We may observe, that that equality of property, to which the populousness of antiquity may be ascribed, had no place among the GAULS \*. Their intestine wars also, before CÆSAR's time, were almost perpetual †. And STRABO. § observes, that tho' all GAUL was cultivated, yet it was not cultivated with any skill or care; the genius of the inhabitants leading them less to arts than arms, till their slavery to ROME produced peace among themselves.

† Celt. pars 1.      ‖ Lib. 5.

‡ Antient GAUL was more extensive than modern FRANCE.

\* Cæsar de bello Gallico; lib. 6.      † Id. ibid.      § Lib. 4.

CÆSAR

CÆSAR ¶ enumerates very particularly the great forces which were levied in BELGIUM to oppose his conquests; and makes them amount to 208,000. These were not the whole people able to bear arms in BELGIUM: For the same historian tells us, that the BELLOVACI could have brought a hundred thousand men into the field, tho' they engaged only for sixty. Taking the whole, therefore, in this proportion of ten to six, the sum of fighting men in all the states of BELGIUM was about 350,000; the whole inhabitants a million and a half. And BELGIUM being about the fourth of GAUL, that country might contain six millions, which is not the third of its present inhabitants\*. We are informed by CÆSAR,

¶ *De bello Gallico*; lib. 2.

\* It appears from CÆSAR's account, that the GAULS had no domestic slaves, who formed a different order from the *Plebes*. The whole common people were indeed a kind of slaves to the nobility, as the people of POLAND are at this day: And a nobleman of GAUL had sometimes ten thousand dependants of this kind. Nor can we doubt, that the armies were composed of the people as well as of the nobility: An army of 100,000 noblemen from a very small state is incredible. The fighting men amongst the HELVETII were the fourth part of the whole inhabitants; a clear proof that all the males of military age bore arms. See CÆSAR *de bello Gall.* lib. 6.

We may remark, that the numbers in CÆSAR's commentaries can be more depended on than those of any other ancient author, because of the GREEK translation, which still remains, and which checks the LATIN original.



that the GAULS had no fixed property in land ; but that the chieftains, when any death happened in a family, made a new division of all the lands among the several members of the family. This is the custom of *Tanistry*, which so long prevailed in IRELAND ; and which retained that country in a state of misery, barbarism, and desolation.

THE antient HELVETIA was 250 miles in length, and 180 in breadth, according to the same author † ; yet contained only 360,000 inhabitants. The canton of BERNE alone has, at present, as many people.

AFTER this computation of APPIAN, and DIODORUS SICULUS, I know not, whether I dare affirm, that the modern DUTCH are more numerous than the antient BATAVI.

SPAIN is decayed from what it was three centuries ago ; but if we step backward two thousand years, and consider the restless, turbulent, unsettled condition of its inhabitants, we may probably be inclined to think, that it is now much more populous. Many SPANIARDS killed themselves when deprived of their arms by the ROMANS ‡. It appears from PAU-

† *De bell. Gallic.* ; lib. 2.

‡ *Tit. Livii* ; lib. 34. cap. 27.

TARCH ‡, that robbery and plunder were esteemed honourable among the SPANIARDS. HIRTIUS † represents in the same light the situation of that country in CÆSAR's time; and he says, that every man was obliged to live in castles and walled towns for his security. It was not till its final conquest under AUGUSTUS, that these disorders were repressed \*. The account which STRABO † and JUSTIN ‡ give of SPAIN, corresponds exactly with those above mentioned. How much, therefore, must it diminish from our idea of the populousness of antiquity, when we find, that CICERO, comparing ITALY, AFRIC, GAUL, GREECE, and SPAIN, mentions the great number of inhabitants, as the peculiar circumstance which rendered this latter country formidable §.

ITALY, 'tis probable however, has decayed: But how many great cities does it still contain? VENICE, GENOA, PAVIA, TURIN, MILAN, NAPLES, FLO-

‡ *In vita Marii.* † *De bello Hisp.*

\* *Vell. Patere.* lib. 2. § 90. † Lib. 3. ‡ Lib. 44.

§ "Nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis, ac terræ domestico nativoque sensu, Italos ipsos ac Latinos—superavimus." *De barbaris. resp.* cap. 9. The disorders of SPAIN seem to have been almost proverbial: "Nec impa-  
catos a tergo horrebis Iberos." *Virg. Georg.* lib. 3. The IBERI are here plainly taken, by a poetical figure, for robbers in general.

RENCE, LEGHORN, which either subsisted not in ancient times, or were then very inconsiderable? If we reflect on this, we shall not be apt to carry matters to so great an extreme as is usual, with regard to this subject.

WHEN the ROMAN authors complain, that ITALY, which formerly exported corn, became dependent on all the provinces for its daily bread, they never ascribe this alteration to the increase of its inhabitants, but to the neglect of tillage and agriculture\*. A natural effect of that pernicious practice of importing corn, in order to distribute it *gratis* among the ROMAN citizens, and a very bad means of multiplying the inhabitants of any country†. The *sportula*, so much talked of by MARTIAL and JUVENAL, being presents regularly made by the great lords to their smaller clients, must have had a like tendency to produce idleness, debauchery, and a continual decay among the people. The parish-rates have at present the same bad consequences in ENGLAND.

\* VARRO *de re rustica*, lib. 2. præf. COLUMELLA præf. SUTTON. AUGUST. cap. 42.

† Tho' the observations of L'Abbé du Bos should be admitted, that ITALY is now warmer than in former times, the consequence may not be necessary, that it is more populous or better cultivated. If the other countries of EUROPE were more savage and woody, the cold winds that blowed from them, might affect the climate of ITALY.

WERE

WERE I to assign a period, when I imagine this part of the world might possibly contain more inhabitants than at present, I should pitch upon the age of TRAJAN and the ANTONINES; the great extent of the ROMAN empire being then civilized and cultivated, settled almost in a profound peace both foreign and domestic, and living under the same regular police and government \*. But we are told, that all extensive

\* The inhabitants of MARSEILLES lost not their superiority over the GAULS in commerce and the mechanic arts, till the ROMAN dominion turned the latter from arms to agriculture and civil life. See STRABO, Lib. 4. That author, in several places, repeats the observation concerning the improvement arising from the ROMAN arts and civility: And he lived at the time when the change was new, and would be more sensible. So also PLINY: "Quis enim non, communicato orbe terrarum, majestate ROMANI imperii, profecisse vitam putet? commercio rerum ac societate festæ pacis, omniaque etiam, quæ occulta antea fuerant, in promiscuo usû facta. Lib. 14. pro-æm. Numine deum electa (speaking of ITALY) quæ cælum ipsum clarius faceret, sparsa congregaret imperia, ritusque molliret, & tot populorum discordes, ferasque linguas sermonis commercio contraheret ad colloquia, & humanitatem homini daret; breviterque una cunctarum gentium in toto orbe patria fieret;" lib. 2. cap. 5. Nothing can be stronger to this purpose than the following passage from TERTULLIAN, who lived about the age of SEVERUS. "Certe quidem ipse orbis in promptu est, cultior de die & instructior pristino. Omnia jam pervia, omnia nota, omnia negotiosa. Solitudines famosas re-

tro

tenfive governments, especially absolute monarchies, are destructive to population, and contain a secret vice and

“tro fundi amœnissimi oblitteraverunt, silvas arva domuerunt, feras pecora fugaverunt; arenæ seruntur, faxa panguntur, paludes eliquantur, tantæ urbes, quantæ non casæ quondam. Jam nec insulæ horrent, nec scopuli terrent; ubique domus, ubique populus, ubique respublica, ubique vita. Summum testimonium frequentiæ humanæ, onerosi sumus mundo, vix nobis elementa sufficiunt; & necessitates arctiores, & querelæ apud omnes, dum jam nos natura non sustinet.” *De anima*, cap. 30. The air of rhetoric and declamation which appears in this passage, diminishes somewhat from its authority, but does not intirely destroy it. The same remark may be extended to the following passage of ARISTIDES the sophist, who lived in the age of ADRIAN. “The whole world,” says he, addressing himself to the ROMANS, “seems to keep one holiday; and mankind, laying aside the swords which they formerly wore, now betake themselves to feasting and to joy. The cities, forgetting their antient contentions, preserve only one emulation, which shall embellish itself most by every art and ornament? Theatres every where arise, amphitheatres, porticoes, aqueducts, temples, schools, academies; and one may safely pronounce, that the sinking world has been again raised by your auspicious empire. Nor have cities alone received an increase of ornament and beauty; but the whole earth, like a garden or paradise, is cultivated and adorned: Insomuch, that such of mankind as are placed out of the limits of your empire (who are but few) seem to merit our sympathy and compassion.”

and poison, which destroy the effect of all these promising appearances †. To confirm this, there is a passage cited from PLUTARCH ‡, which being somewhat singular, we shall here examine it.

THAT author, endeavouring to account for the silence of many of the oracles, says, that it may be

'Tis remarkable, that tho' DIODORUS SICULUS makes the whole inhabitants of ÆGYPT, when conquered by the ROMANS, amount only to three millions; yet JOSEPH: *de bello Jud.* lib. 2. cap. 16. says, that its inhabitants, excluding those of ALEXANDRIA, were seven millions and a half, in the reign of NERO: And he expressly says, that he drew this account from the books of the ROMAN publicans, who levied the poll-tax. STRABO, lib. 17. praises the superior police of the ROMANS with regard to the finances of ÆGYPT, above that of its former monarchs: And no part of administration is more essential to the happiness of a people. Yet we read in ATHENÆUS, (lib. 1. cap. 25.) who flourished during the reign of the ANTONINES, that the town MARSA, near ALEXANDRIA, which was formerly a large city, had dwindled into a village. This is not, properly speaking, a contradiction. SUIDAS (AUGUST.) says, that the Emperor AUGUSTUS, having numbered the whole ROMAN empire, found it contained only 4,301,047 men (4304700.) There is here surely some great mistake, either in the author or transcriber. But this authority, feeble as it is, may be sufficient to counterbalance the exaggerated accounts of HERODOTUS and DIODORUS SICULUS with regard to more early times.

† *L'Esprit des loix*, liv. 23. chap. 19.

‡ *De orac. defectus*.

ascribed to the present desolation of the world, proceeding from former wars and factions; which common calamity, he adds, has fallen heavier upon GREECE than on any other country; inasmuch, that the whole could scarce at present furnish three thousand warriors; a number which, in the time of the MEDIAN war, were supplied by the single city of MEGARA. The gods, therefore, who affect works of dignity and importance, have suppressed many of their oracles, and deign not to use so many interpreters of their will to so diminutive a people.

I MUST confess, that this passage contains so many difficulties, that I know not what to make of it. You may observe, that PLUTARCH assigns, for a cause of the decay of mankind, not the extensive dominion of the ROMANS, but the former wars and factions of the several nations; all which were quieted by the ROMAN arms. PLUTARCH's reasoning, therefore, is directly contrary to the inference which is drawn from the fact he advances.

POLYBIUS supposes, that GREECE had become more prosperous and flourishing after the establishment of the ROMAN yoke\*; and tho' that historian wrote

\* Lib. 2. cap. 62. It may perhaps be imagined, that POLYBIUS, being dependent on ROME, would naturally extol the ROMAN dominion. But, in the first place, POLYBIUS, tho' one

wrote before these conquerors had degenerated, from being the patrons, to be the plunderers of mankind; yet as we find from TACITUS †, that the severity of the emperors afterwards corrected the licence of the governors, we have no reason to think that extensive monarchy so destructive as it is often represented.

WE learn from STRABO ‡, that the ROMANS, from their regard to the GREEKS, maintained, to his time; most of the privileges and liberties of that celebrated nation; and NERO afterwards rather increased them ||. How therefore can we imagine, that the ROMAN yoke was so burdensome over that part of the world? The oppression of the proconsuls was checked; and the magistracies in GREECE being all bestowed, in the several cities, by the free votes of the people, there was no great necessity for the competitors to attend the emperor's court. If great numbers went to seek their fortunes in ROME, and ad-

one sees sometimes instances of his caution, discovers no symptoms of flattery. *Secondly*, This opinion is only delivered in a single stroke, by the by, while he is intent upon another subject; and 'tis allowed, if there be any suspicion of an author's insincerity, that these oblique propositions discover his real opinion better than his more formal and direct assertions.

† *Annal.* lib. 1. cap. 2.

‡ *Lib.* 8. & 9.

|| PLUTARCH. *De his qui sero a numine puniuntur.*



vance themselves by learning or eloquence, the commodities of their native country, many of them would return with the fortunes which they had acquired, and thereby enrich the GRECIAN commonwealths.

BUT PLUTARCH says, that the general depopulation had been more sensibly felt in GREECE than in any other country. How is this reconcileable to its superior privileges and advantages?

BESIDES, this passage, by proving too much, really proves nothing. *Only three thousand men able to bear arms in all GREECE!* Who can admit so strange a proposition, especially if we consider the great number of GREEK cities, whose names still remain in history, and which are mentioned by writers long after the age of PLUTARCH? There are there surely ten times more people at present, when there scarce remains a city in all the bounds of ancient GREECE. That country is still tolerably cultivated, and furnishes a sure supply of corn, in case of any scarcity in SPAIN, ITALY, or the south of FRANCE.

WE may observe, that the ancient frugality of the GREEKS, and their equality of property, still subsisted during the age of PLUTARCH; as appears from LUCIAN †. Nor is there any ground to imagine, that

† *De mercede conductis.*

that country was possessed by a few masters, and a great number of slaves.

'Tis probable, indeed, that military discipline, being intirely useless, was extremely neglected in GREECE after the establishment of the ROMAN empire; and if these commonwealths, formerly so warlike and ambitious, maintained each of them a small city-guard, to prevent mobbish disorders, 'tis all they had occasion for: And these, perhaps, did not amount to 3000 men, thro'out all GREECE. I own, that if PLUTARCH had this fact in his eye, he is here guilty of a very gross paralogism, and assigns causes no way proportioned to the effects. But is it so great a prodigy, that an author should fall into a mistake of this nature \*?

BUT

\* I must confess, that that discourse of PLUTARCH, concerning the silence of the oracles, is in general of so odd a texture, and so unlike his other productions, that one is at a loss what judgment to form of it. 'Tis wrote in dialogue, which is a method of composition that PLUTARCH commonly little affects. The personages he introduces advance very wild, absurd, and contradictory opinions, more like the visionary systems or ravings of PLATO than the solid sense of PLUTARCH. There runs also thro' the whole an air of superstition and credulity, which resembles very little the spirit that appears in other philosophical compositions of that author. For 'tis remarkable, that tho' PLUTARCH be an historian as superstitious as HERO-

DOTUS

BUT whatever force may remain in this passage of PLUTARCH, we shall endeavour to counterbalance it by as remarkable a passage in DIODORUS SICULUS, where the historian, after mentioning NINUS's army of 1,700,000 foot and 200,000 horse, endeavours to support the credibility of this account by some posterior facts; and adds, that we must not form a notion of the antient populousness of mankind from the present emptiness and depopulation which is spread

DOTUS or LIVY, yet there is scarcely, in all antiquity, a philosopher less superstitious, excepting CICERO and LUCIAN. I must therefore confess, that a passage of PLUTARCH, cited from this discourse, has much less authority with me, than if it had been found in most of his other compositions.

There is only one other discourse of PLUTARCH liable to like objections, *viz.* that concerning those whose punishment is delayed by the Deity. It is also wrote in dialogue, contains like superstitious, wild visions, and seems to have been chiefly composed in rivalry to PLATO, particularly his last book, *de republica*.

And here I cannot but observe, that MONS. FONTENELLE, a writer eminent for candor, seems to have departed a little from his usual character, when he endeavours to throw a ridicule upon PLUTARCH on account of passages to be met with in this dialogue concerning oracles. The absurdities here put into the mouths of the several personages are not to be ascribed to PLUTARCH. He makes them refute each other; and, in general, he seems to intend the ridiculing of those very opinions, which FONTENELLE would ridicule him for maintaining. See *Histoire des oracles*.

over the world †. Thus an author, who lived at that very period of antiquity which is represented as most populous ‡, complains of the desolation which then prevailed, gives the preference to former time, and has recourse to antient fables as a foundation for his opinion. The humour of blaming the present, and admiring the past, is strongly rooted in human nature, and has an influence even on persons endued with the profoundest judgment and most extensive learning.

† Lib, 2.

‡ He was coteremporary with CÆSAR and AUGUSTUS.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various positions in the various departments of the Government of the State of New York, for the year 1901.

224 100 (100%)

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## ESSAY XII.

### Of the ORIGINAL CONTRACT.

**A**S no party, in the present age, can support itself, without a philosophical or speculative system of principles, annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find, that each of the parties, into which this nation is divided, has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions, which it pursues. The people being commonly very rude builders, especially in this speculative way, and more especially still, when actuated by party zeal; 'tis natural to imagine, that their workmanship must be a little unshapely; and discover evident marks of that violence and hurry, in which it was raised. The one party, by tracing up the origin of government to the DEITY, endeavour to render government so sacred and inviolate, that it must be little less than sacrilege, however disorderly it may become, to touch or invade it, in the smallest article. The other party, by founding government altogether  
on

on the consent of the PEOPLE, suppose that there is a kind of *original contract*, by which the subjects have reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority, with which they have, for certain purposes, voluntarily entrusted him. These are the speculative principles of the two parties ; and these too are the practical consequences deduced from them.

I SHALL venture to affirm, *That both these systems of speculative principles are just ; tho' not in the sense, intended by the parties : And That both the schemes of practical consequences are prudent ; tho' not in the extremes, to which each party, in opposition to the other, has commonly endeavoured to carry them.*

THAT the DEITY is the ultimate author of all government, will never be denied by any one who admits a general providence, and allows, that all events in the universe are conducted by an uniform plan and directed to wise purposes. As 'tis impossible for human race to subsist, at least in any comfortable or secure state, without the protection of government ; government must certainly have been intended by that beneficent Being, who means the good of all his creatures : And as it has universally, in fact, taken place, in all countries, and all ages ; we may conclude, with still greater certainty, that it was intended by that  
omniscient

omniscient Being, who can never be deceived by any event or operation. But since he gave rise to it, not by any particular or miraculous interposition, but by his concealed and universal efficacy; a sovereign cannot, properly speaking, be called his vicegerent, in any other sense than every power or force, being derived from him, may be said to act by his commission. Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of providence; nor has the greatest and most lawful prince any more reason, upon that account, to plead a peculiar sacredness or inviolable authority, than an inferior magistrate, or even an usurper, or even a robber and a pyrate. The same divine super-intendant, who, for wise purposes, invested an ELIZABETH or a HENRY\* with authority, did also, for purposes, no doubt, equally wise, the unknown, bestow power on a BORGIA or an ANGRIA. The same causes, which gave rise to the sovereign power in every state, established likewise every petty jurisdiction in it, and every limited Authority. A constable therefore, no less than a king, acts by a divine commission, and possesses an indefeasible right.

WHEN we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education; we must necessarily allow, that nothing but their own consent

\* HENRY the 4th of FRANCE.



could, at first, associate them together, and subject them to any authority. The people, if we trace up government to its first origin in the woods and deserts, are the source of all power and jurisdiction, and voluntarily, for the sake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their equal and companion. The conditions, upon which they were willing to submit, were either express, or were so clear and obvious, that it might well be esteemed superfluous to express them. If this, then, be meant by the *original contract*, it cannot be denied, that all government is, at first, founded on a contract, and that the most ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed entirely by that principle. In vain, are we sent to the records to seek for this charter of our liberties. It was not wrote on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the use of writing and all the other civilized arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the equality, which we find in all the individuals of that species. The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and derived from authority, the effect of established government. A man's natural force consists only in the vigour of his limbs, and the firmness of his courage; which could never subject multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but their own consent, and their sense of the advantages of peace and order, could have had that influence.

BUT

BUT philosophers, who have embraced a party (if that be not a contradiction in terms) are not contented with these concessions. They assert, not only that government in its earliest infancy arose from consent, or the voluntary combination of the people; but also, that, even at present, when it has attained its full maturity, it rests on no other foundation. They affirm, that all men are still born equal, and owe allegiance to no prince or government, unless bound by the obligation and sanction of a *promise*. And as no man, without some equivalent, would forego the advantages of his native liberty, and subject himself to the will of another; this promise is always understood to be conditional, and imposes on him no obligation, unless he meets with justice and protection from his sovereign. These advantages the sovereign promises him in return; and if he fails in the execution, he has broke, on his side, the articles of engagement, and has thereby freed his subjects from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to these philosophers, is the foundation of authority in every government; and such the right of resistance, possess'd by every subject.

BUT would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing that, in the least, corresponds to their ideas, or can warrant so refined and philosophical a system. On the contrary, we find, every where, princes, who claim their sub-

jects as their property, and assert their independent right of sovereignty, from conquest or succession. We find also, every where, subjects, who acknowledge this right in their princes, and suppose themselves born under obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain parents. These connexions are always conceived to be equally independent of our consent, in PERSIA and CHINA; in FRANCE and SPAIN; and even in HOLLAND and ENGLAND, wherever the doctrines abovementioned have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar, that most men never make any enquiry about its origin or cause, more than about the principle of gravity, resistance, or the most universal laws of nature. Or if curiosity ever move them; so soon as they learn, that they themselves and their ancestors have, for several ages, or from time immemorial, been subject to such a government or such a family; they immediately acquiesce, and acknowledge their obligation to allegiance. Were you to preach, in most parts of the world, that political connexions are founded altogether on voluntary consent or a mutual promise, the magistrate would soon imprison you, as seditious, for loosening the ties of obedience; if your friends did not before shut you up, as delirious, for advancing such absurdities. 'Tis strange, that an act of the mind, which every individual is supposed to have formed, and after he came to the use of reason too, other-

otherwise it could have no authority ; that this act, I say, should be so unknown to all of them, that over the face of the whole earth there scarce remain any traces or memory of it.

BUT the contract, on which government is founded, is said to be the *original contract* ; and consequently may be supposed too old to fall under the knowledge of the present generation. If the agreement, by which savage men first associated and conjoined their force, be here meant, this is acknowledged to be real ; but being so antient, and being obliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be supposed to retain any authority. If we would say any thing to the purpose, we must assert, that every particular government, which is lawful, and which imposes any duty of allegiance on the subject, was, at first, founded on consent and a voluntary compact. But besides that this supposes the consent of the fathers to bind the children, even to the most remote generations (which republican writers will never allow) besides this, I say, it is not justified by history or experience, in any age or country of the world.

ALMOST all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people. When

an artful and bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction, 'tis often easy for him, by employing sometimes violence, sometimes false pretences, to establish his dominion over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partizans. He allows no such open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or force. He gives them no leisure to assemble together in a body to oppose him. Even all those, who are the instruments of his usurpation, may wish his fall; but their ignorance of each other's intention keeps them in awe, and is the sole cause of his security. By such arts as these many governments have been established; and this is all the *original contract*, which they have to boast of.

THE face of the earth is continually changing, by the encrease of small kingdoms into great empires, by the dissolution of great empires into smaller kingdoms, by the planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there any thing discoverable in all these events, but force and violence? Where is the mutual agreement or voluntary association so much talked of?

EVEN the smoothest way, by which a nation may receive a foreign master, by marriage or a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; but supposes  
them

them to be disposed of, like a dowry or a legacy, according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers.

BUT where no force interposes, and election takes place ; what is this election so highly vaunted ? 'Tis either the combination of a few great men, who decide for the whole, and will allow of no opposition : Or 'tis the fury of a rabble, that follow a seditious ringleader, who is not known, perhaps, to a dozen among them, and who owes his advancement merely to his own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows.

ARE these disorderly elections, which are rare too, of such mighty authority, as to be the only lawful foundation of all government and allegiance ?

IN reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total dissolution of government, which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes the determination or choice of the new establishment depend upon a number which nearly approaches the body of the people : For it never comes entirely to the whole body of them. Every wise man, then, wishes to see, at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general, who may speedily seize the prize, and give to the people a master, which they are so unfit to choose for themselves. So little correspondent is fact and reality to those philosophical notions.

LET not the establishment at the *revolution*, deceive us, or make us so much in love with a philosophical origin to government, as to imagine all others monstrous and irregular. Even that event was far from corresponding to these refined ideas. It was only the succession, and that only in the regal part of the government, which was then changed : And it was only the majority of seven hundred, who determined that change for near ten millions. I doubt not, indeed, but the bulk, of these ten millions acquiesced willingly in the determination : But was the matter left, in the least, to their choice ? Was it not justly supposed to be, from that moment, decided, and every man punished, who refused to submit to the new sovereign ? How otherways could the matter have ever been brought to any issue or conclusion ?

THE republic of ATHENS was, I believe, the most extensive democracy, which we read of in history : Yet if we make the requisite allowances for the women, the slaves, and the strangers, we shall find, that that establishment was not, at first, made, nor any law ever voted, by a tenth part of those, who are bound to pay obedience to it. Not to mention the islands and foreign dominions, which the ATHENIANS claimed as theirs by right of conquest. And as 'tis well known, that popular assemblies in that city were always full of licence and disorder, notwithstanding the forms and laws by which they were checked :  
How

How much more disorderly must they be, where they form not the established constitution, but assemble tumultuously on the dissolution of the antient government, in order to give rise to a new one? How chimerical must it be to talk of a choice in any such circumstances?

THE ACHÆANS enjoyed the freest and most perfect democracy of all antiquity; yet they employed force to oblige some cities to enter into their league, as we learn from POLYBIUS\*.

HARRY the IVth and HARRY the VIIth of ENGLAND, had really no other title to the throne but a parliamentary election; yet they never would acknowledge it, for fear of weakening their authority. Strange! if the only real foundation of all authority be consent and promise.

'Tis in vain to say, that all governments are, or should be, at first, founded on popular consent, as much as the necessity of human affairs will admit. This favours entirely my pretension. I maintain, that human affairs never will admit of this consent; seldom of the appearance of it: But that conquest or usurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by dissolving the antient governments, is the origin of almost all the new ones, which ever were established in the

\* Lib. 2. cap. 38.



world. And that in the few cases, where consent may seem to have taken place, it was commonly so irregular, so confined, or so much intermixed either with fraud or violence, that it cannot have any great authority.

My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend, that it has very seldom had place in any degree, and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other foundation of government must also be admitted.

WERE all men possess of so inflexible a regard to justice, that, of themselves, they would totally abstain from the properties of others; they had for ever remained in a state of absolute liberty, without subjection to any magistrates or political society: But this is a state of perfection, of which human nature is justly esteemed incapable. Again; were all men possess of so perfect an understanding, as always to know their own interest, no form of government had ever been submitted to, but what was established on consent, and was fully canvass'd by each member of the society: But this state of perfection is likewise much superior to human nature. Reason, history and experience show us, that all political societies have had an origin much less accurate and regular; and were one to choose  
a pe-

a period of time, when the people's consent was least regarded in public transactions, it would be precisely on the establishment of a new government. In a settled constitution, their inclinations are often studied; but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, military force or political craft usually decides the controversy.

WHEN a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are commonly dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation. The prince is watchful and jealous, and must carefully guard against every beginning or appearance of insurrection. Time, by degrees, removes all these difficulties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family, whom, at first, they considered as usurpers or foreign conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they have no recourse to any notion of voluntary consent or promise, which, they know, never was, in this case, either expected or demanded. The original establishment was formed by violence, and submitted to from necessity. The subsequent administration is also supported by power, and acquiesced in by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation. They imagine not, that their consent gives their prince a title: But they willingly consent, because they think,

that, from long possession, he has acquired a title independent of their choice or inclination.

SHOULD it be said, that by living under the dominion of a prince, which one might leave, every individual has given a *tacit* consent to his authority, and promised him obedience ; it may be answered, That such implied consent can only take place, where a man imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under established governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain government ; it would be absurd to infer a consent or choice, which he expressly, in this case, renounces and abjures.

CAN we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his own country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires ? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master ; tho' he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.

WHAT if the prince forbid his subjects to quit his dominions ; as in *TIBERIUS's* time, it was regarded as a crime in a *ROMAN* knight that he had attempted to fly to the *PARTHIANS*, in order to escape the tyranny

ranny of that emperor \* ? Or as the antient Muscovites prohibited all travelling under pain of death ? And did a prince observe, that many of his subjects were seized with the frenzy of transporting themselves to foreign nations, he would doubtless, with great reason and justice, restrain them, in order to prevent the depopulation of his own country. Would he forfeit the allegiance of all his subjects, by so wise and reasonable a law ? Yet the freedom of their choice is surely, in that case, ravished from them.

A COMPANY of men, who should leave their native country, in order to people some uninhabited region, might dream of recovering their native freedom ; but they would soon find, that their prince still laid claim to them, and called them his subjects, even in their new settlement. And in this he would but act conformably to the common ideas of mankind.

THE truest *tacit* consent of this kind, which is ever observed, is when a foreigner settles in any country, and is beforehand acquainted with the prince, and government, and laws, to which he must submit : Yet is his allegiance, tho' more voluntary, much less expected or depended on, than that of a natural born subject. On the contrary, his native prince still asserts a claim to him. And if he punishes not the renegade,

when he seizes him in war with his new prince's commission ; this clemency is not founded on the municipal law, which in all countries condemns the prisoner ; but on the consent of princes, who have agreed to this indulgence, in order to prevent reprisals.

SUPPOSE an usurper, after having banished his lawful prince and royal family, should establish his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any country, and should preserve such exact discipline in his troops, and so regular a disposition in his garrisons, that no insurrection had ever been raised, or even murmur heard, against his administration : Can it be asserted, that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treason, have tacitly consented to his authority, and promised him allegiance, merely because, from necessity, they live under his dominion ? Suppose again their natural prince, restored, by means of an army, which he assembles in foreign countries : They receive him with joy and exultation, and shew plainly with what reluctance they had submitted to any other yoke. I may now ask, upon what foundation the prince's title stands ? Not on popular consent surely : For tho' the people willingly acquiesce in his authority, they never imagine, that their consent makes him sovereign. They consent ; because they apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful sovereign. And as to  
that

that tacit consent, which may now be inferred from their living under his dominion, this is no more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and usurper.

WHEN we assert, that all lawful government arises from the people, we certainly do them a great deal more honour than they deserve, or even expect and desire from us. After the ROMAN dominions became too unwieldy for the republic to govern, the people, over the whole known world, were extremely grateful to AUGUSTUS for that authority, which, by violence, he established over them; and they shewed an equal disposition to submit to the successor, whom he left them, by his last will and testament. It was afterwards their misfortune, that there never was, in one family, any long regular succession; but that their line of princes was continually broke, either by private assassinations or public rebellions. The *praetorian* bands, on the failure of every family, set up one emperor; the legions in the East a second; those in GERMANY, perhaps, a third: And the sword alone could decide the controversy. The condition of the people, in that mighty monarchy, was to be lamented, not because the choice of the emperor was never left to them; for that was impracticable: But because they never fell under any succession of masters, who might regularly follow each other. As to the violence and wars and Bloodshed, occasioned by every new settlement;

ment; those were not blameable, because they were inevitable.

THE house of LANCASTER ruled in this island about sixty years; yet the partizans of the white rose seemed daily to multiply in ENGLAND. The present establishment has taken place during a still longer period. Have all views of right in another family been utterly extinguished; even tho' scarce any man now alive had arrived at years of discretion, when it was expelled; or could have consented to its dominion, or have promised it allegiance? A sufficient indication surely of the general sentiment of mankind on this head. For we blame not the partizans of the abdicated family, merely on account of the long time, during which they have preserved their imaginary fidelity. We blame them for adhering to a family, which, we affirm, has been justly expelled, and which, from the moment the new settlement took place, had forfeited all title to authority.

BUT would we have a more regular, at least, a more philosophical refutation of this principle of an original contract or popular consent; perhaps, the following observations may suffice.

ALL *moral* duties may be divided into two kinds. The *first* are those, to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates

rates in them, independent of all ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility. Of this nature are, love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on the advantage, which results to society from such humane instincts, we pay them the just tribute of moral approbation and esteem: But the person, actuated by them, feels their power and influence, antecedent to any such reflection.

THE *second* kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected. 'Tis thus *justice* or a regard to the property of others, *fidelity* or the observance of promises, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For as 'tis evident, that every man loves himself better than any other person, he is naturally impelled to extend his acquisitions as much as possible; and nothing can restrain him in this propensity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects of that licence, and the total dissolution of society, which must ensue from it. His original inclination, therefore, or instinct, is here checked and restrained by a subsequent judgment or observation.



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THE case is precisely the same with the political or civil duty of *allegiance*, as with the natural duties of justice and fidelity. Our primary instincts lead us, either to indulge ourselves in unlimited liberty, or to seek dominion over others: And 'tis reflection only, which engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests of peace and order. A very small degree of experience and observation suffices to teach us, that society cannot possibly be maintained without the authority of magistrates, and that this authority must soon fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not payed to it. The observation of these general and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation, which we attribute to it.

WHAT necessity, therefore, is there to found the duty of *allegiance* or obedience to magistrates on that of *fidelity* or a regard to promises, and to suppose, that 'tis the consent of each individual, which subjects him to government; when it appears, that both allegiance and fidelity stand precisely on the same foundation, and are both submitted to by mankind, on account of the apparent interests and necessities of human society? We are bound to obey our sovereign, 'tis said; because we have given a tacit promise to that purpose. But why are we bound to observe our promise? It must here be asserted, that the commerce and intercourse of mankind, which are of such mighty advantage,

advantage, can have no security where men pay no regard to their engagements. In like manner, may it be said, that men could not live at all in society, at least in a civilized society without laws and magistrates and judges, to prevent the encroachments of the strong upon the weak, of the violent upon the just and equitable. The obligation to allegiance, being of like force and authority with the obligation to fidelity, we gain nothing by resolving the one into the other. The general interests or necessities of society are sufficient to establish both.

If the reason is asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer: *because society could not otherwise subsist*: And this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your answer is, *because we should keep our word*. But besides, that no body, till trained in a philosophical system, can either comprehend or relish this answer: Besides this, I say, you find yourself embarrassed, when 'tis asked, *why we are bound to keep our word*? And you can give no other answer, but what would, immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.

BUT to whom is allegiance due? And who are our lawful sovereigns? This question is often the most difficult of any, and liable to infinite discussions. When people are so happy, that they can answer, *Our present*

*sent sovereign, who inherits, in a direct line, from ancestors, that have governed us for many ages ; this answer admits of no reply ; even tho' historians, in tracing up to the remotest antiquity the origin of that royal family, may find, as commonly happens, that its first authority was derived from usurpation and violence. 'Tis confess'd, that private justice or the abstinence from the properties of others, is a most cardinal virtue : Yet reason tells, that there is no property in durable objects, such as lands or houses, when carefully examined in passing from hand to hand, but must, in some period, have been founded on fraud and injustice. The necessities of human society, neither in private nor public life, will allow of such an accurate enquiry : And there is no virtue or moral duty, but what may, with facility, be refined away, if we indulge a false philosophy, in sifting and scrutinizing it, by every captious rule of logic, in every light or position, in which it may be placed.*

THE questions with regard to private property have filled infinite volumes of law and philosophy, if in both we add the commentators to the original text ; and in the end, we may safely pronounce, that many of the rules, there established, are uncertain, ambiguous, and arbitrary. The like opinion may be formed with regard to the successions and rights of princes and forms of government. Many cases, no doubt, occur, especially in the infancy of any government,

vernment, which admit of no determination from the laws of justice and equity: And our historian RAPIN, allows, that the controversy between EDWARD the third and PHILIP de VALOIS was of this nature, and could be decided only by an appeal to heaven, that is, by war and violence.

Who shall tell me, whether GERMANICUS or DRUSUS ought to have succeeded TIBERIUS, had he died, while they were both alive, without naming any of them for his successor? Ought the right of adoption to be received as equivalent to that of blood, in a nation, where it had the same effect in private families, and had already, in two instances, taken place in the public? Ought GERMANICUS to be esteemed the eldest son because he was born before DRUSUS; or the younger, because he was adopted after the birth of his brother? Ought the right of the elder to be regarded in a nation, where the eldest brother had no advantage in the succession of private families? Ought the ROMAN empire, at that time, to be esteemed hereditary, because of two examples; or ought it, even so early, to be regarded as belonging to the stronger or the present possessor, as being founded on so recent an usurpation?

COMMODUS mounted the throne after a pretty long succession of excellent emperors, who had acquired their title, not by birth, or public election, but by the  
fictitious

fictitious rite of adoption. That bloody debauchee being murdered by a conspiracy suddenly formed between his wench and her gallant, who happened at that time to be *Prætorian Præfect*, or to have the command of the guards; these immediately deliberated about choosing a master to human kind, to speak in the style of those ages; and cast their eyes on PERTINAX. Before the tyrant's death was known, the *Præfect* went secretly to that senator, who, on the appearance of the soldiers, imagined that his execution had been ordered by COMMONUS. He was immediately saluted emperor by the officer and his attendants; cheerfully proclaimed by the populace; unwillingly submitted to by the guards; formally recognized by the senate; and passively received by the provinces and armies of the empire.

THE discontent of the *Prætorian* bands soon broke out in a sudden sedition, which occasioned the murder of that excellent prince: And the world being now without a master and without government, the guards thought proper to set the empire formally to sale. JULIAN, the purchaser, was proclaimed by the soldiers, recognized by the senate, and submitted to by the people, and must also have been submitted to by the provinces, had not the envy of the legions begot opposition and resistance. PESCENNIUS NIGER in SYRIA elected himself emperor, gained the

tumultuary consent of his army, and was attended with the secret good-will of the senate and people of ROME. ALBINUS in BRITAIN found an equal right to set up his claim; but SEVERUS, who governed PANNONIA, prevailed in the end above both of them. That able politician and warrior, finding his own birth and dignity too much inferior to the imperial crown, profest at first, an intention only of revenging the death of PERTINAX. He marched as general into ITALY, defeated JULIAN; and without our being able to fix any precise commencement even of the soldiers consent, he was from necessity acknowledged emperor by the senate and people; and fully established in his violent authority by subduing NIGER and ALBINUS \*.

*Inter hæc Gordianus CÆSAR* (says CAPITOLINUS, speaking of another period) *sublatus a militibus, Imperator est appellatus, quia non erat alius in præsentî.* 'Tis to be remarked that GORDIAN was a boy of fourteen years of age.

FREQUENT instances of a like nature occur in the history of the emperors; in that of ALEXANDER's successors; and of many other countries: Nor can any thing be more unhappy than a despotic government of that kind; where the succession is disjointed and irregular, and must be determined, on every occasion,

\* *HERODOTUS*, lib. 2.

by force or election. In a free government, the matter is often unavoidable, and is also much less dangerous. The interests of liberty may there frequently lead the people, in their own defence, to alter the succession of the crown. And the constitution, being compounded of parts, may still maintain a sufficient stability, by resting on the aristocratical or democratical members, tho' the monarchical be altered, from time to time, in order to accommodate it to the former.

IN an absolute government, when there is no legal prince, who has a title to the throne, it may safely be determined to belong to the first occupier. Instances of this kind are but too frequent, especially in the eastern monarchies. When any race of princes expires, the will or destination of the last sovereign will be regarded as a title. Thus the edict of LEWIS the XIVth, who called the bastard prince to the succession in case of the failure of all the legitimate princes, would, in such an event, have some authority \*. Thus the will of CHARLES the second disposed

\* 'Tis remarkable, that in the remonstrance of the duke of BOURBON and the legitimate princes, against this destination of LOUIS the XIVth, the doctrine of the *original contract* is insisted on, even in that absolute government. The FRENCH nation, say they, choosing HUGH CAPET and his posterity to rule over them and their posterity, where the former line fails, there is a

tacit

posed of the whole SPANISH monarchy. The cession of the antient proprietor, especially when joined to conquest, is likewise esteemed a very good title. The general bond or obligation, which binds us to government, is the interest and necessities of society; and this obligation is very strong. The determination of it to this or that particular prince or form of government is frequently more uncertain and dubious. Present possession has considerable authority in these cases, and greater than in private property; because of the disorders, which attend all revolutions and changes of government \*.

tacit right reserved to choose a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the bastard princes to the throne, without the consent of the nation. But the *Compte de BOULAINVILLIERS*, who wrote in defence of the bastard princes, ridicules this notion of an original contract, especially when applied to HUGH CAPET; who mounted the throne, says he, by the same arts, which have ever been employed by all conquerors and usurpers. He got his title, indeed, recognized by the states after he had put himself in possession: But is this a choice or contract? The *Compte de BOULAINVILLIERS*, we may observe, was a noted republican; but being a man of learning, and very conversant in history, he knew the people were never almost consulted in these revolutions and new establishments, and that time alone bestowed right and authority on what was commonly at first founded on force and violence. See *Etat de la FRANCE*, Vol. III.

\* The crime of rebellion, amongst the antients was commonly marked by the terms *revenge*, *novas res moliri*.



We shall only observe, before we conclude, that tho' an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be esteemed unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no other standard, by which any controversy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to find, that it leads to paradoxes, which are repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages. The doctrine, which founds all lawful government to an *original contract*, or consent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the ablest of its partizans, in prosecution of it, scrupled to affirm, *that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all\**; and *that the supreme power in a state cannot take from any man by taxes and impositions, any part of his property, without his own consent or that of his representatives†*. What authority any moral reasoning can have, which leads into opinions, so wide of the general practice of mankind, in every place but this single kingdom, 'tis easy to determine‡.


\* See LOCKE on government, chap. 7. §. 90.

† Id. chap. II. §. 138, 139, 140.

‡ The only passage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to government is ascribed to a promise is in

PLATO in *Criton*; where SOCRATES refuses to escape from prison, because he had tacitly promised to obey the laws. Thus he builds a *tory* consequence of passive obedience, on a *whig* foundation of the original contract.

New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If no man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on contract, 'tis certain it cannot, in general, have any such foundation.



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## ESSAY XIII.

### OF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.

**I**N the former essay, we endeavour to refute the *speculative* systems of politics advanced in this nation; as well the religious system of the one party, as the philosophical of the other. We come now to examine the *practical* consequences, deduced by each party, with regard to the measures of submission due to sovereigns.

As the obligation to justice is founded intirely on the interests of society, which require mutual abstinence from property, in order to preserve peace among mankind; 'tis evident, that, when the execution of justice would be attended with very pernicious consequences, that virtue must be suspended, and give place to public utility, in such extraordinary and such pressing emergencies: The maxim, *fiat Justitia & ruat Cælum*, let justice be performed, tho' the universe be destroyed, is apparently false, and by sacrificing the end to the means, shews a preposterous idea of the

subordination of duties. What governor of a town makes any scruple of burning the suburbs, when they facilitate the advances of the enemy? Or what general abstains from plundering a neutral country, when the necessities of war require it, and he cannot otherwise maintain his army? The case is the same with the duty of allegiance; and common sense teaches us, that as government obliges to obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, that duty must always, in extraordinary cases, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. *Salus populi suprema Lex*, the safety of the people is the supreme law. This maxim is agreeable to the sentiments of mankind in all ages: Nor is any one, when he reads of the insurrections against a NERO, or a PHILIP, so infatuated with party-systems, as not to wish success to the enterprize, and praise the undertakers. Even our high monarchical party, in spite of their sublime theory, are forced, in such cases, to judge, and feel, and approve, in conformity to the rest of mankind.

RESISTANCE, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary emergencies, the question can only be, among good reasoners, with regard to the degree of necessity, which can justify resistance, and render it lawful or commendable. And here I must confess, that I shall always incline to *their* side, who draw the bond of allegiance the closest possible, and consider

an infringement of it, as the last refuge in desperate cases, when the public is in the highest danger, from violence and tyranny. For besides the mischiefs of a civil war, which commonly attends insurrection; 'tis certain, that where a disposition to rebellion appears among any people, it is one chief cause of tyranny in the rulers, and forces them into many violent measures, which they never would have embraced, had every one seemed inclined to submission and obedience. 'Tis thus the *tyrannicide* or assassination, approved of by ancient maxims, instead of keeping tyrants and usurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting; and is now justly, upon that account, abolished by the laws of nations, and universally condemned as a base and treacherous method of bringing to justice these disturbers of society.

BESIDES; we must consider, that as obedience is our duty in the common course of things, it ought chiefly to be inculcated; nor can any thing be more preposterous than an anxious care and sollicitude in stating all the cases, in which resistance may be allowed. Thus, tho' a philosopher reasonably acknowledges, in the course of an argument, that the rules of justice may be dispensed with in cases of urgent necessity; what should we think of a preacher or casuist, who should make it his chief study to find out such cases, and enforce them with all the vehemence of argument and eloquence? Would he not be bet-

ter employed in inculcating the general doctrine, than in displaying the particular exceptions, which we are, perhaps, but too much inclined, of ourselves, to embrace, and to extend ?

THERE are, however, two reasons, which may be pleaded in defence of that party among us, who have, with so much industry, propagated the maxims of resistance ; maxims, which, it must be confessed, are, in general, so pernicious, and so destructive of civil society. The *first* is, that their antagonists carrying the doctrine of obedience to such an extravagant height, as not only never to mention the exceptions in extraordinary cases (which might, perhaps, be excusable) but even positively to exclude them ; it became necessary to insist on these exceptions, and defend the rights of injured truth and liberty. The *second*, and, perhaps, better reason, is founded on the nature of the BRITISH constitution and form of government.

'TIS almost peculiar to our constitution to establish a first magistrate with such high pre-eminence and dignity, that, tho' limited by the laws, he is, in a manner, so far as regards his own person, above the laws, and can neither be questioned nor punished for any injury or wrong, which may be committed by him. His ministers alone, or those who act by his commission, are obnoxious to justice ; and while the  
prince

prince is thus allured, by the prospect of personal safety, to give the laws their free course, an equal security is, in effect, obtained, by the punishment of lesser offenders, and at the same time a civil war is avoided, which would be the infallible consequence, were an attack, at every turn, made directly upon the sovereign. But tho' the constitution pays this salutary compliment to the prince, it can never reasonably be understood, by that maxim, to have determined its own destruction, or to have established a tame submission, where he protects his ministers, perseveres in injustice, and usurps the whole power of the commonwealth. This case, indeed, is never expressly put by the laws; because it is impossible for them, in their ordinary course, to provide a remedy for it, or establish any magistrate, with superior authority, to chastise the exorbitancies of the prince. But as a right without a remedy would be the greatest of all absurdities; the remedy in this case, is the extraordinary one of resistance, when affairs come to that extremity, that the constitution can be defended by it alone. Resistance, therefore, must, of course, become more frequent in the BRITISH government, than in others, which are simpler, and consist of fewer parts and movements. Where the king is an absolute sovereign, he has little temptation to commit such enormous tyranny as may justly provoke rebellion: But where he is limited, his imprudent ambition, without any great vices, may run



him into that perilous situation. This is commonly supposed to have been the case with CHARLES the First; and if we may now speak truth, after animosities are laid, this was also the case with JAMES the Second. These were harmless, if not, in their private character, good men; but mistaking the nature of our constitution, and engrossing the whole legislative power, it became necessary to oppose them with some vehemence; and even to deprive the latter formally of that authority, which he had used with such imprudence and indiscretion.

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## ESSAY XIV.

### Of the COALITION of PARTIES.

**T**O abolish all distinctions of party may not be practicable, perhaps not desirable, in a free government. The only parties, which are dangerous, are such as entertain opposite views with regard to the essentials of government, the succession of the crown, or the more considerable privileges belonging to the several members of the constitution; where there is no room for any compromise or accommodation, and where the controversy may appear so momentous as to justify even an opposition by arms to the pretensions of antagonists. Of this nature was the animosity continued for above a century between the parties in ENGLAND; an animosity which broke out sometimes into civil war, which occasioned violent revolutions, and which continually endangered the peace and tranquillity of the nation. But as there has appeared of late the strongest symptoms of an universal desire to abolish these party distinctions;

this tendency to a coalition affords the most agreeable prospect of future happiness, and ought to be carefully cherished and promoted by every lover of his country.

THERE is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end, than to prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all disputes, to persuade each that its antagonist may possibly be sometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the praise and blame which we bestow on either side. The two former Essays, concerning the *original contract* and *passive obedience*, are calculated for this purpose with regard to the *philosophical* controversies between the parties, and tend to show that neither side are in these respects so fully supported by reason as they endeavour to flatter themselves. We shall proceed to exercise the same moderation with regard to the *historical* disputes between the parties, by proving that each of them was justified by plausible topics; that there were on both sides wise men who meant well to their country, and that the past animosity between the parties had no better foundation than narrow prejudice or interested passion.

THE popular party, who afterwards acquired the name of whigs, might justify by very specious argu-

ments, that opposition to the crown, from which our present free constitution is derived. Tho' obliged to acknowledge, that precedents in favour of prerogative had uniformly taken place during many reigns before CHARLES the First, they thought, that there was no reason for submitting any longer to so dangerous an authority. Such might have been their reasoning: The rights of mankind are so sacred, that no prescription of tyranny or arbitrary power can have authority sufficient to abolish them. Liberty is so inestimable a blessing, that, wherever there appears any probability of recovering it, a nation may willingly run many hazards, and ought not even to repine at the greatest effusion of blood or treasure. All human institutions, and none more than government, are in continual fluctuation. Kings are sure to embrace every opportunity of extending their prerogatives: And if favourable incidents be not also laid hold of to extend and secure the privileges of the people, an universal despotism must for ever prevail amongst mankind. The example of all the neighbouring nations prove, that it is no longer safe to entrust with the crown the same exorbitant prerogatives which had formerly been exercised during rude and simple ages. And tho' the example of many late reigns may be pleaded in favour of a power in the prince somewhat arbitrary, more remote reigns afford instances of stricter limitations imposed on the crown; and those pretensions of the parliament, now branded with the title

of innovations, are only a recovery of the just rights of the people.

THESE views, far from being odious, are surely large, and generous, and noble : To their prevalence and success the kingdom owes its liberty ; perhaps its learning, its industry, commerce, and naval power : By them chiefly the ENGLISH name is distinguished among the society of nations, and aspires to a rivalry with that of the freest and most illustrious commonwealths of antiquity. But as all these mighty consequences could not reasonably be foreseen at the time when the contest began, the royalists of that age wanted not spacious arguments on their side, by which they could justify their defence of the then established prerogatives of the crown. We shall state the question, as it might appear to them at the assembling of that parliament, which by their violent encroachments on the crown, began the civil wars.

THE only rule of government, they might have said, known and acknowledged among men, is use and practice : Reason is so uncertain a guide that it will always be exposed to doubt and controversy : Could it ever render itself prevalent over the people, men had always retained it as their sole rule of conduct : They had still continued in the primitive, unconnected state of nature, without submitting to political government, whose sole basis is, not pure reason,

son, but authority and precedent. Dissolve these ties, and you break all the bonds of civil society, and leave every man at liberty to consult his particular interest, by those expedients, which his appetite, disguised under the appearance of reason, shall dictate to him. The spirit of innovation is in itself pernicious, however favourable its particular object may sometimes appear: A truth so obvious, that the popular party themselves are sensible of it, and therefore cover their encroachments on the crown by the plausible pretence of their recovering the antient liberties of the people.

BUT the present prerogatives of the crown, granting all the suppositions of that party, have been incontestibly established ever since the accession of the House of TUDOR; a period, which, as it now comprehends an hundred and sixty years, may be allowed sufficient to give stability to any constitution. Would it not have appeared ridiculous, in the reign of the Emperor ADRIAN, to talk of the constitution of the republic as the rule of government; or to suppose that the former rights of the senate, and consuls and tribunes were still subsisting?

BUT the present claims of the ENGLISH monarchs are infinitely more favourable than those of the ROMAN emperors during that age. The authority of  
AUGUSTUS

AUGUSTUS was a plain usurpation, grounded only on military violence, and forms such an æra in the ROMAN history, as is obvious to every reader. But if HENRY VII. really, as some pretend, enlarged the power of the crown, it was only by insensible acquisitions, which escaped the apprehension of the people, and have scarcely been remarked even by historians and politicians. The new government, if it deserves the name, is an imperceptible transition from the former; is entirely engrafted on it; derives its title fully from that root; and is to be considered only as one of those gradual revolutions, to which human affairs, in every nation, will be for ever subject.

THE House of TUDOR, and after them that of STUART, exercised no prerogatives, but what had been claimed and exercised by the PLANTAGENETS. Not a single branch of their authority can be said to be altogether an innovation. The only difference is, that perhaps the former kings exerted these powers only by intervals, and were not able by reason of the opposition of their barons, to render them so steady a rule of administration\*. But the sole inference from this fact is,

\* The author believes that he was the first writer who advanced that the family of TUDOR possessed in general more authority than their immediate predecessors: An opinion, which,

is, that these antient times were more turbulent and seditious ; and that royal authority, the constitution, and the laws have happily of late gained the ascendant.

UNDER what pretence can the popular party now talk of recovering the antient constitution ? The former controul over the kings was not placed in the commons, but in the barons : The people had no authority, and even little or no liberty, till the crown, by suppressing these factious tyrants, enforced the execution of the laws, and obliged all the subjects equally to respect each others rights, privileges, and properties. If we must return to the antient barbarous and GOTHIC constitution ; let those gentlemen, who now behave themselves with so much insolence to their sovereign, set the first example. Let them make court to be admitted as retainers on a neighbouring baron ; and by submitting to slavery under him acquire some protection to themselves ; together with the power of exercising rapine and oppression over their inferior slaves and villains. This was the

he hopes, will be supported by history, but which he proposes with some diffidence. There are strong symptoms of arbitrary power in some former reigns, even after signing of the charters. The power of the crown in that age depended less on the constitution than on the capacity and vigour of the prince who wore it.

condition



condition of the commons among their remote ancestors.

BUT how far back shall we go, in having recourse to antient constitutions and governments? There was a constitution still more antient than that to which their innovators affect so much to appeal. During that period there was no *magna charta*: The barons themselves possessed few regular, stated privileges: And the house of commons probably had not an existence.

IT is pleasant to hear a house, while they are usurping the whole power of government, talk of reviving antient institutions. Is it not known, that, tho' the representatives received wages from their constituents; to be a member of their house was always considered as a burthen, and a freedom from it as a privilege? Will they persuade us, that power, which of all human acquisitions is the most coveted, and in comparison of which even reputation and pleasure and riches are slighted, could ever be regarded as a burthen by any man?

THE property acquired of late by the commons, it is said, entitles them to more power than their ancestors enjoyed. But to what is this encrease of their property owing, but to an encrease of their liberty and their security? Let them therefore acknowledge, that

that their ancestors, while the crown was restrained by the seditious barons, really enjoyed less liberty than they themselves have attained, after the sovereign acquired the ascendant: And let them enjoy that liberty with moderation; and not forfeit it by new exorbitant claims, and by rendering it a pretence for endless innovations.

THE true rule of government is the present established practice of the age. That has most authority, because it is recent: It is also better known, for the same reason. Who has assured those tribunes, that the PLANTAGENETS did not exercise as high acts of authority as the TUDORS? The historians, they say, do not mention them. But the historians are also silent with regard to the chief exertions of prerogative by the TUDORS. Where any power or prerogative is fully and undoubtedly established, the exercise of it passes for a thing of course, and readily escapes the notice of history and annals. Had we no other monuments of ELIZABETH'S reign, than what are preserved even by CAMDEN, the most copious, judicious, and exact of our historians, we should be entirely ignorant of the most important maxims of her government.

WAS not the present monarchical government, to its full extent, authorized by lawyers, recommended by divines, acknowledged by politicians, acquiesced in,

in, nay passionately cherished, by the people in general ; and all this during a period of at least a hundred and sixty years, and till of late, without the least murmur or controversy ? This general consent surely, during so long a time, must be sufficient to render a constitution legal and valid. If the origin of all power be derived, as is pretended, from the people ; here is their consent in the fullest and most ample terms that can be desired or imagined.

BUT the people must not pretend, because they can, by their consent, lay the foundations of government, that therefore they are to be permitted, at their pleasure, to overthrow and subvert them. There is no end of these seditious and arrogant claims. The power of the crown is now openly struck at : The nobility are also in visible peril : The gentry will soon follow : The popular leaders, who will then assume the name of gentry, will next be exposed to danger : And the people themselves, become incapable of civil government, and lying under the restraint of no authority, must, for the sake of peace, admit, instead of their legal and mild monarchs, a succession of military and despotic tyrants.

THESE consequences are the more to be dreaded, that the present fury of the people, tho' glossed over by pretensions to civil liberty, is in reality incited by the fanaticisms of religion ; a principle the most blind,  
headstrong

headstrong and ungovernable, by which human nature can ever possibly be actuated. Popular rage is dreadful from whatever motive derived : But must be attended with the most pernicious consequences, when it arises from a principle, which disclaims all controul by human law, reason, or authority.


THESE are the arguments, which each party may make use of to justify the conduct of their predecessors, during that great crisis. The event has shown, that the reasonings of the popular party were better founded ; but perhaps, according to the established maxims of lawyers and politicians, the views of the royalists ought, beforehand, to have appeared more solid, more safe, and more legal. But this is certain, that the greater moderation we now employ in representing past events ; the nearer we shall be to produce a full coalition of the parties, and an entire acquiescence in our present happy establishment. Moderation is of advantage to every establishment : Nothing but zeal can overturn a settled power : And an over-active zeal in friends is apt to beget a like spirit in antagonists. The transition from a moderate opposition against an establishment, to an entire acquiescence in it is easy and insensible.

THERE are many invincible arguments, which should induce the malecontent party to acquiesce entirely

tirely in the present settlement of the constitution. They now find, that the spirit of civil liberty, tho' at first connected with religious fanaticism, could purge itself from that pollution, and appear under a more genuine and engaging aspect; a friend to toleration, and an encourager of all the enlarged and generous sentiments, that do honour to human nature. They may observe, that the popular claims could stop at a proper period; and after retrenching the exorbitant prerogatives of the crown, could still maintain a due respect to monarchy, to nobility, and to all antient institutions. Above all, they must be sensible, that the very principle, which made the strength of their party, and from which it derived its chief authority, has now deserted them; and gone over to their antagonists. The plan of liberty is settled; its happy effects are proved by experience; a long tract of time has given it stability; and whoever would attempt to overturn it, and to recall the past government or abdicated family, would, besides other more criminal imputations, be exposed in their turn to the reproach of faction and innovation. While they peruse the history of past events, they ought to reflect, both that these rights of the crown are long since annihilated, and that the tyranny, and violence, and oppression, to which they often gave rise, are ill, from which the established liberty of the constitution has now at last happily protected

tested the people. These reflections will prove a better security to our freedom and privileges, than to deny, contrary to the clearest evidence of facts, that such regal powers ever had any existence. There is not a more effectual method of betraying a cause, than to lay the stress of the argument on a wrong place, and by disputing an untenable post, enure the adversaries to success and victory.

ESSAY



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## ESSAY XV.

### Of the PROTESTANT SUCCESSION.

**I** SUPPOSE, that a member of parliament, in the reign of King WILLIAM. or Queen ANNE, while the establishment of the *Protestant Succession* was yet uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he would choose in that important question, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and disadvantages on each side. I believe the following particulars would have entered into his consideration.

He would easily perceive the great advantages resulting from the restoration of the STUART family; by which we should preserve the succession clear and undisputed, free from a pretender, with such a specious title as that of blood, which, with the multitude, is always the claim, the strongest and most easily comprehended. 'Tis in vain to say, as many have done, that the question with regard to *governors,*



independent of *government*, is frivolous, and little worth disputing, much less fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter into these sentiments; and 'tis much happier, I believe, for society, that they do not, but rather continue in their natural prejudices and prepossessions. How could stability be preserved in any monarchical government, (which, tho' perhaps, not the best, is, and always has been, the most common of any) unless men had so passionate a regard for the true heir of their royal family; and even tho' weak in understanding, or infirm in years, gave him so great a preference above persons the most accomplished in shining talents, or celebrated for great achievements? Would not every popular leader put in his claim at every vacancy, or even without any vacancy; and the kingdom become the theatre of perpetual wars and convulsions? The condition of the ROMAN empire, surely, was not, in this respect, much to be envied; nor is that of the *Eastern* nations, who pay little regard to the title of their sovereigns, but sacrifice them, every day, to the caprice or momentary humour of the populace or soldiery. 'Tis but a foolish wisdom, which is so carefully displayed, in undervaluing princes, and placing them on a level with the meanest of mankind. To be sure, an anatomist finds no more in the greatest monarch than in the lowest peasant or day-labourer; and a moralist may, perhaps, frequently find less. But  
what

what do all these reflections tend to? We, all of us, still retain these prejudices in favour of birth and family; and neither in our serious occupations, nor most careless amusements, can we ever get entirely rid of them. A tragedy, that should represent the adventures of sailors, or porters, or even of private gentlemen, would presently disgust us; but one that introduces kings and princes, acquires in our eyes an air of importance and dignity. Or should a man be able, by his superior wisdom, to get entirely above such prepossessions, he would soon, by means of the same wisdom, again bring himself down to them, for the sake of society, whose welfare he would perceive to be intimately connected with them. Far from endeavouring to undeceive the people in this particular, he would cherish such sentiments of reverence to their princes; as requisite to preserve a due subordination in society. And tho' the lives of twenty thousand men be often sacrificed to maintain a king in possession of his throne, or preserve the right of succession undisturbed, he entertains no indignation at the loss, on pretence that every individual of these was, perhaps, in himself, as valuable as the prince he served. He considers the consequences of violating the hereditary rights of kings: Consequences, which may be felt for many centuries; while the loss of several thousand men brings so little prejudice to a large kingdom, that it may not be perceived a few years afterwards.

THE advantages of the HANOVER succession are of an opposite nature, and arise from this very circumstance, that it violates hereditary right; and places on the throne a prince, to whom birth gave no title to that dignity. 'Tis evident to any one who considers the history of this island, that the privileges of the people have, during the two last centuries, been continually upon the increase, by the division of the church-lands, by the alienations of the barons estates, by the progress of trade, and above all, by the happiness of our situation, which, for a long time, gave us sufficient security, without any standing army or military establishment. On the contrary, public liberty has, almost in every other nation of EUROPE, been, during the same period, extremely upon the decline; while the people were disgusted at the hardships of the old GOTHIC militia, and chose rather to intrust their prince with mercenary armies, which he easily turned against themselves. It was nothing extraordinary, therefore, that some of our BRITISH sovereigns mistook the nature of the constitution, and genius of the people; and as they embraced all the favourable precedents left them by their ancestors, they overlooked all those which were contrary, and which supposed a limitation in our government. They were encouraged in this mistake, by the example of all the neighbouring princes, who, bearing the same title or appellation, and being adorned with the same ensigns of authority, naturally led them to claim

claim the same powers and prerogatives \*. The flattery of courtiers farther blinded them ; and above all, that

\* It appears from the speeches, and proclamations, and whole train of King JAMES I.'s actions, as well as his son's, that they considered the ENGLISH government as a simple monarchy, and never imagined that any considerable part of their subjects entertained a contrary idea. This made them discover their pretensions, without preparing any force to support them ; and even without reserve or disguise, which are always employed by those, who enter upon any new project, or endeavour to innovate in any government. King JAMES told his parliament plainly, when they meddled in state affairs, *Ne futor ultra crepidam*. He used also, at his table, in promiscuous companies, to advance his notions, in a manner still more undisguised ; As we may learn from a story told in the life of Mr. WALLER, and which that poet used frequently to repeat. When Mr. WALLER was young, he had the curiosity to go to court ; and he stood in the circle, and saw King JAMES dine, where, amongst other company, there sat at table two bishops. The King, openly and aloud, proposed this question, *Whether he might not take his subjects money, when he had occasion for it, without all this formality of parliament ?* The one bishop readily replied, *God forbid you should not : For you are the breath of our nostrils*. The other bishop declined answering, and said he was not skilled in parliamentary cases : But upon the King's urging him, and saying he would admit of no evasion, his lordship replied very pleasantly, *Why, then, I think your majesty may lawfully take my brother's money : For he offers it*. In Sir WALTER RALBIGH's preface to the History of the

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World,

that of the clergy, who from several passages of *scripture*, and these wrested too, had erected a regular and avowed system of tyranny and despotic power. The only method of destroying, at once, all these exorbitant claims and pretensions, was to depart from the true hereditary line, and choose a prince, who, being plainly a creature of the public, and receiving the crown on conditions, expressed and avowed, found his authority established on the same bottom with the privileges of the people. By electing him in the royal line, we cut off all hopes of ambitious subjects, who

World, there is this remarkable passage. PHILIP II. by strong band and main force, attempted to make himself not only an absolute monarch over the Netherlands, like unto the kings and sovereigns of England and France; but Turk-like, to tread under his feet all their natural and fundamental laws, privileges, and antient rights. SPENSER, speaking of some grants of the ENGLISH kings to the IRISH corporations, says, "All which, tho', at the time  
 " of their first grant, they were tolerable, and perhaps reasonable, yet now are most unreasonable and inconvenient. But  
 " all these will easily be cut off with the superior power of her  
 " Majesty's prerogative, against which her own grants are not  
 " to be pleaded or enforced." *State of IRELAND*, p. 1537. Edit. 1706.

As these were very common, if not, perhaps, the universal notions of the times, the two first princes of the house of STUART were the more excusable for their mistake. And RAMPEN, suitable to his usual malignity and partiality, seems to treat them with too much severity, upon account of it.

might

might, in future emergencies, disturb the government by their cabals and pretensions: By rendering the crown hereditary in his family, we avoided all the inconveniencies of elective monarchy: And by excluding the lineal heir, we secured all our constitutional limitations, and rendered our government uniform and of a piece. The people cherish monarchy, because protected by it: The monarch favours liberty, because created by it. And thus every advantage is obtained by the new establishment, as far as human skill and wisdom can extend itself.

THESE are the separate advantages of fixing the succession, either in the house of STUART, or in that of HANOVER. There are also disadvantages in each establishment, which an impartial patriot would ponder and examine, in order to form a just judgment upon the whole.

THE disadvantages of the Protestant succession consist in the foreign dominions, which are possessed by the princes of the HANOVER line, and which, it might be supposed, would engage us in the intrigues and wars of the continent, and lose us, in some measure, the inestimable advantage we possess of being surrounded and guarded by the sea, which we command. The disadvantages of recalling the abdicated family consist chiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to society than that established amongst us,

is contrary to it, and affords no toleration, or peace, or civility to any other religion.

It appears to me, that all these advantages and disadvantages are allowed on both sides ; at least, by every one, who is at all susceptible of argument or reasoning. No subject, however loyal, pretends to deny, that the disputed title and foreign dominions of the present royal family are a loss. Nor is there any partisan of the STUART family, but will confess, that the claim of hereditary, indefeasible right, and the Roman Catholic religion, are also disadvantages in that family. It belongs, therefore, to a philosopher alone, who is of neither party, to put all these circumstances in the scale, and assign to each of them its proper poise and influence. Such an one will readily, at first, acknowledge, that all political questions are infinitely complicated, and that there scarce ever occurs in any deliberation, a choice, which is either purely good, or purely ill. Consequences, mixed and varied, may be foreseen to flow from every measure : And many consequences, unforeseen, do always in fact, result from it. Hesitation, and reserve, and suspense, are, therefore, the only sentiments he brings to this essay or trial. Or if he indulges any passion, 'tis that of derision and ridicule against the ignorant multitude, who are always clamorous and dogmatical, even in the nicest questions, of which, from want of  
temper,

temper, perhaps still more than of understanding, they are altogether unfit judges.

BUT to say something more determinate on this head, the following reflections will, I hope, show the temper, if not the understanding, of a philosopher.

WERE we to judge merely by first appearance, and by past experience, we must allow that the advantages of a parliamentary title in the house of HANOVER are much greater than those of an undisputed hereditary title in the house of STUART; and that our fathers acted wisely in preferring the former to the latter. So long as the house of STUART reigned in BRITAIN, which, with some interruption, was above 80 years, the government was kept in a continual fever, by the contentions between the privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. If arms were dropt, the noise of disputes continued: Or if these were silenced, jealousy still corroded the heart, and threw the nation into an unnatural ferment and disorder. And while we were thus occupied in domestic contentions, a foreign power, dangerous, if not fatal, to public liberty, erected itself in EUROPE, without any opposition from us, and even sometimes with our assistance.

BUT during these last sixty years, when a parliamentary establishment has taken place; whatever



factions may have prevailed either among the people or in public assemblies, the whole force of our constitution has always fallen to one side, and an uninterrupted harmony has been preserved between our princes and our parliaments. Public liberty, with internal peace and order, has flourished almost without interruption: Trade, and manufactures, and agriculture, have increased: The arts, and sciences, and philosophy, have been cultivated. Even religious parties have been necessitated to lay aside their mutual rancour: And the glory of the nation has spread itself all over EUROPE; while we stand the bulwark against oppression, and the great antagonist of that power which threatens every people with conquest and subjection. So long and so glorious a period no nation almost can boast of: Nor is there another instance in the whole history of mankind, that so many millions of people have, during such a space of time, been held together, in a manner so free, so rational, and so suitable to the dignity of human nature.

BUT tho' this recent instance seems clearly to decide in favour of the present establishment, there are some circumstances to be thrown into the other scale; and 'tis dangerous to regulate our judgment by one event or example.

WE have had two rebellions during the flourishing period above mentioned, besides plots and conspiracies

cies without number. And if none of these have produced any very fatal event, we may ascribe our escape chiefly to the narrow genius of those princes who disputed our establishment ; and may esteem ourselves so far fortunate. But the claims of the banished family, I fear, are not yet antiquated ; and who can foretel, that their future attempts will produce no greater disorder ?

THE disputes betwixt privilege and prerogative may easily be composed by laws, and votes, and conferences, and concessions ; where there is tolerable temper or prudence on both sides, or on either side. Among contending titles, the question can only be determined by the sword, and by devastation, and by civil war.

A PRINCE who fills the throne with a disputed title, dares not arm his subjects ; the only method of securing a people fully, both against domestic oppression and foreign conquest.

NOTWITHSTANDING all our riches and renown, what a critical escape did we lately make from dangers, which were owing not so much to bad conduct and ill success in war, as to the pernicious practice of mortgaging our finances, and the still more pernicious maxim of never paying off our incumbrances ? Such

fatal measures could never have been embraced, had it not been to secure a precarious establishment \*.

BUT to convince us, that an hereditary title is to be embraced rather than a parliamentary one, which is not supported by any other views or motives ; a man needs only transport himself back to the æra of the restoration, and suppose, that he had had a seat in that parliament which recalled the royal family, and put a period to the greatest disorders that ever arose from the opposite pretensions of prince and people. What would have been thought of one, that had proposed, at that time, to set aside CHARLES II. and settle the crown on the Duke of YORK or GLOCESTER, merely in order to exclude all high claims, like those of their father and grandfather ? Would not such an one have been regarded as a very extravagant projector, who loved dangerous remedies, and could tamper and play with a government and national constitution, like a quack with a sickly patient ?

THE advantages which result from a parliamentary title, preferably to an hereditary one, tho' they are great, are too refined ever to enter into the conception of

\* Those who consider how universal this pernicious practice of funding has become all over EUROPE, may perhaps dispute this last opinion. But we lay under less necessity than other States.

the vulgar. The bulk of mankind would never allow them to be sufficient for committing what would be regarded as an injustice to the prince. They must be supported by some gross, popular, and familiar topics; and wise men, tho' convinced of their force, would reject them, in compliance with the weakness and prejudices of the people. An incroaching tyrant or deluded bigot alone, by his misconduct, is able to enrage the nation, and render practicable what was always, perhaps, desireable.

IN reality, the reason assigned by the nation for excluding the race of STUART, and so many other branches of the royal family, is not on account of their hereditary title (which, however just in itself, would, to vulgar apprehensions, have appeared altogether absurd) but on account of their religion. Which leads us to compare the disadvantages above mentioned of each establishment.

I CONFESS, that, considering the matter in general, it were rather to be wished, that our prince had no foreign dominions, and could confine all his attention to the government of this island. For, not to mention some real inconveniencies that may result from territories on the continent, they afford such a handle for calumny and defamation, as is greedily seized by the people, who are always disposed to think ill of their superiors. It must, however, be acknowledged,

known, that HANOVER is, perhaps, the spot of ground in EUROPE the least inconvenient for a King of BRITAIN. It lies in the heart of GERMANY, at a distance from the great powers, which are our natural rivals: It is protected by the laws of the empire, as well as by the arms of its own sovereign, and it serves only to connect us more closely with the house of AUSTRIA, which is our natural ally.

IN the last war, it has been of service to us, by furnishing us with a considerable body of auxiliary troops, the bravest and most faithful in the world. The Elector of HANOVER is the only considerable prince in the empire, who has pursued no separate end, and has raised up no state pretensions, during the late commotions of EUROPE; but has acted, all along, with the dignity of a king of BRITAIN. And ever since the accession of that family, it would be difficult to show any harm we have ever received from the electoral dominions, except that short disgust in 1718, with CHARLES XII. who, regulating himself by maxims very different from those of other princes, made a personal quarrel of every public injury.

THE religious persuasion of the house of STUART is an inconvenience of a much deeper dye, and would threaten us with much more dismal consequences. The Roman Catholic religion, with its huge train of priests and friars, is vastly more expensive than ours:

Even

Even tho' unaccompanied with its natural attendants of inquisitors, and stakes, and gibbets, it is less tolerating : And not contented with dividing the sacerdotal from the regal office (which must be prejudicial to any state) it bestows the former on a foreigner, who has always a separate, and may often have an opposite interest to that of the public.

BUT were this religion ever so advantageous to society, it is contrary to that which is established among us, and which is likely to keep possession, for a long time, of the minds of the people. And tho' it is much to be hoped, that the progress of reason and philosophy will, by degrees, abate the virulent acrimony of opposite religions all over EUROPE ; yet the spirit of moderation has, as yet, made too slow advances to be intirely trusted, The conduct of the SAXON family, where the same person can be a Catholic King and a Protestant Elector, is, perhaps, the first instance, in modern times, of so reasonable and prudent a behaviour. And the gradual progress of the Catholic superstition does, even there, prognosticate a speedy alteration : After which, 'tis justly to be apprehended, that persecutions will put a speedy period to the Protestant religion in the place of its nativity.

THUS, upon the whole, the advantages of the settlement in the family of STUART, which frees us  
from

from a disputed title, seem to bear some proportion with those of the settlement in the family of HANOVER, which frees us from the claims of prerogative: But at the same time, its disadvantages, by placing on the throne a Roman Catholic, are much greater than those of the other establishment, in settling the crown on a foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot, in the reign of K. WILLIAM or Q. ANNE, would have chosen amidst these opposite views, may, perhaps, to some appear hard to determine. For my part, I esteem liberty so invaluable a blessing in society, that whatever favours its progress and security, can scarce be too fondly cherished by every one who is a lover of human kind.

BUT the settlement in the house of HANOVER has actually taken place. The princes of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without solicitation on their part, have been called to mount our throne, by the united voice of the whole legislative body. They have, since their accession, displayed, in all their actions, the utmost mildness, equity, and regard to the laws and constitution. Our own ministers, our own parliaments, ourselves have governed us; and if aught ill has befallen us, we can only blame fortune or ourselves. What a reproach must we become among nations, if, disgusted with a settlement so deliberately made, and whose conditions have been so religiously observed, we should throw every thing again  
into.

into confusion ; and by our levity and rebellious disposition, prove ourselves totally unfit for any state but that of absolute slavery and subjection ?

THE greatest inconvenience attending a disputed title, is, that it brings us in danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wise man, to avoid this inconvenience, would run directly upon a civil war and rebellion ? Not to mention, that so long possession, secured by so many laws, must, ere this time, in the apprehension of a great part of the nation, have begot a title in the house of HANOVER, independent of their present possession : So that now we should not, even by a revolution, obtain the end of avoiding a disputed title.

No revolution made by national forces, will ever be able, without some other great necessity, to abolish our debts and incumbrances, in which the interest of so many persons is concerned. And a revolution made by foreign forces, is a conquest : A calamity with which the precarious balance of power very nearly threatens us, and which our civil dissensions are likely, above all other circumstances, to bring suddenly upon us.





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## ESSAY XVI.

### IDEA OF A PERFECT COMMONWEALTH.

OF all mankind, there are none so pernicious as political projectors, if they have power ; nor so ridiculous, if they want it : As on the other hand, a wise politician is the most beneficial character in nature, if accompanied with authority ; and the most innocent, and not altogether useless, even if deprived of it. 'Tis not with forms of government, as with other artificial contrivances ; where an old engine may be rejected, if we can discover another more accurate and commodious, or where trials may safely be made, even tho' the success be doubtful. An established government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumstance of its being established ; the bulk of mankind being governed by authority, not reason, and never attributing authority to any thing that has not the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try projects merely upon the credit of supposed argument and philosophy, can

can never be the part of a wise magistrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age ; and tho' he may attempt some improvement for the public good, yet will he adjust his innovations, as much as possible, to the antient fabric, and preserve intire the chief pillars and supports of the constitution.

THE mathematicians in EUROPE have been much divided concerning that figure of a ship, which is the most commodious for sailing ; and HUYGENS, who at last determined this controversy, is justly thought to have obliged the learned, as well as commercial world ; tho' COLUMBUS had sailed to AMERICA, and Sir FRANCIS DRAKE made the tour of the world, without any such discovery. As one form of government must be allowed more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humours of particular men ; why may we not inquire what is the most perfect of all, tho' the common botched and inaccurate governments seem to serve the purposes of society, and tho' it be not so easy to establish a new government, as to build a vessel upon a new plan ? The subject is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of the old governments, or the combination

combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world? In all cases, it must be advantageous to know what is most perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring any real constitution or form of government as near it as possible, by such gentle alterations and innovations as may not give too great disturbance to society.

ALL I pretend to in the present essay is to revive this subject of speculation; and therefore I shall deliver my sentiments in as few words as possible. A long dissertation on that head would not, I apprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard such disquisitions both as useless and chimerical.

ALL plans of government, which suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the *Republic* of PLATO, and the *Utopia* of Sir THOMAS MORE. The *OCEANA* is the only valuable model of a commonwealth, that has as yet been offered to the public.

THE chief defects of the *OCEANA* seem to be these. *First*, Its rotation is inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever ability, by intervals, out of public employments. *Secondly*, Its *Agrarian* is impracticable. Men will soon learn the art, which was practised in ancient ROME, of concealing their possessions under other

other people's names; till at last, the abuse will become so common, that they will throw off even the appearance of restraint. *Thirdly*, The OCEANA provides not a sufficient security for liberty, or the redress of grievances. The senate must propose, and the people consent; by which means, the senate have not only a negative upon the people, but, what is of infinitely greater consequence, their negative goes before the votes of the people. Were the King's negative of the same nature in the ENGLISH constitution, and could he prevent any bill from coming into parliament, he would be an absolute monarch. As his negative follows the votes of the houses, it is of little consequence: Such a difference is there in the manner of placing the same thing. When a popular bill has been debated in the two houses, is brought to maturity, all its conveniencies and inconveniencies weighed and balanced; if afterwards it be presented for the royal assent, few princes will venture to reject the unanimous desire of the people. But could the King crush a disagreeable bill in embryo (as was the case for some time, in the SCOTCH parliament, by means of the lords of the articles) the BRITISH government would have no balance, nor would grievances ever be redressed: And 'tis certain, that exorbitant power proceeds not, in any government, from new laws, so much as from neglecting to remedy the abuses which frequently rise from the old ones. A government, says MACHIAVEL, must often be brought  
back

back to its original principles. It appears then, that in the OCEANA the whole legislature may be said to rest in the senate ; which HARRINGTON would own to be an inconvenient form of government, especially after the *Agrarian* is abolished.

HERE is a form of government, to which I cannot, in theory, discover any considerable objection.

LET GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 100 counties, and each county into 100 parishes, making in all 10,000. If the country purposed to be erected into a commonwealth, be of more narrow extent, we may diminish the number of counties ; but never bring them below thirty. If it be of greater extent, 'twere better to enlarge the parishes, or throw more parishes into a county, than increase the number of counties.

LET all the free-holders of ten pounds a-year in the country, and all the house-holders worth 200 pounds in the town-parishes, meet annually in the parish-church, and chuse, by ballot, some freeholder of the county for their member, whom we shall call the county *representative*.

LET the 100 county representatives, two days after their election, meet in the county-town, and chuse by ballot, from their own body, ten county *magistrates*,  
and

and one *senator*. There are, therefore, in the whole commonwealth, 100 senators, 1100 county magistrates, and 10,000 county representatives. For we shall bestow on all senators the authority of county magistrates, and on all county magistrates the authority of county representatives.

LET the senators meet in the capital, and be endowed with the whole executive power of the commonwealth; the power of peace and war, of giving orders to generals, admirals, and ambassadors, and, in short, all the prerogatives of a BRITISH King, except his negative.

LET the county representatives meet in their particular counties, and possess the whole legislative power of the commonwealth; the greatest number of counties deciding the question; and where these are equal, let the senate have the casting vote.

EVERY new law must first be debated in the senate; and tho' rejected by it, if ten senators insist and protest, it must be sent down to the counties. The senate may join to the copy of the law, their reasons for receiving or rejecting it.

BECAUSE it would be troublesome to assemble the whole county representatives for every trivial law, that may be requisite, the senate have their choice of  
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sending down the law either to the county magistrates or county representatives.

THE magistrates, tho' the law be referred to them, may, if they please, call the representatives, and submit the affair to their determination.

WHETHER the law be referred by the senate to the county magistrates or representatives, a copy of it, and of the senate's reasons, must be sent to every representative eight days before the day appointed for the assembling, in order to deliberate concerning it. And tho' the determination be, by the senate, referred to the magistrates, if five representatives of the county order the magistrates to assemble the whole court of representatives, and submit the affair to their determination, they must obey.

EITHER the county magistrates or representatives may give, to the senator of the county, the copy of a law to be proposed to the senate; and if five counties concur in the same order, the law, tho' refused by the senate, must come either to the county magistrates or representatives, as is contained in the order of the five counties.

ANY twenty counties, by a vote either of their magistrates or representatives, may throw any man out



of all public offices for a year. Thirty counties for three years.

THE senate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The senate cannot throw out twice in a year the senator of the same county.

THE power of the old senate continues for three weeks after the annual election of the county representatives. Then all the new senators are shut up in a conclave, like the cardinals; and by an intricate ballot, such as that of VENICE or MALTA, they chuse the following magistrates; a protector, who represents the dignity of the commonwealth, and presides in the senate; two secretaries of state; these six councils, a council of state, a council of religion and learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of the admiralty, each council consisting of five persons; together with six commissioners of the treasury and a first commissioner. All these must be senators. The senate also names all the ambassadors to foreign courts, who may either be senators or not.

THE senate may continue any or all of these, but must re-elect them every year.

THE protector and two secretaries have session and suffrage in the council of state. The business of that council is all foreign politics. The council of state has session and suffrage in all the other councils.

THE council of religion and learning inspects the universities and clergy. That of trade inspects every thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inspects all the abuses of laws by the inferior magistrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal law. That of war inspects the militia and its discipline, magazines, stores, &c. and when the republic is in war, examines into the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the same power with regard to the navy, together with the nomination of the captains and all inferior officers.

NONE of these councils can give orders themselves, except where they receive such powers from the senate. In other cases, they must communicate every thing to the senate.

WHEN the senate is under adjournment, any of the councils may assemble it before the day appointed for its meeting.

BESIDES these councils or courts, there is another called the court of *competitors*; which is thus consti-

tuted. If any candidates for the office of senator have more votes than a third of the representatives, that candidate, who has most votes, next to the senator elected, becomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a magistrate or representative: But he takes his seat in the court of competitors. Here then is a court which may sometimes consist of a hundred members, sometimes have no members at all; and by that means, be for a year abolished.

THE court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has only the inspection of public accounts, and the accusing any man before the senate. If the senate acquit him, the court of competitors may, if they please, appeal to the people, either magistrates or representatives. Upon that appeal, the magistrates or representatives meet on the day appointed by the court of competitors, and chuse in each county three persons; from which number every senator is excluded. These to the number of 300 meet in the capital, and bring the person accused to a new trial.

THE court of competitors may propose any law to the senate; and if refused, may appeal to the people; that is, to the magistrates or representatives, who examine it in their counties. Every senator, who is  
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thrown out of the senate by a vote of the court, takes his seat in the court of competitors.

THE senate possesses all the judicative authority of the house of Lords, that is, all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewise nominates the Lord Chancellor, and all the officers of the law.

EVERY county is a kind of republic within itself, and the representatives may make county-laws; which have no authority 'till three months after they are voted. A copy of the law is sent to the senate, and to every other county. The senate, or any single county, may, at any time, annul any law of another county.

THE representatives have all the authority of the BRITISH justices of peace in trials, commitments, &c.

THE magistrates have the nomination of all the officers of the revenue in each county. All causes with regard to the revenue are appealed ultimately to the magistrates. They pass the accompts of all the officers; but must have all their own accompts examined and passed at the end of the year by the representatives.

THE magistrates name rectors or ministers to all the parishes.

THE Presbyterian government is established; and the highest ecclesiastical court is an assembly or synod of all the presbyters of the county. The magistrates may take any cause from this court, and determine it themselves.

THE magistrates may try, and depose or suspend any presbyter.

THE militia is established in imitation of that in SWISSERLAND, which being well known, we shall not insist upon it. It will only be proper to make this addition, that an army of 20,000 men be annually drawn out by rotation, paid and encamped during six weeks in summer; that the duty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.

THE magistrates nominate all the colonels and downwards. The senate all upwards. During war, the general nominates the colonel and downwards, and his commission is good for a twelvemonth. But after that it must be confirmed by the magistrates of the county to which the regiment belongs. The magistrates may break any officer in the county regiment. And the senate may do the same to any officer in the service. If the magistrates do not think proper to confirm the general's choice, they may nominate another officer in the place of him they reject.

ALL

ALL crimes are tried within the county by the magistrates and a jury. But the senate can stop any trial, and bring it before themselves.

ANY county may indict any man before the senate, for any crime.

THE protector, the two secretaries, the council of state, with any five more that the senate appoints, on extraordinary emergencies, are possessed of *dictatorial* power for six months.

THE protector may pardon any person condemned by the inferior courts.

IN time of war, no officer of the army that is in the field, can have any civil office in the commonwealth.

THE capital, which we shall call LONDON, may be allowed four members in the senate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The representatives of each of these choose one senator, and ten magistrates. There are therefore in the city four senators, forty-four magistrates, and four hundred representatives. The magistrates have the same authority as in the counties. The representatives also have the same authority; but they never meet in one general court: They give their votes in their particular county, or division of hundreds.

WHEN they enact any city-law, the greatest number of counties or divisions determines the matter. And where these are equal, the magistrates have the casting vote.

THE magistrates chuse the mayor, sberiff, recorder, and other officers of the city.

IN the commonwealth, no representative, magistrate, or senator, as such, has any salary. The prosecutor, secretaries, councils, and ambassadors, have salaries.

THE first year in every century is set apart to correct all inequalities, which time may have produced in the representative. This must be done by the legislature.

THE following political aphorisms may explain the reason of these orders.

THE lower sort of people and small proprietors are good enough judges of one not very distant from them in rank or habitation ; and therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuse the best, or nearly the best representative : But they are wholly unfit for county-meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grantees an opportunity of deceiving them.

TEN thousand, even tho' they were not annually elected, are a large enough basis for any free government. 'Tis true, the nobles in POLAND are more than 10,000, and yet these oppress the people. But as power continues there always in the same persons and families, this makes them, in a manner, a different nation from the people. Besides, the nobles are there united under a few heads of families.

ALL free governments must consist of two councils, a less and a greater, or, in other words, of a senate and people. The people, as HARRINGTON observes, would want wisdom, without the senate: The senate, without the people, would want honesty.

A LARGE assembly of 1000, for instance, to represent the people, if allowed to debate, would fall into disorder. If not allowed to debate, the senate has a negative upon them, and the worst kind of negative, that before resolution.

HERE therefore is an inconvenience, which no government has yet fully remedied, but which is the easiest to be remedied in the world. If the people debate, all is confusion: If they do not debate, they can only resolve; and then the senate carves for them. Divide the people into many separate bodies; and then they may debate with safety, and every inconvenience seems to be prevented.



CARDINAL de RETZ says, that all numerous assemblies, however composed, are mere mob, and swayed in their debates by the least motive. This we find confirmed by daily experience. When an absurdity strikes a member, he conveys it to his neighbour, and so on, till the whole be infected. Separate this great body; and tho' every member be only of middling sense, 'tis not probable, that any thing but reason can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being removed, good sense will always get the better of bad among a number of people. Good sense is one thing: But follies are numberless; and every man has a different one. The only way of making a people wise, is to keep them from uniting into large assemblies.

THERE are two things to be guarded against in every *senate*: Its combination, and its division. Its combination is most dangerous. And against this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies.

1. The great dependence of the senators on the people by annual elections; and that not by an undistinguishing rabble, like the ENGLISH electors, but by men of fortune and education.
2. The small power they are allowed. They have few offices to dispose of. Almost all are given by the magistrates in the counties.
3. The court of competitors, which being composed of men that are their rivals, next to

them in interest, and uneasy in their present situation will be sure to take all advantages against them.

THE division of the senate is prevented, 1. By the smallness of their number. 2. As faction supposes a combination to a separate interest, it is prevented by their dependence on the people. 3. They have a power of expelling any factious member. 'Tis true, when another member of the same spirit comes from the county, they have no power of expelling him: Nor is it fit they should; for that shows the humour to be in the people, and probably arises from some ill conduct in public affairs. 4. Almost any man, in a senate so regularly chosen by the people, may be supposed fit for any civil office. 'T would be proper, therefore, for the senate to form some general resolutions with regard to the disposing of offices among the members: Which resolutions would not confine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one hand, or extraordinary stupidity on the other, appears in any senator; but yet they would be sufficient to prevent brigue and faction, by making the disposal of the offices a thing of course. For instance, let it be a resolution, That no man shall enjoy any office, till he has sat four years in the senate: That, except ambassadors, no man shall be in office two years following: That no man shall attain the higher offices but thro' the lower: That no man shall

shall be protector twice, &c. The senate of VENICE govern themselves by such resolutions.

IN foreign politics the interest of the senate can scarce ever be divided from that of the people; and therefore 'tis fit to make the senate absolute with regard to them; otherwise there could be no secrecy nor refined policy. Besides, without money no alliance can be executed; and the senate is still sufficiently dependant. Not to mention, that the legislative power being always superior to the executive, the magistrates or representatives may interpose, whenever they think proper.

THE chief support of the BRITISH government is the opposition of interests; but that, tho' in the main serviceable, breeds endless factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The competitors have no power of controlling the senate: They have only the power of accusing, and appealing to the people.

'Tis necessary, likewise, to prevent both combination and division in the thousand magistrates. This is done sufficiently by the separation of places and interests.

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BUT lest that should not be enough, their dependence on the 10,000 for their elections, serves to the same purpose.

NOR is that all : For the 10,000 may resume the power, whenever they please ; and not only when they all please, but when any five of a hundred please, which will happen upon the very first suspicion of a separate interest.

THE 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention their annual election, by almost the whole body of the people.

A SMALL commonwealth is the happiest government in the world within itself ; because every thing lies under the eye of the rulers : But it may be subdued by great force from without. This scheme seems to have all the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.

EVERY county-law may be annulled either by the senate or another county ; because that shows an opposition of interest : In which case no part ought to decide for itself. The matter must be referred to the whole, which will best determine what agrees with general interest.

As to the clergy and militia, the reasons of these orders are obvious. Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magistrate, and without a militia, 'tis folly to think any free government will ever have security or stability.

In many governments, the inferior magistrates have no rewards but what arise from their ambition, vanity, or public spirit. The salaries of the PARISH judges amount not to the interest of the sums they pay for their offices. The DUTCH burgo-masters have little more immediate profit than the ENGLISH justices of peace, or the members of the house of commons formerly. But lest any should suspect, that this would beget negligence in the administration, (which is little to be feared, considering the natural ambition of mankind) let the magistrates have competent salaries. The senators have access to so many honourable and lucrative offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little attendance required of the representatives.

THAT the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who considers the resemblance it bears to the commonwealth of the United Provinces, formerly one of the wisest and most renowned governments that ever was in the world. The alterations in the present scheme are all evidently to the better. 1. The representation is more equal.

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2. The unlimited power of the burgo-masters in the towns, which forms a perfect aristocracy in the DUTCH commonwealth, is corrected by a well-tempered democracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county-representatives. 3. The negative, which every province and town has upon the whole body of the DUTCH republic, with regard to alliances, peace and war, and the imposition of taxes, is here removed. 4. The counties, in the present plan, are not so independent of each other, nor do they form separate bodies so much as the seven provinces; where the jealousy and envy of the smaller provinces and towns against the greater, particularly HOLLAND and AMSTERDAM, have frequently disturbed the government. 5. Larger powers, tho' of the safest kind, are intrusted to the senate than the States-General possess; by which means, the former may become more expeditious, and secret in their resolutions, than 'tis possible for the latter.

THE chief alterations that could be made on the BRITISH government, in order to bring it to the most perfect model of limited monarchy, seem to be the following. *First*, The plan of the republican parliament ought to be restored, by making the representation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county-elections who possess not a property of 200 pounds value. *Secondly*, As such a house of Commons would be too weighty for a frail house of Lords, like

like the present, the Bishops and Scotch Peers ought to be removed, whose behaviour, in *former parliaments*, destroyed entirely the authority of that house: The number of the upper house ought to be raised to three or four hundred: Their seats not hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own members; and no commoner should be allowed to refuse a seat that was offered him. By this means, the house of Lords would consist entirely of the men of chief credit, ability, and interest of the nation; and every turbulent leader in the house of Commons might be taken off, and connected in interest with the house of Peers. Such an aristocracy would be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy and against it. At present, the balance of our government depends in some measure on the ability and behaviour of the sovereign; which are variable and uncertain circumstances.

I ALLOW, that this plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, is still liable to three great inconveniencies. *First*, It removes not entirely, tho' it may soften, the parties of *court* and *country*. *Secondly*, The King's personal character must still have a great influence on the government. *Thirdly*, The sword is in the hands of a single person, who will always neglect to discipline the militia, in order to have a pretext for keeping up a standing army. 'Tis evident, that this is a mortal distemper in the BRITISH government,

ment, of which it must at last inevitably perish. I must, however, confess, that SWEDEN seems, in some measure, to have remedied this inconvenience, and to have a militia, with its limited monarchy, as well as a standing army, which is less dangerous than the BRITISH.

WE shall conclude this subject, with observing the falsehood of the common opinion, that no large state, such as FRANCE or BRITAIN, could ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form of government can only take place in a city or small territory. The contrary seems evident. Tho' 'tis more difficult to form a republican government in an extensive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady and uniform, without tumult and faction. 'Tis not easy, for the distant parts of a large state to combine in any plan of free government; but they easily conspire in the esteem and reverence for a single person, who, by means of this popular favour, may seize the power, and forcing the more obstinate to submit, may establish a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the same notions of government, the natural equality of property favours liberty, and the nearness of habitation enables the citizens mutually to assist each other. Even under absolute princes, the subordinate government of cities is commonly republican; while that of coun-

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ties and provinces is monarchical. But these same circumstances, which facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their constitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies are turbulent. For however the people may be separated or divided into small parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation, in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very sensible. Aristocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were most admired by antient writers; but they are jealous and oppressive. In a large government, which is modelled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrates, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that 'tis very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public interest.

'Tis needless to inquire, whether such a government would be immortal. I allow the justness of the poet's exclamation on the endless projects of human race, *Man and for ever!* The world itself probably is not immortal. Such consuming plagues may arise as would leave even a perfect government a weak prey to its neighbours. We know not to what lengths  
enthusiasm,

enthusiasm, or other extraordinary motions of the human mind, may transport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where difference of interest is removed, whimsical and unaccountable factions often arise, from personal favour or enmity. Perhaps rust may grow to the springs of the most accurate political machine, and disorder its motions. Lastly, extensive conquests, when pursued, must be the ruin of every free government ; and of the more perfect governments sooner than of the imperfect ; because of the very advantages which the former possess above the latter. And tho' such a state ought to establish a fundamental law against conquests ; yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and present interest makes men forgetful of their posterity. 'Tis a sufficient incitement to human endeavours, that such a government would flourish for many ages ; without pretending to bestow on any work of man, that immortality, which the Almighty seems to have refused to his own productions.

END of the SECOND VOLUME.



1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

6. The following are the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various positions in the organization of the American Society of Civil Engineers:

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1601 UV-Visible Spectrophotometer.





